One hundred years
ago yesterday, plus three, the right-socialists who had associated themselves
with Prime Minister Kerensky’s directory convened a national “Democratic Conference”
of the soviets. They hoped to recover what they were losing in the local Petrograd
Soviet, which earlier that week had voted to confirm the Bolshevik resolution
calling for a government of the soviets, that is, not of Kerensky, the
bourgeois-liberal Cadets, and the right-socialist compromisers.
As you can see, Mr. Marx is well read in the theory of revolutions. You can also see that, between the two of us, he's the leftist. Now we are starting a new series to commemorate the Russian Revolution: 100 Years Ago Today, in Russia. See the right-hand column below to learn how the posts are organized.
Marx's Theory of Revolutions

Showing posts with label Compromiser. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Compromiser. Show all posts
Monday, September 28, 2020
Democratic Conference of the Soviets
Monday, August 3, 2020
Kerensky Resigns
One hundred years
ago today, plus three, Prime Minister Kerensky, possibly annoyed that the
right-socialist ministers in his cabinet were not willing to go as far right as
he in order to meet the demands of the bourgeois-liberal Cadets, resigned. It’s
also possible he was only trying to strengthen his hand against both left and
right, and thought resignation was the best way to do it.
Read about it here.
Or read the whole chapter on Kerensky’s
Government here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following
this link.
Friday, September 27, 2019
The Democratic Conference of Compromisers
One hundred years
ago today, plus two, the right-socialists, that is, socialist parties to the
right of the Bolsheviks (a.k.a. Compromisers), convened a Democratic Conference
to discuss what they ought to do about the Coalition Government. The Bolsheviks
read their recommendations into the record too.
Wednesday, November 29, 2017
July Days: The Manifestation
July 3 – June 20, 1917: Greetings to the
Armies. By a vote of 472 to 271, with 39 abstentions, the Petrograd Soviet
sends greetings to the Russian armies, some
of which were then engaged in the summer offensive. Though the vote may not
seem very close to us, Trotsky sees it as the sign of a shift favorable to the
Bolsheviks and their allies on the left.
July 4 – June 21, 1917: Mood of the
Garrison. A machine gun regiment in Petrograd resolves not to go to the
front unless “the war shall have a revolutionary character.” When threatened
with disbandment, they offered to disband the Provisional Government instead.
Another sign of a leftward shift among the masses.
On the same day,
the skilled workers at the large Putilov factory (36,000 workers in all)
struck. In Pravda, Lenin urged
restraint on the part of the soldiers and workers: “…an immediate attack would
be inexpedient.” The Bolshevik’s Military Organization also warned their Red
Guards against faked summonses to armed demonstration during this time.
July 5 – June 22, 1917: Bolshevik Counsels.
Representatives of 70 Petrograd factories meet with left Bolsheviks, who, in
spite of a worsening economy, continue to urge restraint. The Bolsheviks
believed the Coalition Government would only become weaker as the summer
offensive collapsed.
A number of ills
plagued the economy in Petrograd and throughout Russia: inflation, factory
closings, food shortages exacerbated by the disrepair of the railroads’ rolling
stock, and a destabilized ruble. The Coalition Government had been completely
unable to do anything, even to decide what to do. Counter-revolutionary
activity by the Cadet party, army officers, and Cossack organizations was in
evidence, probably aided by the banks and agents of Russia’s allies in the
Entente.
These were the
concrete conditions – less food, less work, rising prices – giving rise to the
revolutionary mood that was, in a matter of weeks, to produce the July Days.
An incident
occurred that reveals this mood. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd
Soviet sent a car bearing a placard with the slogan “Forward with Kerensky!”
into the Vyborg workers’ district. It was seized by the Moscow regiment, who tore
up the placard and gave the car to the Machine Gun regiment.
July 6 – June 23, 1917: High Point of the
Offensive. The capital receives reports that elements of the Second Russian
Army had captured the first lines of German trenches in their front. Patriots
in the capital were delighted, but the troops had already stopped where they
were and begun deserting instead of continuing the advance.
Meanwhile
elections in the Baranovsky factory sent three Bolsheviks to the Petrograd
Soviet, replacing Social Revolutionaries. And Kronstadt anarchists demanded the
release of prisoners being held in the Peter and Paul Fortress.
July 7 – June 24, 1917: Factory Closings.
Izvestia, the official organ of the
Petrograd Soviet, reports a plan for more factory closings.
On the same day,
the Vyborg Soviet adopted a resolution condemning the summer offensive as an
“adventure of the Provisional Government” on behalf of “old robber treaties”
with Russia’s partners in the Entente. The soviet held the Mensheviks and
Social Revolutionaries equally responsible.
Meanwhile the
Congress of Soviets adjourned without taking any further action against the
Bolsheviks, or, for that matter, against the Coalition Government. At some point during the Congress, the delegates named a
Central Executive Committee and gave it formal authority over all the other
soviets created after the February Revolution. Up to then, the Executive
Committee of the Petrograd Soviet had exercised this authority informally.
July 9 – June 26, 1917: Protest from the Front.
The Grenadier Guards regiment at the front sends a delegation to the Petrograd
garrison to denounce the summer offensive and warn the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets about joining with the bourgeoisie. Other units,
including sailors of the Helsinki fleet, the 2nd Machine Gun
regiment, and the 3rd Infantry regiment also took steps in support
of the revolution during this time.
July 11 – June 28, 1917: Lenin in Finland.
Trotsky says Lenin is ill and recovering in Finland on this day. It’s my
impression that, given his prescience about the mood of the revolution (and the
coming July Days), Lenin may possibly have been ill, but he was certainly in
Finland. He editorialized daily, sometimes twice daily, in Pravda during this time.
July 13 – June 30, 1917: Zemsky Nachalniks.
The Coalition Government dismisses the zemsky nachalniks, officials over the
agricultural villages drawn from petit bourgeois landowners. Since Alexander
III had created the office in the late 19th century, they had
exercised administrative and judicial powers over the peasantry to the
exclusion of local councils and even the aristocracy.
The zemsky
nachalniks were feared and despised by the peasantry. But Trotsky views the
government’s action as a “belated partial reform”; it was certainly no
substitute for a genuine agrarian policy.
July 14 – July 1, 1917: Mensheviks Heckled.
At a meeting of the Grenadier Guards regiment, the soldiers heckle Menshevik
speakers and arrest the president of the regimental committee.
Meanwhile the
All-Russian Congress of Landed Proprietors convened in Moscow, signaling
renewed resistance among aristocratic and other large landowners to the
Coalition Government’s (feeble) attempts at land reform, and to attempts by the
peasantry to take matters into their own hands.
July 15 – July 2, 1917: Cadets Resign Their
Ministries. The four ministers representing the Constitutional Democrats
(Cadets) in the Coalition Government resign en
masse. The Cadets had been the voice of the bourgeoisie in the government,
led by former Minister of War Miliukov, whom Kerensky replaced in May.
The resignations
became the signal for the July Days. Trotsky analyzes the Cadet political
strategy as follows. The pretext for the resignations was an agreement the
Coalition Government struck with the Ukraine; it did not accommodate the
imperial ambitions of the bourgeoisie sufficiently well. The timing coincided
with the failure of the summer offensive, known to the well-informed in the
capital if not to the public generally. Thus the right-socialists remaining in
the government would have to face the fallout of the failure, including the
protests of the revolutionary masses, alone. If the government (a “coalition”
now of only right-socialist parties) had to put down the anticipated
demonstrations by force, an opening might develop for weakening the Soviet side
of the dual government. So Miliukov may have thought. And things did start to
work out along these lines.
Meanwhile,
Trotsky and Lunacharsky addressed the Machine Gun regiment on the occasion of
the departure of one of their companies to the front as replacements. This was
the regiment that, after the June Demonstration, had resolved not to send out
replacements unless the war “…shall have a revolutionary character.” They now
declared this company the “last” replacement company they would agree to send.
The regiment proved to be an open flame amid the combustibles of the July Days.
Also on this day,
on the occasion of a conference of the Trotskyites, Pravda printed a statement on their behalf, saying that there were
“no differences either in principle or tactics” between them and the
Bolsheviks.
July 16 – July 3, 1917: July Days: The
Vanguard. The Machine Gun regiment meets and sacks the leadership of its
soldiers’ committee. The soldiers wanted the question of demonstrations
immediately put before the meeting. An anarchist spoke, urging them to take to
the streets of Petrograd in arms. The new committee chairman, a Bolshevik,
wanted to ask the advice of the Bolshevik Military Organization
The head of that
organization, Nevsky, was responsible for Bolshevik ties to party elements in
the garrison, as well as armed Red Guards units among the workers. Dispatched
at length to the meeting, Nevsky preached the party line: restraint – wait
until the summer offensive collapses as expected.
But by 3:00 p.m.,
the regiment had voted for armed demonstrations. They began sending envoys to
the workers and to other military formations, including the Kronstadt naval
fortress, seeking support.
The Machine Gun
regiment was truly the vanguard of the revolutionary soldiery, in ideology, in
agitation for the July Days, and as it proved, in the coming march.
Additional posts
follow, focusing on different organizations and institutions, to show their
actions, reactions, and role in the events of the day. They’re arranged so the
end of the day appears last.
Also on this day,
but not in connection with these events, the Provisional Government reached a
preliminary agreement with the Ukrainian Rada (parliament) on the question of
national independence. But the agreement fell apart within a month.
July 16 – July 3, 1917: July Days: The
Central Committee. When the envoys of the Machine Gun regiment arrived at
Bolshevik headquarters in the former palace of the ballerina Kshesinskaia that
afternoon, the Central Committee could not immediately decide whether the
regiment’s armed manifestation was a threat or an opportunity. The party had
been calling for restraint, saying that the press of events would offer a
better time for action of this kind. The reaction would be weaker if the
government were weaker.
On the other hand
was the opportunity. Tomsky expounded what Lenin, who was absent in Finland,
might have thought, “It is impossible to talk of a manifestation at this moment
unless we want a new revolution.” That is, a proletarian revolution to overthrow the bourgeois-liberal
Provisional Government. But the risks of premature action appeared too great.
Volodarsky told the regimental envoys that the machine gunners “must submit to
the decisions of the party”; they were sent back to the regiment. An appeal for
restraint was prepared for front page of Pravda
the next morning.
The meeting broke
up at about 4:00 p.m. and those attending dispersed to the workers’
neighborhoods and the factories with the same message. Stalin was dispatched to
the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviet with the news. He remained the party’s
liaison with the Executive Committee throughout the July Days.
July 16 – July 3, 1917: July Days: The
Factories. Envoys of the Machine Gun regiment arrived that afternoon at the
Putilov factory, one of Petrograd’s largest, bearing the message of the armed
manifestation. They told the workers that the regiment had decided not to send
anyone to the front, but to take to the streets instead. The secretary of the
factory committee was a Bolshevik, but he was unable to persuade the assembled
workers, some 10,000, to send to the Central Committee for guidance.
Representatives of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets had no better
success.
At about 6:00
p.m., the meeting got word that the Vyborg workers were already on the march to
the headquarters of the Soviet in the Tauride Palace. This decided the matter.
In fact, the same result was reached virtually everywhere. The Renaud factory,
for example, provided trucks to the machine gunners at their request. The Red
Guards contingents in the factories took up arms.
July 16 – July 3, 1917: July Days: The
Manifestation. By 7:00 p.m., the main street on the Vyborg side of the
river was packed with demonstrators. The Machine Gun regiment took the lead,
followed by the workers, with the Moscow regiment bringing up the rear. As
these marchers were the militants, not the mere sympathizers, Trotsky says,
they did not reach the numbers of the June Demonstration. But as many as 500,000
workers and soldiers may have participated, including all or part of seven
other regiments of the garrison.
The Bolshevik
headquarters was the first stop. There Nevsky and others again urged the
soldiers and Red Guards to go home, again without success. Seeing the policy of
restraints had been a failure, party leaders on the scene, including members of
the Central Committee, decided instead to, Trotsky says, “guide the developing
movement” along peaceful and politically advantageous lines.
Hearing the
decision, the marchers sang the Marseillaise. The party prepared a list of
demands for submission to the Petrograd Soviet at the Tauride Palace, next and
final stop on the march. Some of the machine gunners crossed the canal to the
Peter and Paul fortress, in the river opposite Bolshevik headquarters,
intending to bring the garrison and its artillery over to the side of the
demonstrators.
The principal
demand adopted by the marchers and now articulated by the Bolsheviks was for
the Central Executive Committee to end the dual government by taking power into
its own hands: All Power to the Soviets! The sequel proved ironic.
July 16 – July 3, 1917: July Days: The
Central Executive Committee. As the banners of the marchers in Nevsky
Prospect approach the Tauride Palace, meetings of the two sections of the
Central Executive Committee of the Soviets are already in session.
The committee had
had news of the Machine Gun regiment’s plans earlier in the day. Kamenev and
the other Bolsheviks present offered to go to the regiment and ask for
restraint. But the Executive Committee preferred to issue a proclamation declaring
demonstrations to be treachery to the revolution. Meanwhile Tseretilli gave the
joint session his ideas for addressing the cabinet crisis brought on by the
resignation of the Cadet ministers the day before.
Realizing a
proclamation might not be enough to stop the what they were calling the
“insurrection,” the Compromisers (i.e., Trotsky’s name for those in the Soviet
who sought accommodation with the Provisional Government and by extension the
bourgeoisie) cast about for the armed protection of troops. Not finding any of
the garrison who were then willing to take their side, they sent to the Fifth
Army, nearest Petrograd at the front. By evening, scarcely a hundred had been
found by the Menshevik assigned this task. Trotsky remarks more than once on
the irony of this effort: The Soviet answering the demonstrators’ demand that
it seize the power, by recruiting troops to suppress the demonstrators rather
than the Provisional Government.
The workers’ and
soldiers’ section of the Central Executive had gone back into session. Recent
elections had given the Bolsheviks a majority in that section, or so the
right-socialists feared. Zinoviev was giving a speech against the Compromisers
when the marchers reached the palace. In response, Kamenev proposed selecting a
commission of 25 members to lead the demonstration; Trotsky seconded. Seeing
the tendency of the debate that followed, the Mensheviks and Social
Revolutionaries walked out of the meeting. The Bolsheviks and Trotskyites who
remained passed a resolution calling on the Central Executive to take power,
and named fifteen members to the leadership committee, leaving ten places open
in case the right-socialists should have second thoughts.
Meanwhile,
Cheidze, Menshevik president of the Soviet, confronted the crowd outside the
palace. When he faltered, Voitinsky took his place, but was also met with
silence. Trotsky fared better when his turn came, but he stopped short of
advocating insurrection (as his enemies were later to claim).
Events did not
stop unfolding at midnight.
Overnight, July 16-17 – July 3-4, 1917: The
Putilov Factory Marches. The march of the Putilov workers, their wives and
children, begins before midnight.
But by then,
after shouting, pushing and shoving, and struggles over the banners of the
soldiers and workers, gunfire had broken out on Nevsky Prospect. We know the
demonstrators were armed; so were their enemies in that bourgeois neighborhood.
The Grenadier Guards regiment returned a volley when shots were fired at them,
possibly by right-wing Cavaliers of St. George or officers crippled in the war,
possibly by provocateurs. Panic ensued; dead and wounded lay in the street.
Meanwhile the
Petrograd Soviet reconvened in joint session. The Menshevik Dan offered a
resolution inviting anyone who would not be able to support the decision of the
committee to leave the meeting beforehand. It was dropped when the Bolsheviks
appeared. The delegation from the demonstrators demanded to be heard, but was
ignored. Little was accomplished except the airing of accusations. A member of
the Jewish Bund accused the Bolsheviks of conspiracy; Tseretilli accused the
demonstrators of aiding the counter-revolution. The meeting adjourned at 5:00
a.m., needless to say without taking any concrete action on any of the
demonstrators’ demands, much less to seize the state power.
The Bolsheviks
and Trotskyites also met late into the night, debating again the question
whether to hold back the demonstration or lead it, and deciding for the latter.
Then Zinoviev was called to the telephone. News from Kronstadt came that the
sailors would march to the aid of the demonstrators that morning. Social
Revolutionaries among the sailors, and even the commissar appointed by the
Provisional Government, had voted to join the march when they’d learned the
Bolsheviks were leading it.
By 3:00 a.m.,
after first encountering obstruction and gunfire, the Putilov workers and
family members, joined on the march by workers of other factories and now some
80,000 strong, reached the Tauride Palace. The Central Executive agreed to
receive their representatives, while the wearied marchers lay on the grounds of
the palace, wondering about the next day, sure only that they would be too
tired to go to work.
July 17 – July 4, 1917: The Manifestation
Continues. Despite the appearance of Prava
the next morning with a blank sheet for a front page, the manifestation of the
July Days continues, now bearing every sign of Bolshevik guidance and
organization. In fact, that is the reason for the problem with Pravda: an article composed the previous
afternoon calling for restraint had to be withdrawn when the Bolsheviks,
confronted with a fait accompli,
decided to lead the demonstrations instead. A separate leaflet announced the
latter.
The second day of
the manifestation belonged more to the workers than the soldiers. Since the
February Revolution, communications between the factory committees, the
workers’ districts, and the militant units in the garrison had improved. This
was in evidence in the run-up to the day’s march. At the direction of the
Bolshevik Military Organization, armored cars were dispatched to cover the
bridges and principal street crossings. The Machine Gun regiment still manned
the Peter and Paul fortress in the river.
The demonstrators
began to assemble at about 11:00 a.m., workers at the head of the march.
Factories struck and held meetings instead of working. Those whose workers had
held back on the first day, even if their factory committees were dominated by
Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, joined the march. Trotsky says the
second day of the manifestation was “more impressive and organized” under “the
guiding hand of the party.”
Neighboring
garrisons also sent troops to join or protect the march as necessary –
significantly, the Kronstadt sailors. Even the Social Revolutionaries in their
ranks, and the commissar or the Provisional government himself, had voted to
join the march. Ten thousand sailors disembarked on the banks of the Neva River
at about noon, and presently appeared at Bolshevik headquarters in the palace
formerly of the ballerina. There, addressed by Lunacharsky, they shouted for a
speech from Lenin. “By the way,” Trotsky says, Lenin happened to be in town,
returned from his sickbed in Finland. Apparently still not quite well, but well
enough to speak briefly, he reminded the marchers of the meaning of the slogans
on their banners.
The leadership of
the left contingent of the Social Revolutionaries who’d joined the march
objected to the prominence of a banner bearing the standard of the Bolshevik
Central Committee. The rank and file not sharing the objection, the march
continued with the banner in place.
Kerensky’s Government
July 20 – July 7, 1917: Kerensky Prime
Minister. The Provisional Government takes steps to resolve the cabinet
crisis precipitated by the resignation of the bourgeois-liberal Cadet ministers
on July 15 – July 2. Some of the ministries that had belonged to the Cadets
were given to right-socialist members of the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets. The Menshevik Tseretilli, for example, was made Minister of the
Interior; this put him in charge of what to do about the Bolsheviks.
Kerensky was
rewarded, for his efforts if not his results, by being made Prime Minister. He
also retained the Ministries of War and the Marine. The reshuffled cabinet
(Trotsky designates it a “transitional government”) launched two lines of
policy: the right-socialist Compromisers, in the absence of the Cadets, wanted
to enact whatever parts of the program of the recent Soviet Congress they
could; Kerensky sought to gratify his friends further to the right by breaking
up centers of Bolshevik influence.
Meanwhile, a
decree subjecting Lenin to arrest had already been issued. Likewise Zinoviev. According
to Deutscher, Stalin’s biographer, Stalin took the leading role in the ensuing
intrigue. Lenin, says Deutscher, thought perhaps he should turn himself in, to
do otherwise would be considered an admission of guilt. Stalin pointed out to
him the risks of putting himself in the hands of the Provisional Government.
Stalin brought the matter to the Executive Committee, but found they were
unable to guarantee Lenin’s safety. Instead Lenin took refuge in the home of
the workman Alliluyev for a few days. There Stalin served as barber, removing
Lenin’s characteristic beard and moustache. A few days later Alliluyev and
Stalin guided Lenin to a suburban train station, whence he travelled undercover
to suburban villages and eventually to Finland. Alliluyev later became Stalin’s
father in law.
Trotsky omits
this, saying instead that from his hiding place, Lenin sent to the Inquiry
Commission of the Soviet to ask for a meeting. Lenin and Zinoviev waited all
day at the agreed place, but the Soviet’s representatives never appeared.
July 20-21 – July 7-8, 1917: War News from
Tarnopol. News of the successful German counterattack at Tarnopol comes to
Petrograd. Beginning the next day, the right-wing “patriotic” press printed
everything it could find out about the attack, including the designations and
positions of the Russian units involved – a serious breach of military secrecy.
Not satisfied with this, the press began to exaggerate the disaster, the better
to shift the blame from the Provisional Government to the Bolsheviks.
On July 20 – July
7, the summer offensive on the Western Front began, too late to save the
Southwestern Front. On July 21 – July 8, the summer offensive on the Northern
Front began, without changing that result. That same day, General Kornilov,
commander of the Southwestern Front, gave orders to fire at retreating troops.
Beginning July 21 – July 8, 1917:
Transitional Government in Action. Once formed, the transitional government
pursue two lines of action. As Trotsky does not give dates for some of their
actions, I’ve simply made the lists that follow.
Actions to
suppress Bolshevik influence:
·
Breaking up the militant formations of the
Petrograd garrison, including the Machine Gun regiment. It seemed like a good
idea, but many among the tens of thousands of troops sent to the front as
replacements were Bolsheviks advanced in party discipline and theory. They
proved to be influential.
·
Outlawing processions in the streets and
disarming the workers
·
Ordering the Kronstadt garrison to turn over
Midshipman Raskolnikov and other leaders of the July Days
·
Arresting Bolshevik and left-Social
Revolutionary leaders in the Baltic Fleet
Actions to
realize the program of the Soviet Congress:
·
On July 21 – July 8, issuing a declaration
concerning, as Trotsky says, “a collection of democratic commonplaces”
July 22 – July 9, 1917: The Government of
Salvation. The Menshevik Dan, citing fears of a counter-revolutionary
military dictatorship, offers a three-part resolution in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets:
·
That the revolution is in danger.
·
That the Provisional Government is the
“Salvation of the Revolution.”
·
That therefore this government should have
“unlimited powers.”
It passed the Central
Executive unanimously with only the Bolsheviks abstaining.
On this day, the
summer offensive on the Rumanian Front began. Rumanian troops supported the
Russian 4th Army in the attack, which had to be thrown back by a
force of mixed nationalities commanded by the German General Mackensen.
Meanwhile, the German counterattack on the Southwestern Front was already a
“catastrophe” for the Russian 11th Army, according to its
commissars. Its commander, General Kornilov, gave orders to shoot retreating
troops.
July 23 – July 10, 1917: A Visit from the
Junkers. The offices of the Menshevik party receive the same treatment
(from the same people) that the Bolsheviks suffered a
few days before.
July 24 – July 11, 1917: Lenin Spirited
Away. Lenin, shorn of his beard and moustache, is escorted by Stalin and
the workman Allilulev to a suburban train station, whence he eventually makes
his way to Finland.
It became
Stalin’s job to maintain liaison with Lenin while he was in hiding.
July 25 – July 12, 1917: Decrees of the
Provisional Government. The right- and left-leaning factions in the
Provisional Government both gain legislative victories on this day. To please
his generals, Kerensky put through a decree restoring the death penalty at the
front. The left, still fumbling to formulate an agrarian policy, managed to put
through a half-hearted measure limiting the sales of land. It pleased no-one.
Kerensky also
removed General Polotsev from command of the Petrograd garrison at about this
time, giving one explanation to the left in the Provisional Government and
another to his friends on the right.
July 26 – July 13, 1917: Bolsheviks
Unseated. The Menshevik Dan carries a resolution in the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets providing, “Any person indicted by the courts is
deprived of membership in the Executive Committee until sentence is
pronounced.” This of course would apply only to Bolsheviks, and specifically to
Lenin and Zinoviev. Kerensky took this opportunity to shut down the Bolshevik
press, which had resurfaced after the smashing of Pravda’s printing presses at the end of the July Days.
The Bolshevik
press no longer existing, Trotsky prevailed on the author Maxim Gorky’s paper
to print an open letter to the government. He said the decree under which Lenin
and others were subject to arrest applied with equal force to himself. We’ll
see the result in the sequel.
Week of July 26 – July 13, 1917: The State
Duma is Heard From. At about this time, the Provisional Committee of the
State Duma passes a resolution denouncing the “Government of Salvation.” The
State Duma was an institutional relic of tsarism; though it had been
democratically elected, it had no official role in the dual government.
Nevertheless the resolution was enough to bring the cabinet down. All the
ministers handed in their portfolios to Kerensky, who now became the sole focal
point of the government.
Kerensky
apparently suffered the ministers to continue in their posts for the time
being, but took advantage of the situation to negotiate with the Cadets for the
formation of a new governing coalition. The Cadets, guided by Miliukov, laid
down four conditions in their opening position:
·
Ministers responsible only “to their own
conscience”
·
Unity with the Entente
·
Discipline in the armies
·
Social reforms to be decided by the Constituent
Assembly, that is, only after it had been convened
While this was
going on, the right-socialist Ministers Tseretilli, of Interior, and
Peshekhonov, of Food Supply, took action, or at any rate made pronouncements,
designed to protect landlords from the peasants who wanted their lands.
Chernov, the Social Revolutionary Minister of Agriculture, resigned when
accusations of German contacts shifted to him.
July 29 – July 16, 1917: Kerensky to the
Front. Kerensky, now Prime Minister as well as War Minister, returns to the
front to confer with his generals. Commander-in-Chief General Brussilov
reported the “complete failure” of the offensive. On the bright side, some
90,000 replacements were expected at the front once the militant formations of
the Petrograd garrison were disbanded.
Former
Commander-in-Chief Alexiev wanted to abolish the soldiers’ committees elected
by enlisted troops (to the exclusion of officers) at the company and regimental
levels. These committees had made important contributions representing the
peasants (most enlisted men in the Russian armies came from the peasantry) in
the soviets. In this connection, Brussilov, oddly, claimed that officers are
“real proletarians.”
General Kornilov,
a Cossack by birth, was not present, as the German advance against his command
on the Southwestern Front continued. But before returning to Petrograd, Prime
Minister Kerensky sacked General Brussilov and appointed General Kornilov
commander-in-chief. Kornilov put conditions on his acceptance of the
appointment:
·
Responsibility only to “his own conscience and
the people”
·
Power to appoint senior commanders
·
Restoration of the death penalty in the rear. It
had already been restored “at the front,” over soldiers in direct contact with
the enemy.
The condition
about responsibility troubled Kerensky; it made no mention of responsibility to
the government. Finding he couldn’t fire Kornilov, Kerensky extracted an oral
statement to the effect that by “the people,” the general meant the
“Provisional Government.”
July 31 – July 18, 1917: Cadet Demands.
Prime Minister Kerensky accedes to the conditions
the Cadets imposed on their participation in a new coalition government. But
then the Cadets made a new one: The government’s declaration of July 21 – July
8 (“democratic commonplaces” according to Trotsky) was unacceptable to them,
and they walked away from the negotiation.
Also on this day,
the socialist-majority Provisional Government issued a decree dissolving the
Finnish Seim (i.e., their parliament), in which left-socialists dominated. They
also issued a threat to punish railroad workers for irregularities in the
operation of the railroads. Further, to commemorate the third anniversary of
the start of the war, the ministers sent a nice note to Russia’s allies in the
Entente, mentioning how the government had just put down an insurrection caused
by German intrigues. All these actions revealed the weakness of the
right-socialist Compromisers in the government during a time when the counter-revolution
was gaining strength.
August 3 – July 21, 1917: Kerensky Resigns.
Aware that he occupied an “indispensable” position between the
right-socialist Compromisers and the bourgeois-liberal Cadets, but impatient
with the negotiations, Kerensky resigns as Prime Minister and leaves Petrograd.
For the second time, the right-socialist ministers remaining in the government
turned in their portfolios. They hoped
Kerensky would agree, if given unlimited discretion, to return as Prime
Minister. The Cadets felt they needed Kerensky too, and proved to be agreeable
to this solution.
August 6 – July 24, 1917: Second Coalition
Formed. After an all-night debate, the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets agrees to give Kerensky “unconditional and unlimited” powers. For their
part, the Cadets agreed they too would join the government. Kerensky used the
powers thus granted to appoint a ministry, the Second Coalition Government, to
suit himself alone and without further negotiation.
Though the
majority of ministers were Menshevik or Social Revolutionary, the ministry was
dominated by Kerensky and his bourgeois friends. Chernov, the Social
Revolutionary who had resigned a few days earlier after being accused of
contacts with the Germans, was reappointed Minister of Agriculture.
One of Kerensky’s
first acts was to arrest Trotsky and Lunacharsky. Trotsky had publicly
declared this was the logical thing for the Provisional Government to do
(with respect to himself), as he was as “implacable an enemy” to the government
as Lenin or the other Bolsheviks who had been indicted after the July Days.
August 8 – July 26, 1917: Sixth Congress of
the Bolshevik Party Convenes. The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party assembles its Sixth Congress in
Petrograd “semi-legally,” as Trotsky says. The Central Committee elected
by this Congress later voted for the armed insurrection now known as the
October Revolution.
About the first
thing the Congress did was pass unanimously a resolution that Lenin and the
other Bolsheviks who had been indicted should not turn themselves in. Stalin
had argued they should, but only “If,
however, power is wielded by an authority which can safeguard our comrades
against violence and is fair-dealing at least to some extent ....” But no-one
believed these conditions would ever be met. Lenin himself was still in hiding,
so the Congress named him “honorary” chairman instead.
The report on party organization revealed
membership had tripled, to 240,000, in the previous three months.
The main business of the Congress was to rethink
the party’s program in light of the July Days and other recent events. For
example, since the Compromisers had led the Petrograd Soviet into complicity
with the counter-revolutionary tendencies of the Kerensky ministry, the
Bolsheviks dropped the slogan “All Power to the Soviets!” The Congress also
adopted a resolution identifying the conditions under which an insurrection
would be the correct response. Lenin’s underground writings, and communications
through a secret liaison, usually Stalin, contributed
to the result.
The Inter-District Organization of United
Social-Democrats or Mezhraiontsy
(sometimes translated “Interdistrictites,” though I have been calling them
“Trotskyites” after their most prominent member) joined the Bolshevik party
while the Congress sat. The Mezhraiontsy
had at last dropped their project of union between the Bolsheviks and the
Mensheviks; the latter were now deeply involved with the Compromisers. Among
the prominent social democrats who then became Bolsheviks were (the
links lead to Wikipedia) Leon Trotsky, Adolf Joffe, Anatoly
Lunacharsky, Moisei Uritsky, David Riazanov, V. Volodarsky, Lev Karakhan, Dmitry Manuilsky, and Sergey Ezhov (Tsederbaum).
Early August (old style) also saw the convocation
of the bourgeois-aligned Congress and Trade and Industry and Congress of
Provincial Commissars. The latter consisted mainly of Cadets, while the opening
speaker at the former happened indiscreetly to mention the “bony hand of
hunger” in a tirade against taxes on commerce. As this was a not very thinly
veiled threat of factory lock-outs, Trotsky says, the phrase “entered...into
the political dictionary of the revolution,” and eventually “cost the
capitalists dear.”
August 9 – July 27, 1917: Bolshevik Influence. Volodarsky reports to the Bolshevik Congress that
the party has “colossal…unlimited influence” in the factories. As the power of
the Central Executive Committee atrophied under the Compromisers, this was to
become a valuable resource in the October Revolution.
Early August – End of July, 1917: State Conference Hatched. At about the end of July (old style), the
Provisional Government announces it will hold a State Conference in Moscow some
two weeks hence. As we’ll see, the event was managed to suit Kerensky’s
theatrical sense of politics and his role in it.
Mid-August – Early August, 1917: The State and Revolution. Lenin drafts the preface to The State and Revolution while in exile in Finland. It seems as
though someone sent him the manuscript – he had left it behind in Switzerland
the previous March – via Stockholm. When he got it in July, he wrote Kamenev: “Entre nous. If they bump me off, I ask
you to publish my little note-book….” It was not published until after the October
Revolution.
Proscription and exile gave him a chance to
substantially complete the book. It was meant to help the proletariat
understand its coming role in the revolutionary state, leading to the withering
away of the state entirely.
August 16 – August 3, 1917. The Congress
Elects the Central Committee. Last on the agenda of the Sixth Congress of
the R.S.D.L.P. is the election of the party’s Central Committee. Lenin was made
chairman; Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev were members. Two former Mezhraiontsys
also sat on the committee, Trotsky for foreign affairs and Uritsky for interior
affairs.
Only one vote out of 134 was cast against Lenin. This (seemingly the
same) individual was joined by one or two others in voting against Zinoviev,
Kamenev, and Trotsky.
August 17 – August 4, 1917: The Narrow
Composition. The “narrow composition” selected by the Bolshevik Central
Committee takes office. It was apparently an executive committee that included
only those members of the Central Committee who were not in hiding (Lenin,
Zinoviev) or in prison (Trotsky). It was dissolved October 23 -October 10
before the October Revolution began.
August 19 – August 6, 1917: The
Counter-Revolution Mobilizes. The Union of the Twelve Cossack Armies passes
a resolution against removing Kornilov from command. The League of Cavaliers of
St. George passed a similar resolution during this time, one that included the
threat of union with the Cossacks.
On the same day a
letter appeared in the party paper of the Social Revolutionaries detailing the
insults and abuses, including arbitrary executions, of the junkers (army
officers drawn from the rural aristocracy and military preparatory academies)
at and behind the front. All three incidents reflect the mobilization of the
military forces of the counter-revolution.
Meanwhile the
narrow composition of the Bolshevik Central Committee selected the party’s
Secretariat from its membership. And before the Central Executive Committee of
the Soviets, Kamenev advocated attendance at the Stockholm Conference. But the
previous April, considering it an instrument of imperialism and not internationalism, the Bolshevik
party conference had voted against participation. Though Kamenev stated he was
speaking only for himself, this was nevertheless considered a breach of party
discipline. Lenin’s
response came from exile in Finland about ten days later, strongly
insisting that Kamenev had no right to speak for himself and in contradiction
to the party’s democratically determined position.
August 20 – August 7, 1917: Black Hundreds
Freed. The Provisional Government frees members of the Black Hundreds,
right-wing nationalist and tsarist (not to mention anti-Semitic) organizations
outlawed by the February Revolution. These organizations, established during
the Revolution of 1905 for the support of the tsar, had since been in decline.
Releasing them constituted another step towards mobilizing the forces of the
counter-revolution.
At about this
time, the government postponed the convocation of the promised Constituent
Assembly – again – this time
to November 28 (old style). They also sent the tsar and his family to Tobolsk
in the Urals, well out of the way of a tsarist counter-revolution.
Wednesday, November 8, 2017
November 8 – October 26, 1917: A New Day
The morning
papers draw a blank on the events of the previous thirty-six hours. They
reported the taking of the Winter Palace and arrest of the ministry, but
weren’t sure what that meant or what kind of difference it would make. By
orders from Smolny, the streets, tramcars, shops, and restaurants opened and
functioned normally. So people went out or went to work and shared the rumors they’d
heard or speculations they’d made up. Trotsky
says “…the seismograph of the Stock Exchange describes a convulsive curve.”
Apparently he means stocks fell – at least they could still make trades.
The American
journalist Reed picked up whatever papers he could find through the course of
the day. Reed’s clippings from the compromisist papers predicted the failure of
the Bolshevik revolution, denounced the party program – peace, land, and bread
– as lies and false promises, and condemned the Congress of Soviets as illegal
and without authority. Trotsky says some of the bourgeois and compromisist
press were reviving the old slander of the German connection. Reed observes
that the few Cadet papers to be found took a “detached, ironical” attitude. A
few of the more destructive papers were suppressed.
So not everything
was new that day. But the Bolshevik paper, lately published under title of Rabochy Put, now reappeared as Pravda.
Follow this link
to the next post, which is out of the regular sequence.
Tuesday, October 31, 2017
October 31 – October 18, 1917: Deadlocks in the Pre-Parliament and in the Baltic
After three days of
debate, neither the right-socialist Compomisers nor the bourgeois Cadets can
pass a resolution on reforming the army and continuing the war. The votes were
symptomatic of general paralysis in the Pre-Parliament on every issue it
attempted to address. The American journalist Reed heard the Cadet Miliukov
give a speech denouncing Skobelov’s
instructions. But this decision had already been taken over Cadet
objections.
At about this
time, Kerensky renewed his dispute with the Baltic Fleet and the soviets of
Finland. The sailors sent a delegation to the Central Executive Committee
demanding removal of “a person who is disgracing…the revolution with his
shameless political chantage.” By this they meant Kerensky. The Regional
Committee of the Finnish Soviets, taking sovereign powers, held up some of the
government’s freight. Kerensky’s response, threats of arrest, left the soviets unimpressed.
Trotsky observes
that the fleet and Finnish soviets were already in a state of insurrection;
they had assumed state functions and administered them independently of the
Provisional Government. In another connection Trotsky observes that the Finnish
garrison and Baltic Fleet had become a dependable reserve for an insurrection
of workers and soldiers in Petrograd.
Meanwhile, the
Petrograd Soviet held elections for its delegates to the Congress of Soviets.
The Bolshevik slate – Trotsky, Kamenev, Volodarsky, Yurenev, and Lashevich –
received well over 400 votes. Just over 200 votes were cast for candidates from
the compromisist parties.
Monday, October 30, 2017
October 30 – October 17, 1917: Congress Postponed
Today, three days
before the Congress of Soviets is to convene, the Central Executive Committee
puts it off by five days, until the 25th (November 7, new style). The
compromisist parties stepped up their efforts to recruit and elect delegates to
the workers’ and soldiers’ soviets, and prepared to summon a congress of
peasants’ soviets as a counterweight. But they were well not positioned to
benefit from the delay.
The Bolsheviks instead
gained the advantage. For example, the Semenovsky Regiment had the blood of
revolutionary workers in 1905 on its hands. It hung back from the rest of the
Petrograd garrison when they were declaring for the Bolshevik program. Yet at a
regimental meeting during this time, Trotsky was permitted to speak; the
representative of the Central Executive Committee, Skobelev, was not. In the
result, the regiment joined with the bulk of the garrison in alignment with the
Bolsheviks.
A rumor that the
Bolsheviks would “come out” that day proved to be untrue. So the rumor was put
off for a few days too.
Meanwhile,
Kamenev published a letter in Gorky’s paper declaring insurrection “an
inadmissible step.” Trotsky characterizes his reasoning as opportunism. The
action was also another breach of party discipline by Kamenev. Hearing of this,
Lenin composed a lengthy Letter to
Comrades, refuting the arguments Kamenev and others were using against
insurrection. The letter appeared in Rabochy Put the following day.
Saturday, October 28, 2017
October 28 – October 15, 1917: Reed’s Interviews at Smolny
The American journalist
Reed interviews Kamenev and Volodarsky in the halls of Smolny Institute. They
answered questions about the coming Congress of Soviets. Both of them spoke
conditionally; neither was sure the Congress would actually take place.
Kamenev said that
if it took place, the Congress would certainly represent the will of the
masses, and probably have a Bolshevik majority. Of course, this was his preferred
path for the transfer of power to the soviets.
Volodarsky said that
the Compromisers were trying to see that the Congress did not come off. So the
Bolsheviks “were realists enough not to depend on that!” But apparently he didn’t say, or Reed didn’t ask, what the
Bolsheviks would do in such a case.
Tuesday, October 24, 2017
August 9 – July 27, 1917: Bolshevik Influence
Volodarsky reports to the Bolshevik Congress that
the party has “colossal…unlimited influence” in the factories. As the power of
the Central Executive Committee atrophied under the Compromisers, this was to
become a valuable resource in the October Revolution.
This is a supplementary post. Follow the
link to the next
one in chronological order.
Sunday, October 22, 2017
October 22 – October 9, 1917: Military Revolutionary Committee
Reacting to the
German occupation of the Western Estonian Archipelago, the Compromisers in the
Petrograd Soviet move for the creation of a Committee of Revolutionary Defense
in the capital. The initial responsibility of the committee would be to decide
questions about transfers from the Petrograd garrison to the front, now nearer
to the capital than at any previous time in the war.
This solved a
political problem for the Bolsheviks. How could the Soviet, which they
controlled, refuse reinforcements from the garrison without appearing to have
betrayed the soldiers at the front? The motion by the Compromisers put the onus
of the decision on them.
The Compromisers
were nevertheless a little surprised when the Bolsheviks supported the motion.
A bit more parliamentary work would be required before the committee became a
reality. In the end, it became a formidable tool, Trotsky says the “chief
lever,” of the October Revolution.
At the same
meeting Trotsky gave his report on the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the
Pre-Parliament. He concluded, pretty unambiguously, “Long live the direct and
open struggle for revolutionary power!”
Tuesday, October 10, 2017
October 10 – September 27, 1917: Resolution in Reval
The soviets of
Reval (now Tallinn), the capital of Estonia and the next line of defense if the
Germans should decide to march on Petrograd, demand that the Pre-Parliament
disband and that a congress of soviets be called to form the government. This
was one of a number of similar resolutions in a battle of resolutions between
the Bolsheviks and the Compromisers on the Central Executive Committee.
On another front,
the resolution also demanded that the soviets must agree to troop transfers.
This policy would prevent, for example, the government from transferring troops
loyal to the revolution out of the Petrograd garrison. It was to become an
issue as the Bolsheviks prepared for insurrection. In theory, Trotsky observes,
the maintenance and deployment of armed forces is a fundamental right of the
state. But the policy the resolution advocates had been a feature of the dual
government
since the February Revolution. Now it was becoming a feature of
preparation for insurrection.
Friday, October 6, 2017
October 6 – September 23, 1917: Bolsheviks Will Not Attend
In a letter, Lenin
argues forcefully in favor
of a Bolshevik boycott of the Pre-Parliament. Not only would participation
send a mixed message to the party’s adherents about the goals of the party, it
would mean working in the wrong direction. The party should be working where it
has strength, in the soviets, factory committees, trade unions, soldiers
committees; not in a forum got up by the Compromisers and bourgeoisie to cover
up their weakness.
This view of the
matter gained acceptance within the party as the meeting of the Pre-Parliament
approached.
Wednesday, September 27, 2017
September 27 – September 14, 1917: Democratic Conference Convenes
Given their
failures in the Soviet, the Compromisers cast about for a means to recover lost
ground. After the Kornilov insurrection was defeated, they settled on a
“Democratic Conference,” which was to be packed in such a way as to prevent the
Bolsheviks from carrying their program.
For this purpose,
a new constituency was heard from: the Cooperators. Ostensibly representing the
peasantry, they in fact petit bourgeois administrators of agriculture who
happened to live in the same villages as the peasants. The Compromisers
credentialed some 150 of them.
Lenin and
Zinoviev were also credentialed, but the Compromisers did not give them
safe-conducts. All Kerensky would promise was that he would not arrest them in
the hall where the conference was being held. He’d arrest them at the entrance.
Safe-conduct or not, Lenin did not plan to attend; he opposed
Bolshevik participation altogether.
The conference
convened on September 14 (September 27, new style) in a Petrograd theater. Kerensky
decided to attend. When he greeted the praesidium, the Bolsheviks on it refused
to shake hands. So did the Kornilovists. Kerensky seems to have pretended they
did.
Then Kerensky
spoke extemporaneously, knowing he would have to address his role in the
Kornilov conspiracy. “I knew what they wanted,” he said incautiously. “Before
they went to Kornilov they came to me and suggested I take the same course.”
The left of course wondered who “they” were, and what they had “suggested,” but
Kerensky shifted topics rather than answer their shouted questions.
Kerensky
committed another verbal blunder in response to another shouted question, this
one about the death penalty. Both the Petrograd
Soviet and the Menshevik
party had passed resolutions against restoration of the death penalty in
the military. Kerensky responded that he hadn’t ordered any executions, and
when he did, “then I will permit you to curse me.” Of course this admitted that
the death penalty was not necessary; nor did it make sense to restore the death
penalty based on Kerensky’s unspoken promise not to use it. In a later speech, Trotsky
pointed this out to anyone who might have missed it.
What the
Bolsheviks would do was on everybody’s mind, including Kerensky’s. He expected
“the forces of the democracy” to support him in case of an insurrection, warning,
“Do not think that I am hanging in the air,” and claiming that he could stop
the railroads and the telegraphs. The Bolsheviks in the hall just laughed: what
an odd expression, “hanging in the air,” for a dictator to use of himself!
Tseretilli said
he thought the government, meaning in particular Kerensky, was getting “a
little dizzy” on the heights.
At one point,
after a number of speeches by individuals who were part of the government,
Trotsky observed, “I have not heard a single speaker here who would...[defend]
the directory or its president.” Nor could any of these speakers articulate the
policies of the government; nothing was being done to revive the economy, to
end the war, or anything else.
The Bolsheviks
called on Trotsky to read their declaration of the policy of the party and
Central Committee. Tseretilli had framed the issue in one of his speeches:
instead of putting the Soviet forward, why don’t the Bolsheviks take the power
themselves? This challenge was whispered on the praesidium and repeated in the
lobbies. Ten days before, the Cadet paper printed an editorial theorizing that
maybe the Bolsheviks could best be got rid of if they were given the power. They would fail and fade to insignificance.
The Bolshevik
declaration was neither evasive nor misleading. The party would not seize power
“against the organized will of the majority of the toiling masses of the
country.” This meant that if the soviets, in many of which the Bolsheviks were
now the majority, willed it, the party would
seize the power. The declaration also refused to recognize any decision of the
Democratic Conference that was not subsequently ratified by the next
All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
When they heard
the declaration’s call for arming the workers, members of the centrist majority
cried in alarm, “What for?” Trotsky replied they would be the revolutionary
country’s best defense against both imperialism and counter-revolution.
The Bolshevik
attitude towards the future of the Russian state being known, the conference proceeded
to debate which policy it would
endorse.
Meanwhile it had
fallen to Stalin, as liaison between the party and Lenin, to bring Lenin's letters from Finland to Petrograd. Lenin had taken a position against participation in the conference.
His first
letter on insurrection, addressed to the Bolshevik Central Committee and
the committees of Petrograd and Moscow, took the party by surprise. It was just
a sketch of points he would continue to make in the weeks to come. But the
Central Committee, on Kamenev’s motion but over Stalin’s objections, decided to
burn it anyway. (One copy was kept for posterity.)
In another
letter, written at about the same time, Lenin begins to add detail to his
plan of insurrection, and grounds it in Marxist theory. Trotsky expresses part
of the plan this way: “To leave the Alexandrinsky Theater [scene of the
Democratic Conference] with an ultimatum and return there at the head of the
armed masses.”
Friday, September 22, 2017
September 22 – September 9, 1917: Rising Tide in the Petrograd Soviet
The Petrograd
Soviet convenes to reconsider the resolution
voted on September 1 (September 14, new style). Each party’s whips made
sure all their members attended; at stake was the substitution of the Bolshevik
party line for that of the Compromisers.
The Bolsheviks
moved to make representation on the praesidium proportional to the party’s
share of the vote in the Soviet. This tactic was not favored by Lenin – still
proscribed and therefore not present – but in the event Tseretilli would not
entertain the motion.
So the Soviet was
asked to declare that the resolution of September 1 did not accord with the Soviet’s line (i.e., that of the Compromisers)
and that the Soviet still had confidence in its praesidium (consisting mostly of
Compromisers). Note that the Bolshevik resolution ruled out coalition
government with the representatives of the bourgeoisie.
Trotsky, just
released from prison, made an observation: Kerensky was missing from the
praesidium. He asked whether the prime minister was still a member. The
praesidium, seeing where Trotsky was going with this, reluctantly answered that
he was. Trotsky answered that this was not what the Bolsheviks expected. “We
were mistaken. The ghost of Kerensky now sits between Dan and Cheidze.” Then he
reminded the Soviet that a vote for the policies of the resolution was also a
vote for the policies of Kerensky, then among those subject to the Soviet’s
investigation for complicity in the plot of Kornilov and the bourgeoisie.
The atmosphere
was so tense that it was decided to take the vote by absence or presence. Those
against the resolution were to signify opposition by leaving the hall.
It took over an
hour, as workers’ and soldiers’ deputies drifted towards the exits amid
whispers and shouts. The Bolsheviks thought they would be about 100 votes short
of a majority. But when the praesidium made the count, it was 414 for the
resolution, 519 against, with 67 abstentions…! Tseretilli offered a parting
shot as he left the platform with the rest of the praesidium: After six months,
the banner of the revolution had passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks; “We
can only express the wish that you may be able to hold it in the same way for
half as long!” Taking the chair, Trotsky offered and passed a special
resolution denouncing those responsible for the slander against the Bolsheviks of
conspiring with the Germans.
Trotsky says,
“The Bolsheviks now entered on their inheritance.” But the inheritance did not
include the organization’s infrastructure: printing presses, funds,
transportation, even the typewriters and inkwells, had all been appropriated to
other uses by the former occupants of the praesidium.
This vote was the
culmination of increasing Bolshevik strength in the soviets, as well as on the
factory committees, in the trade unions, and on the soldiers committees. The
party had recovered all it had lost after the July Days and the slander of conspiracy – and more besides. Trotsky devotes two chapters, with much
anecdotal evidence, to this account; I have given several of the more prominent
examples in separate entries.
Tuesday, September 19, 2017
September 16 – September 3, 1917: “On Compromises”
In Rabochy Put (Worker’s Way), a successor
to the shuttered Pravda, Lenin writes
of an opening for the proletarian revolution created by the defeat of Kornilov’s
insurrection. He argued in “On
Compromises” that if the Soviet were to reject proposals for coalition with
the Cadets in the government, the way would be open for an all-socialist
government incorporating the system of soviets.
He described the
compromise this way: “The compromise on our part is
our return to the pre-July demand of all power to the Soviets and a government
of [Social Revolutionaries] and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets.” And in
return: “The Mensheviks and S.R.s, being the government bloc, would then agree …
to form a government wholly and exclusively responsible to the Soviets, the
latter taking over all power locally as well.”
Of course, as we’ll see, the right-socialists never opened
this window.
Thursday, August 31, 2017
August 31 – August 18, 1917: Against the Death Penalty
The Petrograd
Soviet demands abolition of the death penalty by a vote of 900 to 4. The four
voting against the resolution were among the right-socialists most closely tied
to the Compromisers and the Provisional Government: Tseretilli, Cheidze, Dan,
and Lieber.
Thursday, August 10, 2017
August 8 – July 26, 1917: Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party Convenes
The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party assembles
its Sixth Congress in Petrograd “semi-legally,” as Trotsky says. The
Central Committee elected by this Congress later voted for the armed
insurrection now known as the October Revolution.
About the first
thing the Congress did was pass unanimously a resolution that Lenin and the
other Bolsheviks who had been indicted should not turn themselves in. Stalin
had argued they should, but only “If,
however, power is wielded by an authority which can safeguard our comrades
against violence and is fair-dealing at least to some extent ....” But no-one
believed these conditions would ever be met. Lenin himself was still in hiding,
so the Congress named him “honorary” chairman instead.
The report on party organization revealed
membership had tripled, to 240,000, in the previous three months.
The main business of the Congress was to rethink
the party’s program in light of the July days and other recent events. For
example, since the Compromisers had led the Petrograd Soviet into complicity
with the counter-revolutionary tendencies of the Kerensky ministry, the
Bolsheviks dropped the slogan “All Power to the Soviets!” The Congress
also adopted a resolution identifying the conditions under which an
insurrection would be the correct response. Lenin’s underground
writings, and communications through a secret liaison, usually
Stalin, contributed to the
result.
The Inter-District Organization of United
Social-Democrats or Mezhraiontsy
(sometimes translated “Interdistrictites,” though I have been calling them “Trotskyites”
after their most prominent member) joined the Bolshevik party while the
Congress sat. The Mezhraiontsy
had at last dropped their project of union between the Bolsheviks and the
Mensheviks; the latter were now deeply involved with the Compromisers. Among
the prominent social democrats who then became Bolsheviks were (the
links lead to Wikipedia) Leon Trotsky, Adolf Joffe, Anatoly
Lunacharsky, Moisei Uritsky, David Riazanov, V. Volodarsky, Lev Karakhan, Dmitry Manuilsky, and Sergey Ezhov (Tsederbaum).
Early August (old style) also saw the convocation
of the bourgeois-aligned Congress and Trade and Industry and Congress of
Provincial Commissars. The latter consisted mainly of Cadets, while the opening
speaker at the former happened indiscreetly to mention the “bony hand of
hunger” in a tirade against taxes on commerce. As this was a not very thinly
veiled threat of factory lock-outs, Trotsky says, the phrase “entered...into
the political dictionary of the revolution,” and eventually “cost the
capitalists dear.”
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