Trotsky Arrives

One hundred years ago today, plus three, after a sea voyage of about three weeks from Canada, Leon Trotsky arrived in Petrograd and raised his voice against socialist participation in the provisional government. Ironically, the former Foreign Minister Miliukov had requested his release from British detention, losing his post as the new government formed.

Read about it here. Or read the whole chapter on the coalition government here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

April Days in May

One hundred years ago today, plus three, the Julian calendar still prevailing in Petrograd, Foreign Minister Miliukov’s luck began to turn when his note to the British and French demanding the annexation of the Dardanelles (then as now part of Turkey on the geographical boundary between Europe and Asia) turned up in print. For the next three days, tens of thousands of soldiers and workers demonstrated against Miliukov and his policy of annexation.

Read about it here. Or read the whole chapter on the April Theses here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

May Day in April

One hundred years ago today, plus three, it was still April 18 in Russia, because Russia was still on the Julian (old style) calendar. The soviets celebrated May Day, International Socialist Labor Day, along with the rest of the world anyway. 

Meanwhile Foreign Minister Miliukov, of the bourgeois Cadet party, was pursuing a plot that, when they found out about it, the people didn’t like.

Read about it here. Or read the whole chapter on the April Theses here. Or read the story from the beginning by following this link.

The April Days

One hundred years ago today, plus two, it was April in Petrograd; workers and soldiers were demonstrating in the streets. Find out why here, and what was the result here.

Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

The April Days

The publication of a secret note from Foreign Minister Miliukov sparks demonstrations in Petrograd, the demonstrations bring down the bourgeois Provisional Government, and a new Provisional Government, which includes socialists, among them Justice Minister Kerensky, takes its place.

100 years ago plus one today, what the Soviet historians call the April Days began. They were in April because Russia was still on the old style Julian calendar. Read about it here, or read the whole story from the beginning here.

February Revolution

February 27 – February 14, 1917: Last State Duma. The State Duma had first been convened in May 1906 as part of a program of civil and political reforms addressing the issues raised by the failed 1905 revolution. This would be the last one.

Tsar Nicholas II granted this elective body certain legislative and oversight functions. However, he retained all executive powers, including the power to appoint state ministers and to dismiss the Duma itself. The Russian state remained effectively an autocracy.

The workers were already aroused. Some 90,000 were on strike in Petrograd, and others had closed plants in Moscow.

March 1 – February 16, 1917: Bread Rationing. Authorities issue cards for rationing bread in Petrograd. Food shortages were widespread in Russia during World War I. Not only had many agricultural workers been conscripted into the armies, but the armies themselves still had to be fed.

March 4 – February 19, 1917: Bread. Within a few days after rationing starts, people – mostly women – mass around Petrograd shops demanding bread.

March 5 – February 20, 1917: Bakeries. The next day, people ransack bakeries in several parts of Petrograd.

March 8 – February 23, 1917: International Women’s Day. A strike by female textile workers celebrating International Women’s Day begins the February Revolution. The Women’s Day observance had been created in 1909 by the Socialist Party of America to commemorate a strike by the Ladies Garment Workers the previous year.

The want of bread continued to be an issue. Though the Bolsheviks had not called for strikes, the women asked the metal workers of the Vyborg district to support theirs. Soon, with the Bolshevik, Menshevik, and Social Revolutionary party machineries behind them, 90,000 workers were in the streets. The demonstrations began on the mainly industrial Vyborg side of the frozen Neva River. Later they poured over to the Petersburg side, which held the imperial palace and the seats of government.

Meanwhile, the tsar Nicholas II is at the front with his marshals. He is not sent word of the strikes until the third day.

At this time, Lenin was an émigré in Berne, Switzerland, Trotsky in New York. Stalin, having flunked the physical for induction into the Russian army, was held a political prisoner in Krasnoyarsk on the Trans-Siberian Railway.

March 9 – February 24, 1917: The Strike Spreads. Two hundred thousand workers, about half the industrial labor force, are on strike in Petrograd. Among others, students joined them. The slogans cried for bread, but also against tsarist autocracy and the war.

On the first day of strikes, only police were sent to control the crowds. But on the second day, the authorities took the second step in a long-planned escalation: they sent Cossacks to drive the workers back with horses and whips. But the plan of the tsar’s Council of Ministers failed. The Cossacks, instead of driving away the workers, in some cases simply filed through them, or let them pass under their horses. Nor did they fire on the workers, but some of them broke up police formations that were. Trotsky says, “…one of them gave the workers a good wink.”

March 10 – February 25, 1917: General Strike. The strike in Petrograd becomes general. By now, 240,000 workers have joined it. Even small factories, and commerce generally, are affected.

The authorities responded with another of their planned escalations, in which the city’s military garrison forms line of battle and opens fire. The result was not at all according to plan. The workers did not confront the soldiers. Rather, one of them, cap in hand, asked the Cossacks to help against the police. Reportedly, some Cossacks attacked the mounted police instead, and one of the police was sabered.

Confrontation was reserved for the police. To the soldiers, the women said, according to Trotsky, “Put down your bayonets – join us.” With the result to be seen in the sequel.

Meanwhile the tsar’s Minister of War telegraphs him about the strikes. Naturally the tsar would like the disorders to be put down. The commander of the Petrograd garrison threatened to send all workers who had registered for the draft to the front – in three days. But the situation would be very different by then.

March 11 – February 26, 1917: Countermeasures Fail. Overnight police arrest revolutionist leadership, including Molotov, Schliapnikov, and Zalutsky of the Bolshevik Committee. The revolution goes on without them.

Workers have gained physical control over parts of the city; all government apparatus in those neighborhoods, including police stations, had been abandoned. The bridges over the Neva being blocked, workers crossed into Petersburg on the ice. Police were firing from concealed positions.

An alarmed tsarina Alexandra, German by birth, telegraphs her husband from the imperial palace in Petersburg. The Minister of War considered asking for troops from the front, but decided to use firehoses instead. That tactic was unsuccessful.

The President of the Duma, Rodzianko, asks the head of the Council of Ministers, Prince Golytsin, to resign. The latter responds by revealing the tsar’s undated edict dissolving the Duma.

Some of the soldiers, or their officers, fired on the demonstrators. Chagrined that trainees from their regiment had done so, a company of the Imperial Guards garrison refuses orders. This was mutiny. Meanwhile the leaders of the Vyborg workers were discussing whether to end the strike.

March 12 – February 27, 1917: The Garrison Mutinies. The morning starts quietly. The tsarina, relieved, telegraphed her husband to that effect. But the workers were meeting at the factories and deciding to continue the insurrection. They issued a declaration to the soldiers …

… but some of them had already refused orders to march into the streets. Instead the regiment leading the mutiny sent messages to the other regiments calling on them to join it. By evening there was scarcely a battalion of loyal troops left to the commander of the garrison, who nevertheless felt it his duty to declare martial law. Meanwhile soldiers had helped the Vyborg workers destroy the police barracks. The Moscow regiment armed some of the workers. They spread throughout the city in armored cars, sacked the arsenal, freed the political prisoners, and arrested the commander of the garrison.

Telegrams to the tsar communicated alarm. Rodzianko thought “the last hour has come,” but the tsar said it’s nonsense. Troops from the front were dispatched to the capital. Golytsin resigned but the tsar refused to appoint a replacement. When part of the Duma assembled in the Tauride Palace (the Progressive Bloc held back), the tsar’s edict of dissolution was revealed. Fearing to remain in session, the deputies could only resolve not to leave town quite yet. Miliukov addressed them, then Kerensky warned that a crowd was approaching.

It was, led by soldiers. As the assembly evaporates, Rodzianko’s motion to form a Provisional Committee of the State Duma cannot be voted on, but this does not stop him from forming it. In another part of the palace, by now occupied by soldiers and workers, the revolution, with the help of leadership just released from the prisons, formed the Soviet of Workers Deputies. The soldiers’ deputies were added the following day. A Menshevik, Cheidze, was named president of the Soviet and its Executive Committee.

The Soviet met that evening amid chaos and ratified the membership of its self-appointed Executive Committee. They assumed control of the distribution of food. In the hours and days that followed, the Soviet occupied the State Bank, Mint, Treasury, and Printing Office; it took control of Petrograd’s postal and telegraph services, the wireless, rail stations, and printing plants. It also arrested those of the tsar’s ministers it could lay its hands on.

The same things happened in Moscow. There were strikes and demonstrations. Soldiers came forward asking how they could become part of the revolution. Political prisoners were freed.

March 13 – February 28, 1917: The Provisional Committee and the Soviet. Neither the leadership of the Progressive Bloc, including the socialist and communist parties in the Duma, much less that of the Bolsheviks, attempts to lead the establishment of the revolutionary state. That was left to the bourgeois liberal parties under Rodzianko, Miliukov, and Kerensky.

The tsar was by then trying to make his way back into Petrograd, from where the thoroughly alarmed tsarina was trying to telegraph him. Neither the telegraphs nor the railways were working for the imperial family by then; they were in the hands of the workers and the Soviet. The tsarina’s telegrams were never sent; the tsar was held up at a suburban station and eventually had to return to the front. The Soviet had also closed down the monarchist press and began to print its own newspaper Izvestia – “The News of the Soviet.”

Troops sent earlier from the front turned back of their own accord. The situation in the capital was too completely lost for them to restore it.

Even the Peter and Paul fortress in the middle of the Neva River, hitherto undisturbed by the insurrection, offered to surrender. Schlusselberg prison was also taken.

March 14 – March 1, 1917: The Provisional Committee and the Tsar. Rodzianko wants to telegraph the tsar. Fearing arrest by the workers, he asked for an escort to the telegraph office by deputies of the Soviet.

The Provisional Committee, on the one hand, accepted the power to form the state that the revolution had won, but on the other, continued to negotiate with the tsar. Though the tsar’s ministers had been placed under arrest and brought before the Duma, he nevertheless proposed a deal that would allow him to continue to fight the war, while the Provisional Committee would administer all other government functions. But it was too late for the tsar. Abdication was broached in an exchange of telegrams that also made the situation in the capital clear to the tsar. He may have offered to appoint new ministers; he definitely agreed to submit the question of abdication to his marshals at the front.

For their part, Miliukov and other bourgeoisie now being named or naming themselves ministers of the Provisional Committee did not want to part with the monarchy entirely, preferring to keep it in name as a shield against the revolution. But the demand of the Soviet’s Executive Committee when it met with the Provisional Committee was modest: only to be allowed to continue agitation among the workers, soldiers, and peasants. The rest of the revolutionary program – land reform, an end to the war, the eight-hour day, etc. – was not put on the table. Even the Bolsheviks on the committee went along with this.

Meanwhile the revolution is complete in Moscow, where the Moscow Soviet holds its first session. It was also spreading to the provincial cities. At Novgorod, the mayor made a speech in its favor; political prisoners are freed. The workers of Samara and Saratov organized Soviets. The chief of police in Kharkov cried, “Long Live the revolution!”

Back in Petrograd, Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries of the Executive Committee issued Order No. 1 for the benefit of the soldiers who had joined the revolution. It called for each regiment to elect members to the soviets and to form regimental committees of enlisted men. It also regulated control of weapons and social interactions with officers, who in every case came from a different social stratum than the peasant soldiery.

March 15 – March 2, 1917: The Tsar Abdicates. The tsar makes one final offer to appoint a new cabinet of ministers. Rodzianko informed him that, no, the question is now “the dynasty itself.” Having received the same advice from his marshals, the tsar agreed. But the Provisional Committee did not insist on getting rid of the whole dynasty. The deputies sent to meet with the tsar returned with an abdication in favor of his brother the Grand Duke Michael, as regent for his son Alexei. One of them said, “Long live the Emperor Michael!” and was promptly arrested.

The Provisional Committee completed its work for becoming a Provisional Government. Prince Lvov was made head of state; Miliukov became Foreign Minister; Kerensky became Minister of Justice. Kerensky was the only minister with any socialist credentials whatsoever. Many ministers – of agriculture, of labor, for example – came from among the big landowners and bourgeoisie. In other words, it resembled Mr. Trump’s cabinet. So much so that the big bourgeois organ, the Council of Trade and Industry, put its resources at the service of the Provisional Government.

Meanwhile the Bolshevik Central Committee resolved that the Provisional Government was counter-revolutionary, but also not to oppose it.

March 16 – March 3 1917: Right and Left Bolsheviks. The Provisional Government next asks Grand Duke Michael to abdicate. He complies. The revolution was announced to the world by radio.

The Bolshevik leadership on the scene, Molotov and self-educated workers Schliapnikov and Zalutsky formulated the party’s response to the measures of the bourgeois liberal Provisional Government. There were still left and right Bolsheviks, with “defensists,” who wanted to continue the war, on the right.

Among the left Bolsheviks were the workers of the Vyborg district. They wanted to depose the Provisional Government in favor of the Soviet. But this precariously balanced “dual government,” as Trotsky calls it, was held together by mutual suspicions in the weeks and months that followed.

Meanwhile “compromisers” on the Executive Committee of the Soviet issued Order No. 2, intended to annul Order No. 1 by limiting it to the Petrograd garrison. Order No. 2 was ineffective, being ignored by the revolutionary soldiery.

April Theses, April Days

About April 14 – April 1, 1917: Somewhere in Finland. A group of Bolsheviks travels to Finland to greet Lenin as he approaches Petrograd. Lenin chided one of them, the right-leaning Kamenev, for positions he had taken in Pravda on cooperation with the Provisional Government and in favor of the defensist war policy.

April 16 – April 3, 1917: At the Finland Station. Lenin arrives in Petrograd at the Finland Station and is given a bouquet that Trotsky says must have made him feel very awkward. He was greeted by Cheidze, the Menshevik president of the Petrograd Soviet.

Cheidze felt he had to caution Lenin about cooperation with the Provisional Government and its defensist policies. Ignoring this, Lenin concluded his brief set of remarks saying, “Long live the world socialist revolution!”

Lenin and his entourage, including Zinoviev the agitator, drove to Bolshevik headquarters in armored cars. They stopped from time to time so Lenin could deliver essentially the same brief speech to crowds along the way.

At headquarters, the expropriated mansion of a court ballerina, Lenin impatiently endured numerous speeches of welcome. At length he addressed the party. For two hours he spoke against the defensist, collaborationist, and right opportunist policies the Petrograd Bolsheviks had let themselves be drawn into. He must also have explained what he thought was the correct line, for as we’ll see he read out the “April Theses” the next day.

Nobody seems to have taken notes. The speech left its hearers dumbfounded, wondering whether he really meant what he’d said.

The All Russia Conference of Soviets was just ending that day.

April 17 – April 4, 1917: The April Theses. Twice, once at a meeting of the Bolsheviks and again at a meeting to which the Mensheviks were also invited, Lenin reads his ten “April Theses.” He said later that week, prefacing the version published in Pravda:

I did not arrive in Petrograd until the night of April 3, and therefore at the meeting on April 4, I could, of course, deliver the report on the tasks of the revolutionary proletariat only on my own behalf, and with reservations as to insufficient preparation.

The only thing I could do to make things easier for myself—and for honest opponents—was to prepare the theses in writing. I read them out, and gave the text to Comrade Tseretelli. I read them twice very slowly: first at a meeting of Bolsheviks and then at a meeting of both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

The first thesis addresses the policy of the revolution to the war, “…[N]ot the slightest concession to ‘revolutionary defensism’ is permissible.” This includes the “error” of fighting only to defend the homeland, with no thought of annexations or indemnities, as the bourgeois Provisional Government would have it publicly – in spite of their private alignments with capitalist interests at home and abroad.

The next four theses address the phenomenon of dual government – power being shared between the soviets and Provisional Government with the soviets as the junior partner – under the heading Fraternization. Lenin sees the dual government as a transitional phase between the bourgeois February Revolution and the proletarian revolution that was yet to come. But the party, a small minority even in the soviets, should not therefore with join the Mensheviks and social democrats in support of the Provisional Government. The party’s goal should be to transfer “the entire state power to the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies,” not ”to return to a parliamentary republic.”

The sixth and seventh theses call for nationalization of all lands under the soviets and consolidation of all banks in a single state bank under the Soviet. Yet in the eighth thesis, Lenin does not advocate immediate transfer of ownership of the means of production to the workers, but rather only the strengthening of the workers’ soviets.

The ninth and tenth theses set forth the political tasks of the Bolshevik party, to include the convocation of a new revolutionary International, one that would specifically exclude social democrats of the stripe who favored collaboration with the Provisional Government.

Visit this page to find the entire text of the Pravda article and all ten theses.

April 20 – April 7, 1917: Pravda publishes “April Theses.” See the link in the entry for April 17 – April 4, 1917.

April 21 – April 8, 1917: Pravda’s Critique. The editors split with Lenin on the “immediate transformation of [the Russian] revolution in to a socialist revolution." In fact, right Bolsheviks continued to struggle against Lenin’s program of action down to the beginning of the October Revolution.

April 29 – April 16, 1917: Trotsky Released. Trotsky is released from British detention in Canada at the request of the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government, Miliukov, who was himself being pressured by the Petrograd Soviet. Trotsky took ship for Russia.

April 30 – April 17, 1917: War Invalids Demonstrate. The Cadets, the bourgeois party of Foreign Minister Miliukov, organize a pro-war demonstration of veterans invalided by the war.

Meantime, in provincial elections, democratically elected dumas are chosen. As the soviets retained local control, Trotsky notes, these bodies were nullities.

May 1 – April 18, 1917: International Socialist May Day. Russian socialists celebrate International Socialist May Day according to the new style calendar, that is, when other socialists around the world are celebrating it – though it happens to be April 18 on the old style calendar. It became a national holiday; not only factories but also government offices shut down.

The holiday atmosphere spread to the front at staff headquarters in Moghilev, where even the tsarist generals marched. Elsewhere Russian troops celebrated with Austro-German POWs, singing the same revolutionary songs in different languages.

This was also the day Foreign Minister Miliukov chose to send a note reaffirming Russia’s loyalty to her allies and her pledge not to make a separate peace. This part was generally agreeable to the defensists in the Soviet. But the subtext endorsed the annexations and indemnities his British and French counterparts expected as part of the peace agreement. Naturally one of the annexations Miliukov was contemplating was that of the Dardanelles, at the expense of Germany’s ally Turkey. This raid had been planned for, but the soldiers eventually refused to carry the plan out.

May 2 – April 19, 1917: The Executive Committee Meets. Miliukov’s note is the topic at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. The meeting ran late without producing any consensus or plan of action.

May 3 – April 20, 1917: The April Days. The text of Miluvov’s note hits the Petrograd papers, sparking three days of demonstrations: the “April Days.”

The Finland Regiment marched to the seat of the Provisional Government at the head of over 30,000 armed soldiers. Workers left their factories and joined them. The banners read, “Down with Miliukov!” “Down with Guchov,” Minister of War in the Provisional Government, too.

The demonstrators lacked a specific program; nor was the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, hastily reconvened, able to supply one. In reaction, General Kornilov, not for the last time, offers troops for suppressing the demonstrations; bourgeois agitators denounce Lenin as a German agent.

May 4 – April 21, 1917: The Dual Government Meets. As the workers and soldiers regather in the streets, ministers of the Provisional Government meet with the Executive Committee of the Soviet. Neither side of the dual government knew what to do about the demonstrations. Prince Lvov, President of the Council of Ministers, thought maybe the Provisional Government should withdraw. Chernov, Minister of Agriculture, said it might be sufficient for Miliukov to exchange the Foreign Ministry for the portfolio of the Minister of Public Education. Miliukov refused both that suggestion and the suggestion that he write a new note. Some members of the Soviet would apparently have been satisfied with a better explanation of the first one.

Meanwhile the demonstrations, which had been announced by Bolshevik workers from Vyborg, continued. The demonstrators ignored the plea of the President of the Petrograd Soviet, Cheidze, to disperse. Counterdemonstrators, organized by the Cadet Party, clashed with the workers. General Kornilov made good his threat to mobilize cavalry and artillery against the workers. Some officers tried to seize one of their banners. Gunfire was exchanged.

But the Soviet ordered the revolutionary regiments to stay in their barracks, and Kornilov’s to return there. The soldiers obeyed the Soviet’s orders; thereafter none of the troops would march unless the orders were counter-signed by the Soviet.

For its part, the Executive Committee would be satisfied with a verbal explanation of Miliukov’s note; he was not compelled to resign. Having come so close to civil war in the capital (and the situation was much the same in Moscow), the Soviet ordered demonstrations to stop for two days. The Bolshevik Central Committee subsequently agreed to the halt.

May 5 – April 22, 1917: Izvestia’s Interpretation. Izvestia, the official organ of the Petrograd Soviet, thinks it necessary to declare that the Soviet had not interfered with the “legally constituted” authority of the Provisional Government by its actions during the April Days. Since the demonstrators were calling for more rather than less interference, the Soviet thus remained less revolutionary-minded than the people themselves.

Nor could a Bolshevik motion for a vote of no confidence in the government come within hundreds of votes of passage. The Petrograd Soviet also politely ignored a resolution of the Helsinki Soviet, backed by revolutionary sailors, offering to help remove the Provisional Government.

May 7 – April 24, 1917: Bolshevik Party Conference. The All-Russia Bolshevik Party Conference called for in the April Theses begins. Neither Stalin nor Kamenev were named to the five-member praesidium.

Lenin spoke against misdirected violence, violence that is not being used as a tactic to further some specific revolutionary strategy. He also presented a resolution “On the Attitude Towards the Provisional Government” that had been adopted by the Petrograd conference of the party. The resolution recognized the government as an organ of the bourgeoisie and landowners, enumerating the programs such as land reform and the eight-hour workday it had failed to act upon or actively resisted. The resolution was published in Pravda on May 10 – April 27.

Coalition Government

May 9 – April 26, 1917: Coalition Government? Prince Lvov – in effect – invites members of the Petrograd Soviet to join the Provisional Government. The actual words of the announcement invite “those active, creative forces of the country” who weren’t already in the government to join it. As we’ll see, the proposal was soon to be acted upon.

May 10 – April 27, 1917: Resolution on the War. Satisfied with revisions to the original draft, Lenin speaks in favor of the party’s resolution on the war. Denouncing the war as imperialist, the resolution declared against annexations and indemnities, against “revolutionary defensism,” and, ironically, against a separate peace. Of course, the “democratic peace” the resolution called for could only occur if proletarians in all the belligerent countries held the state power and so agreed. To this end, fraternization with enemy soldiers at the front, already taking place, was encouraged.

Pravda published the resolution on May 12 – April 29.

May 12 – April 29, 1917: All Russia Bolshevik Party Conference Ends. Besides the resolutions described in prior entries, the conference considers reports and resolutions on the party’s attitude toward the provincial soviets, revisions to its program, the agrarian and nationalist questions, and the current situation of the international proletarian revolution.

The party’s agrarian policy sought to align the peasants in the countryside with the workers in the cities under the Bolshevik banners. It called for confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility, church, and crown, nationalization of the lands, and transfer of the lands to the peasantry under leasehold. The party also undertook to organize the peasants in an independent arm, and support their efforts in existing peasant soviets and land committees.

A new Central Committee was also elected; Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin, and Sverdlov were among those given seats.

After the April Days, the votes in elections to the soviets begin to shift, favorably to the Bolsheviks.

May 13 – April 30, 1917: Miliukov Resigns. Unable to resist backlash for the handling of his policy on the war and annexation (i.e., the Dardanelles), Miliukov resigns his post as Foreign Minister. Guchov, the Minister of War, having refused to sign the Declaration of the Rights of the Soldiers, also resigned his post.

This left some portfolios open for distribution to the socialists who had been invited to join the Provisional Government. Already some of the provincial soviets, including that of Moscow, had declared against participation. On the other hand, some of the soldiers seemed to prefer having a socialist in charge of the war.

May 17 – May 4, 1917: Trotsky Arrives. Released from a British prisoner of war camp in Canada some weeks before, Trotsky arrives in Petrograd. Among his first acts was speaking against participation in the Provisional Government.

Meanwhile, the First All-Russian Conference of Peasants’ Deputies convened.

May 18 – May 5, 1917: Coalition Government! Prince Lvov’s proposal offers six of the fifteen ministerial portfolios to the socialists. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet voted to accept it, Bolsheviks only voting against.

Lvov was to remain as premier. Kerensky, a Social Revolutionary who was already in the government, took the war ministry; the foreign ministry stayed with the Cadets in the person of Tereshchenko. Socialists got the ministries of labor and of trade and industry, and the Menshevik Tseretilli became minister of posts. No Bolshevik joined the government.

Russia’s allies in the Entente seem to have been pleased. A broader government embracing leaders of the socialist revolution might be better able to keep Russia in the war. This was certainly Kerensky’s intention.

May 24 – May 11, 1917: Kerensky to the Front. War Minister Kerensky travels to the front to agitate for an offensive.

May 25 – May 12, 1917: Crimes of the Peasantry. Prince Lvov, Premier of the Coalition Government, finds it necessary to denounce the crimes of the peasants. The “crimes” had been going on, increasingly, since April, in part because the government had done little or nothing about land reform except to form land committees in rural districts. The committees were permitted to discuss the matter but not given official power to do anything about it.

So some peasants had been taking matters into their own hands, confiscating the lands and weapons of the rural nobility, seizing animals and equipment, etc. They even disrupted land surveys in order to prevent sales of land by the owning classes. In many cases, revolutionized peasant-soldiers on leave led these efforts.

May 26 – May 13, 1917: The Kronstadt Soviet and Sailors. This episode begins when the Kronstadt soviet removes the Cadet governor who had been appointed by the Provisional Government, and assumes control of the island and its fortress itself. The island and fortress lie at the mouth of the Neva River, not far from Petrograd. The episode has a sequel.

May 27 – May 14, 1917: Kerensky Issues Orders. War Minister Kerensky issues orders telling the troops to “go where your leaders conduct you,” gratuitously adding they would “carry on the points of [their] bayonets – peace.”

During this time the Coalition Government convened a “special conference” to discuss calling a Constituent Assembly. Nothing came of it; the term “Constituent Assembly” continued to be a mask for the bourgeois government’s inaction on the revolutionary programs and policies demanded by the soviets.

May 29 – May, 16, 1917: Resolutions of the Soviet. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet adopts a number of resolutions that Lenin considered to be on the way to the proletarian state. They called for state-run monopolies and trusts, regulated distribution of goods and commodities, price fixing, and oversight of credit. The next day the Minister of Trade and Industry resigned; other than that, the Coalition Government did nothing.

June, 1917: Root Mission. President Wilson sends former Secretary of War Elihu Root to Petrograd with messages on the United States war aims and conditions for securing US loans for the further prosecution of the war. He summed up the US attitude, as Wikipedia says, very trenchantly: "No fight, no loans."

Thus, the US offered credits of up to $75 million, contingent on Russia undertaking the summer offensive. The Romanovs expressed a desire to subscribe, contingent on the state treasury’s support for the tsar’s family. But the Russian big bourgeoisie refused to subscribe.

June 4 – May 22, 1917: The Agrarian Question. Lenin addresses the All-Russian Conference of Peasants’ Deputies on agrarian policy. He made it clear that nationalization of the lands was the Bolshevik policy, as opposed to transfer of ownership to individual peasants as private property.

Under nationalization, the state would own the land, and rent it back to farmers, “free labor on free soil,” on terms “equal for all.” The party considered this the best way to protect the livelihood of poor peasants as against the richer, petit bourgeois class of peasants. Model farms were to be established on larger tracts confiscated from the nobility, church, and crown.

You can read Lenin’s address to the conference by following the link.

At the front, the Chief of Staff reported disaffection among the troops and continuing fraternization with enemy troops. On the Rumanian front, he said, “…the infantry does not want to advance.” Trotsky provides plenty of specific examples of disaffection.

June 5 – May 23, 1917: Changes in Command. War Minister Kerensky replaces General Alexeiev with General Brussilov as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies. Brussilov was thought to be more enterprising, thus more amenable to carrying out the desired offensive.

This set off a series of dismissals by Kerensky and Brussilov, including that of Brussilov himself. Some generals were dismissed for “indulgence” to the regimental soldiers’ committees (from which officers were excluded). Others were dismissed for the opposite reason, “resisting democratization” of the army. For “excessive indulgence” to the committees, Brussilov was eventually replaced with Kornilov. But Kornilov himself had been dismissed from command in Petrograd because he’d proven unable to get along with democratic elements in the government.

June 6 – May 24, 1917: Upheaval in Kronstadt. At the urging of the Petrograd Bolsheviks, the Kronstadt Soviet places itself under the Provisional Government. But it reversed the decision the next day. The sailors had put some 80 officers of the fleet under arrest.

Two days later (June 8 – May 27), the Petrograd Soviet put the sailors on trial in absentia. Trotsky served, unsuccessfully as the sequel shows, as their defense counsel.

June 10 – May 28, 1917: Conference of Peasants’ Deputies Adjourns. The Conference, caught between opposition to the Provisional Government’s land policy (or lack of one) and its distaste for the Bolshevik solution (i.e., nationalization), selects a Social Revolutionary executive committee and president.

In the meantime, the district land committees passed increasingly under the control of the peasantry, and were increasingly able to exercise control over the use of the land. This happened mostly peacefully, accompanied by a shift in the countryside to alignment with the Bolsheviks.

State Conference in Moscow

Week Before August 25 – August 12, 1917: Plans for a General Strike. To forestall a Bolshevik plan to denounce the State Conference as counter-revolutionary and then walk out, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets passes a resolution effectively limiting the party’s access to the floor. So the Bolsheviks turned in their credentials.

Then the Moscow Soviet voted, pretty narrowly, against a calling a general strike to welcome the conference delegates. The Bolsheviks took counsel with Menshevik and Social Revolutionary workers in the soviet who had voted for the strike, and with leaders of the trade unions. Together they decided upon a one-day protest strike, in preference to a demonstration that might have made targets of the marchers as during the July Days in Petrograd.

Another secret committee consisting of two Bolsheviks, two Mensheviks, and two Social Revolutionaries made arrangements to prevent the Cavaliers of St. George, with their allies among officers and junkers, from forming a cordon along the line of Kornilov’s expected procession through the city.

Meanwhile, Kornilov sent four divisions of cavalry towards Petrograd, possibly at Kerensky’s request, and a regiment of Cossacks to Moscow. This was a stratagem of counter-revolution rather than of war against Germany.

August 25 – August 12, 1917: State Conference in Moscow. Stage managed by Prime Minister Kerensky, the State Conference opens in Moscow. Delegates had a little trouble getting there: a protest strike called by the Bolsheviks and their left-socialist allies shut down the railroad stations and tramways. Even the waiters in the restaurants joined the strike, and the city lights went out too. Some 400,000 workers were on strike; one-day strikes took place in Kiev, Kostreva, and Tsaritizn as well.  

Poised at the center of the uneasy compromise between the left and right elements invited to the conference, Kerensky made the first speech at about 4:00 p.m. He warned the left (meaning the Bolsheviks, not in attendance) against insurrection, and he warned the right (explicitly naming Kornilov) against counter-revolution. As self-described “supreme head” of the state, he, Kerensky, would know how to deal with any such threats.

Kerensky defended his war policy without attempting to explain the failure of the June offensive. When he invited the delegates to rise and salute the ambassadors of the Entente, only the Menshevik Martov and a few others remained seated, despite catcalls from the officers’ loge.

Miliukov writes in his history of the revolution that despite Kerensky’s efforts to project the power of the office he held, “he evoked only a feeling of pity.”

Other ministers of the Provisional Government then spoke. Among them, the Minister of Industry asked the capitalists to restrain themselves in the matter of profit; the Minister of Finance spoke of his plan to decrease the direct tax on the possessing classes by increasing other indirect taxes. This drew loud cheers from the right. Chernov, the Social Revolutionary Minister of Agriculture, was not permitted to speak. Of course, the Provisional Government had no agrarian policy to talk about.

The dramatic pattern devised by Kerensky for the conference was anticipated by the alternation of left and right speakers who held ministries in the Provisional Government. 

August 26 – August 13, 1917: State Conference in Recess. Apparently, August 13 fell on a Sunday in the old style calendar for 1917 in Russia. So the State Conference went into recess for the day.

Kornilov took a few moments to confide in Miliukov that he felt the (expected) fall of Riga to the Germans would be too great an “opportunity” to pass up. As we will see, he’d already set the date for his insurrection. He let Miliukov know about that too.

August 27 – August 14, 1917: State Conference Concludes. As the second and final session of the State Conference in Moscow begins, the left applauds Prime Minister Kerensky when he enters, and the right applauds General Kornilov. Then Kerensky proposed an ovation for the army, and everyone joined in.

When Kornilov was invited to speak, the delegates rose in thunderous applause. All, that is, except the delegates of the soldiery. A shouting match ensued; Kerensky called for order. Kornilov’s speech blamed the legislation of the Provisional Government for reducing the army to a “crazy mob.” He warned the conference that if Riga (in Latvia, then threatened by the Germans) were taken, was the “road to Petrograd is open.” The Bolshevik paper in Moscow commented that as defeat at Tarnopol “made Kornilov commander-in-chief, the surrender of Riga might make him dictator.”

After a speech by an archbishop of the Church Council condemning the government for unbelief, General Kaledin, representing the Cossack armies, spoke. He endorsed Kornilov’s policies for prosecution of the war: militarizing the railroads and factories, permitting death penalty in the rear, and putting the Petrograd garrison under Kornilov’s command. And he added another one: abolish the soldiers’ committees formed at the company and regimental levels after the February Revolution. The right liked this a lot better than the left.

The left spoke next, in the person of Cheidze, president of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. He defended the soldiers’ committees and the soviets, but spoke against forcible expropriation of lands by the peasantry. Neither did the next speaker, representing the Executive Committee of the peasants’ soviet, make any contribution to the resolution of the agrarian question. Now the contradictions between left and right had become palpable, and it was becoming possible to perceive the paralysis of the Provisional Government in which these irreconcilable differences were joined.

Proving that the device of putting people in the audience to serve as objects of rhetoric and applause is not new, the prisoners of Schlusselburg were announced. These survivors of the 1905 revolution were thus honored by, among others, their formerly tsarist jailors, now turned bourgeois liberal: Generals Alexiev, Kornilov, Kaledin; the archbishop; Rodzianko and Guchov, next to speak.

Guchov, the Provisional Government’s first war minister, had to admit the government was “the shadow of a power.” Rodzianko, president of the bourgeois-dominated State Duma, recommended that body, on account of its constitutional legitimacy, as a guide to the Provisional Government. This drew laughter from the left, as the legitimacy of the Duma had evaporated when its creator, the tsar, had been deposed.

Then Kerensky read a telegram from President Wilson, who preferred the result of the February Revolution to tsarism, saying the American and Russian governments “are pursuing no selfish aims” in the war.

The agenda swung back towards the left. Tseretilli defended the role of the soviets and the soldiers’ committees in the revolution.

Then back to the right. Miliukov recounted what he considered the “mistakes of the revolutionary democracy,” all of which, it just so happens, had led to the resignations of Cadet ministers. Among the “capitulations” he described were allowing the solders’ committees to be formed, and failing to suppress seizures of land by the peasants. This latter comment was directed at the Minister of Agriculture, Chernov.

The Menshevik Tseretilli spoke again, promising even harsher measures against the Bolsheviks.

After that the pendulum swung right to left and back ceaselessly. General Alexiev, formerly the tsar’s commander-in-chief, called for discipline in the army. He was answered by left-leaning officers who defended Kerensky. Officers crippled by the war speak for the right; crippled enlisted men for the left. The head of the railroad workers’ union spoke against the counter-revolution, and was answered by a magnate of the industry and a bank economist. Trotsky lists many more such pairings.

The conference was reaching the bottom of Kerensky’s agenda. An anarchist, oddly, received the applause of the right. Plekhanov, the oldest of the first Russian Marxists still living, was applauded from both sides. He mentioned, a little prematurely, the “unhappy memory of Lenin.”

That evening a representative of the Union of Horse Breeders (all large landowners, of course) spoke against land reform and in favor of the war. Then, to clamorous applause, Tseretilli shook hands with a railroad magnate. Even Miliukov thought this was insincere, but necessary.

As the end approached, a young Cossack officer pointed out that “the working Cossacks were not with Kaledin,” the Cossack general who had spoken earlier in the day. The right did not like this; an officer called out, “German marks!” This caused an explosion, nearly a fight. But it showed that the split in Russian society so plain at the conference extended even to the Cossack armies.

At last, Kerensky took the floor again. As the man in the middle between left and right, he urged “better understanding” and “better respect.” Then he relapsed into a self-absorbed melodrama reminiscent of Hitler’s maxim, the strong man is strongest when alone, but without the strength. A passage from Miliukov quoted by Trotsky describes the speech; it left “the hall…stupefied, and this time both halves of it.”

August 29 – August 16, 1917: Leftward Movement. A conference of the Social Revolutionary party demands that the League of Officers be expelled from Kornilov’s military headquarters at Moghiliev.

The damage the State Conference caused to Kerensky’s government, by revealing deep differences in Russian society that it was too paralyzed even to patch over, was becoming evident. The masses, Trotsky says, were instead moving to the left.

October 31 – October 18, 1917: Deadlocks in the Pre-Parliament and in the Baltic

After three days of debate, neither the right-socialist Compomisers nor the bourgeois Cadets can pass a resolution on reforming the army and continuing the war. The votes were symptomatic of general paralysis in the Pre-Parliament on every issue it attempted to address. The American journalist Reed heard the Cadet Miliukov give a speech denouncing Skobelov’s instructions. But this decision had already been taken over Cadet objections.

At about this time, Kerensky renewed his dispute with the Baltic Fleet and the soviets of Finland. The sailors sent a delegation to the Central Executive Committee demanding removal of “a person who is disgracing…the revolution with his shameless political chantage.” By this they meant Kerensky. The Regional Committee of the Finnish Soviets, taking sovereign powers, held up some of the government’s freight. Kerensky’s response, threats of arrest, left the soviets unimpressed.

Trotsky observes that the fleet and Finnish soviets were already in a state of insurrection; they had assumed state functions and administered them independently of the Provisional Government. In another connection Trotsky observes that the Finnish garrison and Baltic Fleet had become a dependable reserve for an insurrection of workers and soldiers in Petrograd.

Meanwhile, the Petrograd Soviet held elections for its delegates to the Congress of Soviets. The Bolshevik slate – Trotsky, Kamenev, Volodarsky, Yurenev, and Lashevich – received well over 400 votes. Just over 200 votes were cast for candidates from the compromisist parties.

October 8 – September 25, 1917: The Last Coalition and the New Soviet

Kerensky announces a new coalition government, destined to be the last one and consisting in large measure of substantial capitalists. The Cadet Konovalov was made Kerensky’s second in command, and given the portfolio for Commerce and Industry. Kerensky also recruited the president of the Moscow stock exchange and the president of the Moscow Military Industrial Committee to the cabinet. Tereshchenko, who drew his wealth from the sugar trade, remained as Foreign Minister. Several Mensheviks held portfolios, but none of them had been of any importance in the Petrograd Soviet. A Social Revolutionary was made Minister of Agriculture.

Kerensky also mended fences with the Entente, keeping their preferred ambassador to London and naming a new one, a Cadet, to Paris.

On the same day, the Petrograd Soviet elected Trotsky as its President. Then it named a new Executive Committee consisting of thirteen Bolsheviks, six Social Revolutionaries, and three Mensheviks. Trotsky introduced and passed a resolution calling on the coalition to resign: the soon to be convened All-Russian Congress of Soviets would “create a genuinely revolutionary government.”

Thus the Bolsheviks continued to be quite open about their claims on the state power. The step missing from Trotsky’s resolution, of course, is armed insurrection.

Trotsky also adduces evidence about the deterioration of Kerensky’s mental condition during this time. Miliukov, for example, called it “psychic neurasthenia.” He later wrote that Kerensky’s friends had observed him pass from “extreme failure of energy” to “extreme excitement under the influence of drugs” during the course of a day. Kerensky was under the treatment of his own Minister of Public Welfare, Kishkin, professionally a psychiatrist, politically a Cadet.

September 10 – August 28, 1917: Kerensky Negotiates

Kerensky summons Commissar Savinkov to the Winter Palace. When he arrived at about 4:00 a.m., General Alexiev and Foreign Minister Tereshchenko were already there. They began talking as if there had been some kind of misunderstanding between Kerensky and Kornilov, thinking to deceive the public with this explanation. Kerensky asked the press not to print anything about his rift with Kornilov, but it was already too late.

The cruiser Aurora sailed to the Winter Palace from Kronstadt that day at about noon. The revolutionary sailors were thus on guard, whether over or for Kerensky was still to be determined.

Towards evening, Miliukov arrived at the palace and offered to mediate between Kerensky and Kornilov. Kerensky seems to have welcomed this, accepting Miliukov’s argument that the balance of power then lay with Kornilov. Miliukov did not disclose that he and his friends on the bourgeois right had Alexiev in mind to succeed Kerensky.

Later still, word came to the palace that Russia’s allies in the Entente were willing, “in the interests of humanity,” to bridge the difficulties between Kornilov and Kerensky. British Ambassador Buchanan had given Foreign Minister Tereshchenko a note to this effect.

Kerensky called the “retired” Cadet ministers to the palace. But before they could reach any decisions, alarming (but false) news that the enemy was nearing the capital was received. So they began to talk again about forming a directory with Alexiev in it. Miliukov’s plan was about to bear fruit.

Then there came a knock at the door. It was Tseretilli, returned from the Soviet to announce its demands. There would be no negotiations with Kornilov; instead the Committee of Defense would continue the struggle. 

Kerensky and his cohorts had no answer for this, no means of compelling the Soviet to abandon its decision. The meeting broke up, the Cadet ministers having resigned the cabinet for good this time. After everyone took his leave, Kerensky spent the night in nearly “complete solitude,” no longer, presumably, singing opera.

Meanwhile Krymov was actually withdrawing from Luga on the evening of the 28^th (September 10, new style). The Committee of Defense took control of the Southwestern Front through the soldiers committees. The Rumanian, Western, and Caucasian Fronts telegraphed the Winter Palace in support of the revolution and against Kornilov. The Northern Front, which Kornilov had suborned, got a new commander who later volunteered for the Red Army.

Kaledin, the Cossack general and political leader, was in the Don steppes, riding around the countryside and testing the mood of the people. Effectively neutral, he was emphatically not forming another front against the Provisional Government. Likewise, the fifth column in Petrograd promised by the League of Officers never showed itself. The provocateurs who were supposed to have drawn the Bolsheviks into the streets left for Finland, taking their allotment of money – what they hadn’t already spent on parties – with them.

August 27 – August 14, 1917: State Conference Concludes

As the second and final session of the State Conference in Moscow begins, the left applauds Prime Minister Kerensky when he enters, and the right applauds General Kornilov. Then Kerensky proposed an ovation for the army, and everyone joined in.

When Kornilov was invited to speak, the delegates rose in thunderous applause. All, that is, except the delegates of the soldiery. A shouting match ensued; Kerensky called for order. Kornilov’s speech blamed the legislation of the Provisional Government for reducing the army to a “crazy mob.” He warned the conference that if Riga (in Latvia, then threatened by the Germans) were taken, was the “road to Petrograd is open.” The Bolshevik paper in Moscow commented that as defeat at Tarnopol “made Kornilov commander-in-chief, the surrender of Riga might make him dictator.”

After a speech by an archbishop of the Church Council condemning the government for unbelief, General Kaledin, representing the Cossack armies, spoke. He endorsed Kornilov’s policies for prosecution of the war: militarizing the railroads and factories, permitting death penalty in the rear, and putting the Petrograd garrison under Kornilov’s command. And he added another one: abolish the soldiers’ committees formed at the company and regimental levels after the February Revolution. The right liked this a lot better than the left.

The left spoke next, in the person of Cheidze, president of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. He defended the soldiers’ committees and the soviets, but spoke against forcible expropriation of lands by the peasantry. Neither did the next speaker, representing the Executive Committee of the peasants’ soviet, make any contribution to the resolution of the agrarian question. Now the contradictions between left and right had become palpable, and it was becoming possible to perceive the paralysis of the Provisional Government in which these irreconcilable differences were joined.

Proving that the device of putting people in the audience to serve as objects of rhetoric and applause is not new, the prisoners of Schlusselburg were announced. These survivors of the 1905 revolution were thus honored by, among others, their formerly tsarist jailors, now turned bourgeois liberal: Generals Alexiev, Kornilov, Kaledin; the archbishop; Rodzianko and Guchov, next to speak.

Guchov, the Provisional Government’s first war minister, had to admit the government was “the shadow of a power.” Rodzianko, president of the bourgeois-dominated Duma, recommended that body, on account of its constitutional legitimacy, as a guide to the Provisional Government. This drew laughter from the left, as the legitimacy of the Duma had evaporated when its creator, the tsar, had been deposed.

Then Kerensky read a telegram from President Wilson, who preferred the result of the February Revolution to tsarism, saying the American and Russian governments “are pursuing no selfish aims” in the war.

The agenda swung back towards the left. Tseretilli defended the role of the soviets and the soldiers’ committees in the revolution.

Then back to the right. Miliukov recounted what he considered the “mistakes of the revolutionary democracy,” all of which, it just so happens, had led to the resignations of Cadet ministers. Among the “capitulations” he described were allowing the solders’ committees to be formed, and failing to suppress seizures of land by the peasants. This latter comment was directed at the Minister of Agriculture, Chernov.

The Menshevik Tseretilli spoke again, promising even harsher measures against the Bolsheviks.

After that the pendulum swung right to left and back ceaselessly. General Alexiev, formerly the tsar’s commander-in-chief, called for discipline in the army. He was answered by left-leaning officers who defended Kerensky. Officers crippled by the war speak for the right; crippled enlisted men for the left. The head of the railroad workers’ union spoke against the counter-revolution, and was answered by a magnate of the industry and a bank economist. Trotsky lists many more such pairings.

The conference was reaching the bottom of Kerensky’s agenda. An anarchist, oddly, received the applause of the right. Plekhanov, the oldest of the first Russian Marxists still living, was applauded from both sides. He mentioned, a little prematurely, the “unhappy memory of Lenin.”

That evening a representative of the Union of Horse Breeders (all large landowners, of course) spoke against land reform and in favor of the war. Then, to clamorous applause, Tseretilli shook hands with a railroad magnate. Even Miliukov thought this was insincere, but necessary.

As the end approached, a young Cossack officer pointed out that “the working Cossacks were not with Kaledin,” the Cossack general who had spoken earlier in the day. The right did not like this; an officer called out, “German marks!” This caused an explosion, nearly a fight. But it showed that the split in Russian society so plain at the conference extended even to the Cossack armies.

At last, Kerensky took the floor again. As the man in the middle between left and right, he urged “better understanding” and “better respect.” Then he relapsed into a self-absorbed melodrama reminiscent of Hitler’s maxim, the strong man is strongest when alone, but without the strength. A passage from Miliukov quoted by Trotsky describes the speech; it left “the hall…stupefied, and this time both halves of it.”

August 26 – August 13, 1917: State Conference in Recess

Apparently, August 13 fell on a Sunday in the old style calendar for 1917 in Russia. So the State Conference went into recess for the day.

Kornilov took a few moments to confide in Miliukov that he felt the (expected) fall of Riga to the Germans would be too great an “opportunity” to pass up. As we will see, he’d already set the date for his insurrection. He let Miliukov know about that too.

Week of July 26 – July 13, 1917: The State Duma is Heard From

At about this time, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma passes a resolution denouncing the “Government of Salvation.” The State Duma was an institutional relic of tsarism; though it had been democratically elected, it had no official role in the dual government. Nevertheless the resolution was enough to bring the cabinet down. All the ministers handed in their portfolios to Kerensky, who now became the sole focal point of the government.

Kerensky apparently suffered the ministers to continue in their posts for the time being, but took advantage of the situation to negotiate with the Cadets for the formation of a new governing coalition. The Cadets, guided by Miliukov, laid down four conditions in their opening position:

·         Ministers responsible only “to their own conscience”

·         Unity with the Entente

·         Discipline in the armies

·         Social reforms to be decided by the Constituent Assembly, that is, only after it had been convened

While this was going on, the right-socialist Ministers Tseretilli, of Interior, and Peshekhonov, of Food Supply, took action, or at any rate made pronouncements, designed to protect landlords from the peasants who wanted their lands. Chernov, the Social Revolutionary Minister of Agriculture, resigned when accusations of German contacts shifted to him.

July 15 – July 2, 1917: Cadets Resign Their Ministries

The four ministers representing the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) in the Coalition Government resign en masse. The Cadets had been the voice of the bourgeoisie in the government, led by former Minister of War Miliukov, whom Kerensky replaced in May.

The resignations became the signal for the July Days. Trotsky analyzes the Cadet political strategy as follows. The pretext for the resignations was an agreement the Coalition Government struck with the Ukraine; it did not accommodate the imperial ambitions of the bourgeoisie sufficiently well. The timing coincided with the failure of the summer offensive, known to the well-informed in the capital if not to the public generally. Thus the right-socialists remaining in the government would have to face the fallout of the failure, including the protests of the revolutionary masses, alone. If the government (a “coalition” now of only right-socialist parties) had to put down the anticipated demonstrations by force, an opening might develop for weakening the Soviet side of the dual government. So Miliukov may have thought. And things did start to work out along these lines.

Meanwhile, Trotsky and Lunacharsky addressed the Machine Gun regiment on the occasion of the departure of one of their companies to the front as replacements. This was the regiment that, after the June Demonstration, had resolved not to send out replacements unless the war “…shall have a revolutionary character.” They now declared this company the “last” replacement company they would agree to send. The regiment proved to be an open flame amid the combustibles of the July Days.

Also on this day, on the occasion of a conference of the Trotskyites, Pravda printed a statement on their behalf, saying that there were “no differences either in principle or tactics” between them and the Bolsheviks.

May 13 – April 30, 1917: Miliukov Resigns

Unable to resist backlash for the handling of his policy on the war and annexation (i.e., the Dardanelles), Miliukov resigns his post as Foreign Minister. Guchov, the Minister of War, having refused to sign the Declaration of the Rights of the Soldiers, also resigned his post.

This left some portfolios open for distribution to the socialists who had been invited to join the Provisional Government. Already some of the provincial soviets, including that of Moscow, had declared against participation. On the other hand, some of the soldiers seemed to prefer having a socialist in charge of the war.

May 4 – April 21, 1917: The Dual Government Meets

As the workers and soldiers regather in the streets, ministers of the Provisional Government meet with the Executive Committee of the Soviet. Neither side of the dual government knew what to do about the demonstrations. Prince Lvov, President of the Council of Ministers, thought maybe the Provisional Government should withdraw. Chernov, Minister of Agriculture, said it might be sufficient for Miliukov to exchange the Foreign Ministry for the portfolio of the Minister of Public Education. Miliukov refused both that suggestion and the suggestion that he write a new note. Some members of the Soviet would apparently have been satisfied with a better explanation of the first one.

Meanwhile the demonstrations, which had been announced by Bolshevik workers from Vyborg, continued. The demonstrators ignored the plea of the President of the Petrograd Soviet, Cheidze, to disperse. Counterdemonstrators, organized by the Cadet Party, clashed with the workers. General Kornilov made good his threat to mobilize cavalry and artillery against the workers. Some officers tried to seize one of their banners. Gunfire was exchanged.

But the Soviet ordered the revolutionary regiments to stay in their barracks, and Kornilov’s to return there. The soldiers obeyed the Soviet’s orders; thereafter none of the troops would march unless the orders were counter-signed by the Soviet.

For its part, the Executive Committee would be satisfied with a verbal explanation of Miliukov’s note; he was not compelled to resign. Having come so close to civil war in the capital (and the situation was much the same in Moscow), the Soviet ordered demonstrations to stop for two days. The Bolshevik Central Committee subsequently agreed to the halt.

May 3 – April 20, 1917: The April Days

The text of Miluvov’s note hits the Petrograd papers, sparking three days of demonstrations: the “April Days.”

The Finland Regiment marched to the seat of the Provisional Government at the head of over 30,000 armed soldiers. Workers left their factories and joined them. The banners read, “Down with Miliukov!" “Down with Guchov,” Minister of War in the Provisional Government, too.

The demonstrators lacked a specific program; nor was the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, hastily reconvened, able to supply one. In reaction, General Kornilov, not for the last time, offers troops for suppressing the demonstrations; bourgeois agitators denounce Lenin as a German agent.