Evidence that the
party was not unanimously behind the resolution of the Bolshevik Central
Committee for insurrection is not long to appear. Naturally Zinoviev and
Kamenev spoke up first. Other members of the Central Committee who were not at
the meeting
of the 10th (October 23, new style) joined in their
reservations. Volodarsky also did.
On this day.
Zinoviev and Kamenev circulated a lengthy pamphlet calling insurrection an
unjustified gamble; the Bolsheviks, relying on their strength in the soviets,
ought to work as an opposition party in the Constituent Assembly instead. They argued
that the “mood” of the masses did not match that of the July Days, and that Bolshevik
strength in the electorate would continue to grow.
But Lenin was not
trying to win an election; he was trying to win a revolution. He and the
members of the committee who had voted for insurrection did not want to
re-establish the dual government in a new parliamentary body, and there carry
on the debate until the people lost interest and gave up. On the contrary he
thought “[t]he success of the Russian and world revolution depends upon a two
or three days’ struggle.” This was his
understanding of the mood of the people and the corresponding consequences of
delay. And, as to the Russian Revolution at least, Lenin was right.
Meanwhile, the
commander of the Northern Front, General Cheremissov, demanded a reinforcement
of troops from the Petrograd garrison. In response, the Executive Committee of
the Petrograd Soviet named the Military Revolutionary Committee and charged it
with deciding questions of this kind. A left Social Revolutionary, Lazimir,
headed the committee. His instructions were such that the regulations he was to
draft would serve armed insurrection and the defense of the capital equally
well.
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