October 5 – September 22, 1917: Bolsheviks
Will Attend. Riazanov, a Marxist of long standing, announces that the
Bolsheviks will attend the Pre-Parliament in order to “expose all attempts at a
new coalition with the bourgeoisie.”
Meanwhile,
delegates of the disbanded Democratic Convention brought the question of
convening the Congress of Soviets before the Central Executive Committee. The
Bolsheviks demanded that it convene within two weeks, otherwise they would call
their own congress of delegates from the Moscow and Petrograd soviets, where
they had majorities. The Central Executive agreed to call the All Russian
Congress on October 20 (November 2, new style).
October 6 – September 23, 1917: Bolsheviks
Will Not Attend. In a letter, Lenin argues forcefully in favor
of a Bolshevik boycott of the Pre-Parliament. Not only would participation
send a mixed message to the party’s adherents about the goals of the party, it
would mean working in the wrong direction. The party should be working where it
has strength, in the soviets, factory committees, trade unions, soldiers
committees; not in a forum got up by the Compromisers and bourgeoisie to cover
up their weakness.
This view of the
matter gained acceptance within the party as the meeting of the Pre-Parliament
approached.
October 7 – September 24, 1917: Railroad
Strike. The frustration of railroad workers over a long-awaited raise boils
over into a strike. Nothing had been done about the raise since the February
Revolution. With numerous railroad lines paralyzed, the government offered
concessions a few days later.
The strike was
symptomatic of increasing difficulty with industrial production and in the food
supply. The overall effect was to shift the railroad workers to the left.
Meanwhile the
Bolshevik Central Committee appointed Sverdlov to monitor the Central Executive
Committee’s attitude towards the Congress of Soviets and to administer the
party’s campaign for the selection of delegates.
October 8 – September 25, 1917: The Last
Coalition and the New Soviet. Kerensky announces a new coalition
government, destined to be the last one and consisting in large measure of
substantial capitalists. The Cadet Konovalov was made Kerensky’s second in
command, and given the portfolio for Commerce and Industry. Kerensky also
recruited the president of the Moscow stock exchange and the president of the
Moscow Military Industrial Committee to the cabinet. Tereshchenko, who drew his
wealth from the sugar trade, remained as Foreign Minister. Several Mensheviks
held portfolios, but none of them had been of any importance in the Petrograd
Soviet. A Social Revolutionary was made Minister of Agriculture.
Kerensky also
mended fences with the Entente, keeping their preferred ambassador to London
and naming a new one, a Cadet, to Paris.
On the same day,
the Petrograd Soviet elected Trotsky as its President. Then it named a new
Executive Committee consisting of thirteen Bolsheviks, six Social
Revolutionaries, and three Mensheviks. Trotsky introduced and passed a
resolution calling on the coalition to resign: the soon to be convened
All-Russian Congress of Soviets would “create a genuinely revolutionary
government.”
Thus the
Bolsheviks continued to be quite open about their claims on the state power.
The step missing from Trotsky’s resolution, of course, is armed insurrection.
Trotsky also
adduces evidence about the deterioration of Kerensky’s mental condition during
this time. Miliukov, for example, called it “psychic neurasthenia.” He later
wrote that Kerensky’s friends had observed him pass from “extreme failure of
energy” to “extreme excitement under the influence of drugs” during the course
of a day. Kerensky was under the treatment of his own Minister of Public
Welfare, Kishkin, professionally a psychiatrist, politically a Cadet.
October 9 – September 26, 1917: Second
Thoughts. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets discovers it would
be impolitic to hold the Congress of Soviets as early as two weeks thence. The
compromisist parties saw they could not campaign effectively for the
Constituent Assembly if they had to be campaigning for the Congress of Soviets
as well.
The Menshevik Dan
moved for a delay. Trotsky responded for the Bolsheviks that if the Central
Executive would not call the Congress under its constitution, the Bosheviks
would call it on behalf of the revolution. The motion carried, for a delay
until October 20 (November 2, new style); the result will be seen in the
sequel.
October 9-10 – September 26-27, 1917:
September Theses. Lenin publishes “Tasks of
the Revolution,“ a kind of September version of the April
Theses, in Rabochy Put. There are
seven tasks; though some of them address issues already addressed in the April
Theses, they all take account of developments in the interim.
The first two
tasks lead to forming the new revolutionary state: all power must pass to the
workers, soldiers and peasants through their representatives in the soviets; no
compromise with the bourgeoisie or their political apparatus is possible.
The third
reiterates the party’s war policy against indemnities, annexation, and
defensism. Lenin lays out specific actions against contingencies during the
lead up to, and after, the insurrection.
The agrarian
policy of the Bolsheviks does not change, but acquires new force in light of
the inaction of the Compromisers and the peasant revolt.
The fifth task
recognizes that the progress of the revolution and the soviets has given the
workers more ability to control the means of production. Therefore this, not as
in April just the development of the soviets, becomes the task.
The last two
tasks offer measures for combating the counter-revolution, something that had
already been done successfully once with the defeat of Kornilov.
On the 10th
(September 27, new style), Lenin, still anxious about putting off the
insurrection until the Congress of Soviets could be convened some two weeks
thence, wrote
to Smilga, the President of the Finnish Regional Committee and a member of
the Central Committee. Lenin let Smilga know that the revolutionary troops in
Finland and the Baltic Fleet might be called upon to advance on Petrograd. He
asked Smilga do to a number of other things, both in the political open and
underground. One, interestingly, was to prepare identification papers for him
in the name of Konstantin Petrovich Ivanov. That’s
how he signed the letter.
October 10 – September 27, 1917: Resolution
in Reval. The soviets of Reval (now Tallinn), the capital of Estonia and
the next line of defense if the Germans should decide to march on Petrograd,
demand that the Pre-Parliament disband and that a congress of soviets be called
to form the government. This was one of a number of similar resolutions in a battle
of resolutions between the Bolsheviks and the Compromisers on the Central
Executive Committee.
On another front,
the resolution also demanded that the soviets must agree to troop transfers.
This policy would prevent, for example, the government from transferring troops
loyal to the revolution out of the Petrograd garrison. It was to become an
issue as the Bolsheviks prepared for insurrection. In theory, Trotsky observes,
the maintenance and deployment of armed forces is a fundamental right of the state.
But the policy the resolution advocates had been a feature of the dual government since the February Revolution. Now it would
become a feature of preparation for insurrection.
After October 10 – September 27, 1917:
Northern Regional Conference of Soviets. In another “well calculated blow”
(according to Trotsky) in the battle over the All-Russian Congress of Soviets,
the Bolsheviks arrange for a conference of soviets of the northern region. This
was a region of Bolshevik strength; the soviets of Petrograd, its suburbs,
Moscow, Kronstadt, Helsinki, and Reval would send delegates, to arrive on
October 13 (October 26, new style), a week before the declared date for the
Congress of Soviets.
October 12-October 20 – September
29-October 7, 1917: Operation Albion. Germany launches an amphibious
operation to secure the West Estonian Archipelago. These islands lay at the
entrance to the Gulf of Riga; they were a stepping stone from Riga (taken on
August 21, old style) to Petrograd. Russian resistance ended shortly after the
naval Battle of
Moon Sound.
October 14 – October 1, 1917: Lenin on the
State Power. Lenin’s pamphlet “Can the
Bolsheviks Retain State Power?” is published. This detailed argument starts
by quoting statements in the bourgeois and compromisist press to the effect
that the Bolsheviks could not hold
the power, even that the best way to get rid of them would be to let them try
and see them fail. Lenin disputes the claims made to support these conclusions.
For example, to
the claim the proletariat "will not be able technically to lay hold of the
state apparatus," Lenin replies, first, why bother? The existing state
apparatus, that of the Provisional Government, is broken and useless and
deserves rather to be smashed up altogether. And second, what do you suppose
the soviets are for? They are the new
state apparatus, closer to the people and more democratic. They were already at
work, and, I might add, the only difference between the existing power of the
soviets and “All Power to the Soviets!” was one of degree.
Knowing that
after an insurrection the Bolsheviks would be faced by the question of state
power, Lenin took some of the time of his enforced exile to continue his work
on The State and Revolution, an
analysis of Marxist texts on the evolution of the state through and after a
revolution. When he wrote the pamphlet, he said the book would hopefully be
available soon, but it was not published until after the October
Revolution.
October 16 – October 3, 1917: A Moscow
Resolution. The Bolshevik Central Committee learns of a resolution of the
Moscow Regional Bureau condemning them for irresolution on the question of
insurrection. Trotsky says that “beyond a doubt” Lenin was behind the
resolution and its “bitter” tone.
The committee
left the matter on the table for a time; the result will be seen in the sequel.
October 17 – October 4, 1917: Battle of
Moon Sound. When they observe German minesweepers attempting to clear the
minefields protecting the passage into the Gulf of Riga, the Baltic Fleet
attacks, hoping to forestall the German amphibious assault on Moon Island.
German battleships exchanged fire with the Russian battleship Slava, which was
so badly damaged it had to be scuttled. Though seven German minesweepers were
sunk, the German fleet gained control of the sound. This led to the final
success of Operation
Albion, and put another scare into Petrograd.
Wikipedia has details on the battle,
including the timetable of engagements and a list of ships damaged or sunk.
The American
journalist Reed says this was also the day the first number of Rabochy i Soldat (Worker and Soldier)
was published.
October 18 – October 5, 1917: Change of
Plans. The Bolshevik Central Committee votes, with only Kamenev dissenting,
to reverse the decision
of October 3 (September 20, old style) in favor of sending its delegates to
the Pre-Parliament.
Beginning October 19 – October 6, 1917:
Evacuate Petrograd? After the success of the German
amphibious operation against the archipelago at the entrance to the Gulf of
Riga, the government floats the idea of evacuating itself to Moscow. Naturally
the forces responsible for the defense of Petrograd objected. On October 19th
(October 6, old style), the soldiers section of the Petrograd Soviet adopted
Trotsky’s resolution calling on the government, if it could not defend the
capital, either to make peace or step aside.
Neither did the
government’s proposal gain any traction with the Compromisers on the Central
Executive Committee, who were told that in the event of a move they would have
to fend for themselves. For their part, the workers considered Petrograd their
fortress.
Within a week’s
time, and after a subsequent demand by the delegates of the Pre-Parliament, the
government decided to stay in the Winter Palace and convene the Constituent
Assembly in the Tauride Palace.
October 20 – October 7, 1917:
Pre-Parliament Meets. As the delegates to the Council of the Republic, or
Pre-Parliament, prepare to assemble, its President, the Social Revolutionary
Avksentiev, visits with Trotsky to ask what is going to happen. (Rumors had
been circulating about the Bolsheviks
withdrawing.) Trotsky says he answered, “A mere nothing, a little shot from
a pistol.”
Problems for the
Pre-Parliament had appeared on the horizon. Kerensky said long before that the
Provisional Government would determine its organization and staff in its own
discretion. The new
Coalition Government was now a fait
accompli. So much for the resolution
of the Democratic Conference reserving to its permanent body the sanction
of those choices. Moreover, if they had their way, the Cadets would not give
the Pre-Parliament legislative powers either. But they feared the powers of a
constituent assembly even more, such was their standing among the mass of
voters. Note that, at this point, both the Bolsheviks and the Cadets still
supported, at least verbally, holding elections for a constituent assembly, an
organization that would normally have powers to form a constitution.
The delegates
expected at the Mariinsky Palace were aligned by party as follows:
·
120 Social Revolutionaries
·
60 Mensheviks
·
66 Bolsheviks
·
156 from the bourgeois parties, half of them
Cadets.
Some of them may
have noticed that the Bolshevik seat on the five-member praesidium went
unoccupied.
Kerensky gave the
opening speech. Though the government, he said, possessed “the fulness of
power,” he was nevertheless willing to listen to “any genuinely valuable
suggestion.” This was, of course, more polite than it was democratic.
Under rules of
order adopted from the now-defunct State Duma, the Bolsheviks were accorded ten
minutes to address the council. Trotsky began by questioning the purpose and
composition of the Pre-Parliament. He accused the bourgeoisie of plotting to
“quash the Constituent Assembly.”
Pleased with the
response to this, Trotsky continued with his prepared text. He denounced the
policies of the Provisional Government as effectively “compelling the masses to
insurrection,” and the government’s proposal to abandon Petrograd to the
Germans as a step in a “counter-revolutionary conspiracy.”
This got an even
bigger reaction. Finally Trotsky announced the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks
from the Pre-Parliament. In his peroration he warned, “Petrograd is in danger!
The revolution is in danger! The people are in danger! …We address ourselves to
the people. All power to the soviets!” And he and the other Bolsheviks left the
hall, leaving behind only a few as observers.
Foreign Minister
Tereshchenko telegraphed the embassies of the Entente that the withdrawal of
the Bolsheviks was “a mere scandal.” In his history of the revolution, the
Cadet Miliukov more insightfully writes that the Bolsheviks spoke and acted
“like people feeling a power behind them.”
There followed in
the Pre-Parliament three days of discussion on the war. The American journalist
Reed says he heard Martov speak in favor of at least raising the “question of
peace,” but the debate ended lamely with a request that the Pre-Parliament be included
in the delegation to the coming Paris Conference of the Entente. They planned
to send the Menshevik Skobelev with instructions: no indemnities, no
annexations, no secret diplomacy; neutralization of canals and straights,
including those of Panama and Suez; gradual disarmament. Believing Skobelev
would be ignored, the Cadets made no objection to these instructions.
This was also the
day that General Cheremissov, the commander of the Northern Front, summoned
representatives of the Petrograd Soviet to a meeting at Pskov. At lot was to
happen before the meeting could take place. Meanwhile Cheremissov was in
nominal command of the Petrograd garrison.
October 20 – October 7, 1917: “The Crisis
is Ripe” Lenin publishes “The Crisis
Is Ripe” in Rabochy Put on this
day. Lenin’s articles had been anticipating the vote of the Central Committee
on insurrection for some weeks. This particular article, among other things,
draws a connection between the call for insurrection and both the agrarian and
nationalities questions.
The Bolshevik
policy on the agrarian question dated back to Lenin’s April
Theses. As against the failure of either the Provisional Government or the
Compromisers to act, he argued, it remains the correct policy for joining the
workers’ insurrection to the on-going peasant revolt.
The importance of
the nationalities question to the timing of the insurrection, Lenin also
argued, is illustrated by the vote of their delegates in the Democratic
Conference. The nationalities were second only to the labor unions in voting
against coalition at the conference.
But these
questions were secondary in Lenin’s mind to the question of the “world working-class revolution.” Trotsky
says this had always been Lenin’s point of departure. Even though capitalism in
Russia lagged behind Europe and America, the crisis had come in Russia first.
The ripeness of the crisis meant precisely that the Russian insurrection should
not be held back, lest the opportunity pass forever and for workers everywhere.
In Lenin’s
opinion this meant not waiting for the Congress of Soviets, still two weeks
off. He thought the forces in Finland, where the soviets and the Baltic Fleet
were already in a state equivalent to insurrection, would be a sufficient
reinforcement for those already in Petrograd and Moscow. Moreover, his doubts
about parliamentary struggle and the ability of such institutions to bring
about world proletarian revolution applied not only to the Pre-Parliament, but
to the Congress of Soviets as well.
And then, to
emphasize his point (in a portion of the letter not intended for publication),
Lenin resigned from the Central Committee. Trotsky believes he can explain this
action. Bolshevik party discipline called for members to accept and support the
democratically decided line of the party. As a member of the Central Committee,
Lenin was already approaching the limit set by this rule. If he resigned,
perhaps, he would be freer to advocate what he thought was the correct line on
insurrection. It was another instance of the masses being to the left of the
party.
But the
resignation was not accepted and nothing more came of it. Meanwhile Lenin’s
wife, Krupskaya, travelled to the party’s district meetings and read this and
his other letters to the rank and file.
October 21 – October 8, 1917: Lenin
Agitates. In an address to the Bolshevik delegates of the Northern Regional
Conference of Soviets, Lenin argues for the line he took in “The Crisis
Is Ripe.” He did not want to put off the insurrection until the Congress of
Soviets, still almost two weeks away. He wanted the revolutionary soldiers and
sailors based in Finland to make “an immediate move on Petrograd.”
Once again,
Trotsky says, as in April with his theses, Lenin had placed himself in
isolation, ahead and to the left of the party and its leading organ, the
Central Committee.
October 22 – October 9, 1917: Military
Revolutionary Committee. Reacting to the German occupation of the Western
Estonian Archipelago, the Compromisers in the Petrograd Soviet move for the
creation of a Committee of Revolutionary Defense in the capital. The initial
responsibility of the committee would be to decide questions about transfers
from the Petrograd garrison to the front, now nearer to the capital than at any
previous time in the war.
This solved a
political problem for the Bolsheviks. How could the Soviet, which they
controlled, refuse reinforcements from the garrison without appearing to have
betrayed the soldiers at the front? The motion by the Compromisers put the onus
of the decision on them.
The Compromisers
were nevertheless a little surprised when the Bolsheviks supported the motion.
A bit more parliamentary work would be required before the committee became a
reality. In the end, it became a formidable tool, Trotsky says the “chief
lever,” of the October Revolution.
At the same
meeting Trotsky gave his report on the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the
Pre-Parliament. He concluded, pretty unambiguously, “Long live the direct and
open struggle for revolutionary power!”
October 23 – October 10, 1917: Northern
Regional Conference. The Northern Regional Conference of Soviets opens in
Petrograd under the presidency of Ensign Krylenko. Antonov had organized the
meeting for the Bolshevik Central Committee – not coincidentally, as he was
also working on the Military Revolutionary Committee.
Trotsky read the
political report. The main issue had become the government’s renewed efforts to
transfer revolutionary troops from the Petrograd garrison. But this question
was connected to the question of power. By their votes, “the people are
trusting us and authorizing us to seize the power.” The question of power had
therefore become something for the whole body of soviets to decide. The
conference adopted a resolution to this effect unanimously, with only three
abstentions.
The military
resources available to the Bolsheviks made themselves heard. A representative
of the Latvian sharpshooters promised 40,000 rifles for the defense of the
Congress of Soviets. The powerful radios of battleships in the Baltic Fleet
broadcast appeals to “overcome all obstacles” to the convocation of the
Congress. Smolny was openly the center of efforts to procure weapons wherever
possible.
October 23 – October 10, 1917: The Vote for
Insurrection. At the apartment of the Menshevik Sukhanov, his wife, a
Bolshevik, receives a quorum of her party’s Central Committee. Twelve of the
twenty-one members attended, including Lenin, disguised with a wig and
spectacles, and shorn of his characteristic beard. The meeting lasted ten
hours; Sukhanov’s wife served her guests bread, sausage, and tea “for
reinforcement,” Trotsky says.
Sukhanov’s wife
had encouraged him not to tire himself by the trip home from Smolny that
evening. But one wonders if he missed the sausages or the household funds
required to procure them.
Sverdlov opened
the meeting in the usual way with a report on organization. He focused,
apparently by previous arrangement with Lenin, on suspicious activities at the
front, including an effort to surround the revolutionary garrison at Minsk with
Cossack cavalry, and communication between the headquarters of the Minsk
garrison and the general staff.
With that Lenin
began to marshal his arguments. He spoke earnestly and extemporaneously; it was
time to put an end to the waverings on the committee. The question came to a
vote sooner than Lenin might have expected: ten to two in favor of
insurrection. For the balance of the ten-hour meeting, one after another, the
members favoring insurrection tried unsuccessfully to persuade the dissenters,
Kamenev and Zinoviev, to change their minds.
The resolution
itself summarizes, somewhat elliptically, the arguments Lenin used and the
committee accepted. Lenin wrote it out, Trotsky says, with the “gnawed end of a
pencil” on a child’s notebook paper. The reasons given for immediate action
begin, in Lenin’s preferred order of precedence, with the international
situation:
·
Perceived progress in the “world-wide socialist
revolution” combined with imperialist threats to its leading edge, the Russian
Revolution
·
Kerensky’s machinations to abandon the military
stronghold of the revolution, Petrograd, to the Germans
·
The scale and intensity of the peasant revolt
·
Bolshevik majorities in elections to the
soviets, etc.
·
Counter-revolutionary preparations, including
renewed efforts to break up the Petrograd garrison
Lenin might have
added another argument he’d used before, that the people might lose confidence
in the Bolsheviks just as they had in the Social Revolutionaries and
Mensheviks, and sink back into indifference and despair. At any rate, the
resolution says, “…all this places the armed insurrection on the order of the
day.” Note that the resolution did not set a specific date for the
insurrection. Trotsky recalled that Lenin wanted Kerensky to be deposed before
the Congress of Soviets was to assemble, and so October 15th
(October 28, new style) was discussed and tentatively set.
The resolution
concludes by putting the onus of action on the party, specifically for
organizing the Northern Regional Conference of Soviets and for resisting the
break-up of the Petrograd garrison.
Reed recounts a
different story about how the vote was taken, one that has verisimilitude but
not verity. He says the vote was taken twice, at first going against
insurrection. Then a “rough workman” arose and warned the committee not to allow
the destruction of the soviets. If they did, “we’re through with you!” Then
another vote favorable to insurrection supposedly took place. Of course the
public were not invited to this secret session of the Central Committee. But
the rumor Reed picked up epitomizes the ripeness of the crisis, and the risk
that the people were growing, again in the words of the committee, “tired of words and resolutions.”
The seven-member
political bureau selected by the committee at this meeting, because it included
Zinoviev and Kamenev and because they immediately tried to stir up opposition
to the resolution, was still-born – it never met.
The Bolsheviks
also took a decision to publish a paper, Beydnoth,
addressed to the peasantry. Though the Social Revolutionaries were the
strongest vote getters in rural areas, Lenin saw an opportunity to bring the
peasants over to the party once the workers’ insurrection caught up with the
peasant revolt.
Besides this,
Trotsky gave a speech to a conference of Petrograd factory committees that day,
calling for the workers to “break through [the] wall” between them and the
peasants. On Trotsky’s motion, the conference created the “Worker to Peasant”
program, under which workers would fabricate farm implements from the waste and
scrap metal of the factories and distribute them in the provinces. But this was
not the real solution to the peasants’ problem; the effort was primarily a form
of agitation. The problem could only be addressed directly when the workers
controlled the means of production.
Meanwhile, now
that the harvest was passing, the peasant revolt was growing.
October 24 – October 11, 1917: Zinoviev and
Kamenev State Their Views. Evidence that the party was not unanimously
behind the resolution of the Bolshevik Central Committee for insurrection is
not long to appear. Naturally Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke up first. Other
members of the Central Committee who were not at the meeting
of the 10th (October 23, new style) joined in their
reservations. Volodarsky also did.
On this day.
Zinoviev and Kamenev circulated a lengthy pamphlet calling insurrection an
unjustified gamble; the Bolsheviks, relying on their strength in the soviets,
ought to work as an opposition party in the Constituent Assembly instead. They
argued that the “mood” of the masses did not match that of the July Days, and
that Bolshevik strength in the electorate would continue to grow.
But Lenin was not
trying to win an election; he was trying to win a revolution. He and the
members of the committee who had voted for insurrection did not want to
re-establish the dual government in a new parliamentary body, and there carry
on the debate until the people lost interest and gave up. On the contrary he
thought “[t]he success of the Russian and world revolution depends upon a two
or three days’ struggle.” This was his
understanding of the mood of the people and the corresponding consequences of
delay. And, as to the Russian Revolution at least, Lenin was right.
Meanwhile, the
commander of the Northern Front, General Cheremissov, demanded a reinforcement
of troops from the Petrograd garrison. In response, the Executive Committee of
the Petrograd Soviet named the Military Revolutionary Committee and charged it
with deciding questions of this kind. A left Social Revolutionary, Lazimir,
headed the committee. His instructions were such that the regulations he was to
draft would serve armed insurrection and the defense of the capital equally
well.
