Red October Approaches

 

One hundred years ago this week, plus three, the pace of events leading up to the October Revolution picked up, so much so that I will post weekly instead of day-by-day during this time.

October 25 – October 12, 1917: Regulations for Insurrection. Draft regulations from the newly formed Military Revolutionary Committee, useful for an insurrection but with ample precedents since the February Revolution, were approved by the Petrograd Soviet. Read  about it here.

October 28 – October 15, 1917: Reed’s Interviews at Smolny. The American journalist John Reed, author of Ten Days That Shook the World, interviewed Kamenev and Volodarsky, members of the Bolshevik Central Committee, among other things about the coming Congress of Soviets. They did discuss the transfer of state power to the soviets, but not, of course, the manner in which it actually was to come about. Read about it here.

October 29 – October 16, 1917: Why the Delay? Lenin, in exile and therefore not fully informed about the state of things in the capital, called a meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee and ventured into the suburbs of Petrograd to attend it. Having received assurances that things were moving with such speed and force that the insurrection could hardly be stopped, he moved a resolution of “vigorous preparations.” It prevailed, again, with only Kamenev and Zinoviev dissenting. Read about it here.

October 30 – October 17, 1917: Congress Postponed. Right-socialists on the Central Executive Committee of the soviets put off the planned national Congress of Soviets by five days, hoping to increase their share of the vote during the interim. The tactic backfired: the Bolsheviks were the gainers by it. Read about it here.

October 31 – October 18, 1917: The Garrison Conference. In a development that would prove to be decisive, the units of the Petrograd garrison nearly unanimously adopted the policy that orders not countersigned by the Petrograd Soviet would not be obeyed. This of course left the right-socialists of the Central Executive Committee of the soviets out of the loop. For the Petrograd Soviet was dominated by the Bolsheviks. Read about it here.

You can read the whole chapter on the Correlation of Forces here, and the chapter on the Day of the Petrograd Soviet here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

Vote for Insurrection

 

One hundred years ago today, plus three, and a day after the Petrograd Soviet had proposed to create a Military Revolutionary Committee for the defense of the capital and thus of the revolution itself, the Bolshevik Central Committee met in a suburban apartment. Lenin, who attended in disguise, moved a vote for armed insurrection, which prevailed 10 votes to 2.

We’ll see about the dissenting votes in another post. Meanwhile, read about the Military Revolutionary Committee here, and the vote for insurrection here. Or read the whole chapter on Lenin’s Insurrection here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

Lenin’s Insurrection

October 5 – September 22, 1917: Bolsheviks Will Attend. Riazanov, a Marxist of long standing, announces that the Bolsheviks will attend the Pre-Parliament in order to “expose all attempts at a new coalition with the bourgeoisie.”

Meanwhile, delegates of the disbanded Democratic Convention brought the question of convening the Congress of Soviets before the Central Executive Committee. The Bolsheviks demanded that it convene within two weeks, otherwise they would call their own congress of delegates from the Moscow and Petrograd soviets, where they had majorities. The Central Executive agreed to call the All Russian Congress on October 20 (November 2, new style).

October 6 – September 23, 1917: Bolsheviks Will Not Attend. In a letter, Lenin argues forcefully in favor of a Bolshevik boycott of the Pre-Parliament. Not only would participation send a mixed message to the party’s adherents about the goals of the party, it would mean working in the wrong direction. The party should be working where it has strength, in the soviets, factory committees, trade unions, soldiers committees; not in a forum got up by the Compromisers and bourgeoisie to cover up their weakness.

This view of the matter gained acceptance within the party as the meeting of the Pre-Parliament approached.

October 7 – September 24, 1917: Railroad Strike. The frustration of railroad workers over a long-awaited raise boils over into a strike. Nothing had been done about the raise since the February Revolution. With numerous railroad lines paralyzed, the government offered concessions a few days later.

The strike was symptomatic of increasing difficulty with industrial production and in the food supply. The overall effect was to shift the railroad workers to the left. 

Meanwhile the Bolshevik Central Committee appointed Sverdlov to monitor the Central Executive Committee’s attitude towards the Congress of Soviets and to administer the party’s campaign for the selection of delegates.

October 8 – September 25, 1917: The Last Coalition and the New Soviet. Kerensky announces a new coalition government, destined to be the last one and consisting in large measure of substantial capitalists. The Cadet Konovalov was made Kerensky’s second in command, and given the portfolio for Commerce and Industry. Kerensky also recruited the president of the Moscow stock exchange and the president of the Moscow Military Industrial Committee to the cabinet. Tereshchenko, who drew his wealth from the sugar trade, remained as Foreign Minister. Several Mensheviks held portfolios, but none of them had been of any importance in the Petrograd Soviet. A Social Revolutionary was made Minister of Agriculture.

Kerensky also mended fences with the Entente, keeping their preferred ambassador to London and naming a new one, a Cadet, to Paris.

On the same day, the Petrograd Soviet elected Trotsky as its President. Then it named a new Executive Committee consisting of thirteen Bolsheviks, six Social Revolutionaries, and three Mensheviks. Trotsky introduced and passed a resolution calling on the coalition to resign: the soon to be convened All-Russian Congress of Soviets would “create a genuinely revolutionary government.”

Thus the Bolsheviks continued to be quite open about their claims on the state power. The step missing from Trotsky’s resolution, of course, is armed insurrection.

Trotsky also adduces evidence about the deterioration of Kerensky’s mental condition during this time. Miliukov, for example, called it “psychic neurasthenia.” He later wrote that Kerensky’s friends had observed him pass from “extreme failure of energy” to “extreme excitement under the influence of drugs” during the course of a day. Kerensky was under the treatment of his own Minister of Public Welfare, Kishkin, professionally a psychiatrist, politically a Cadet.

October 9 – September 26, 1917: Second Thoughts. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets discovers it would be impolitic to hold the Congress of Soviets as early as two weeks thence. The compromisist parties saw they could not campaign effectively for the Constituent Assembly if they had to be campaigning for the Congress of Soviets as well.

The Menshevik Dan moved for a delay. Trotsky responded for the Bolsheviks that if the Central Executive would not call the Congress under its constitution, the Bosheviks would call it on behalf of the revolution. The motion carried, for a delay until October 20 (November 2, new style); the result will be seen in the sequel.

October 9-10 – September 26-27, 1917: September Theses. Lenin publishes “Tasks of the Revolution,“ a kind of September version of the April Theses, in Rabochy Put. There are seven tasks; though some of them address issues already addressed in the April Theses, they all take account of developments in the interim.

The first two tasks lead to forming the new revolutionary state: all power must pass to the workers, soldiers and peasants through their representatives in the soviets; no compromise with the bourgeoisie or their political apparatus is possible.

The third reiterates the party’s war policy against indemnities, annexation, and defensism. Lenin lays out specific actions against contingencies during the lead up to, and after, the insurrection.

The agrarian policy of the Bolsheviks does not change, but acquires new force in light of the inaction of the Compromisers and the peasant revolt.

The fifth task recognizes that the progress of the revolution and the soviets has given the workers more ability to control the means of production. Therefore this, not as in April just the development of the soviets, becomes the task.

The last two tasks offer measures for combating the counter-revolution, something that had already been done successfully once with the defeat of Kornilov.

On the 10^th (September 27, new style), Lenin, still anxious about putting off the insurrection until the Congress of Soviets could be convened some two weeks thence, wrote to Smilga, the President of the Finnish Regional Committee and a member of the Central Committee. Lenin let Smilga know that the revolutionary troops in Finland and the Baltic Fleet might be called upon to advance on Petrograd. He asked Smilga do to a number of other things, both in the political open and underground. One, interestingly, was to prepare identification papers for him in the name of Konstantin Petrovich Ivanov. That’s how he signed the letter.

October 10 – September 27, 1917: Resolution in Reval. The soviets of Reval (now Tallinn), the capital of Estonia and the next line of defense if the Germans should decide to march on Petrograd, demand that the Pre-Parliament disband and that a congress of soviets be called to form the government. This was one of a number of similar resolutions in a battle of resolutions between the Bolsheviks and the Compromisers on the Central Executive Committee.

On another front, the resolution also demanded that the soviets must agree to troop transfers. This policy would prevent, for example, the government from transferring troops loyal to the revolution out of the Petrograd garrison. It was to become an issue as the Bolsheviks prepared for insurrection. In theory, Trotsky observes, the maintenance and deployment of armed forces is a fundamental right of the state. But the policy the resolution advocates had been a feature of the dual government since the February Revolution. Now it would become a feature of preparation for insurrection.

After October 10 – September 27, 1917: Northern Regional Conference of Soviets. In another “well calculated blow” (according to Trotsky) in the battle over the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Bolsheviks arrange for a conference of soviets of the northern region. This was a region of Bolshevik strength; the soviets of Petrograd, its suburbs, Moscow, Kronstadt, Helsinki, and Reval would send delegates, to arrive on October 13 (October 26, new style), a week before the declared date for the Congress of Soviets.

October 12-October 20 – September 29-October 7, 1917: Operation Albion. Germany launches an amphibious operation to secure the West Estonian Archipelago. These islands lay at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga; they were a stepping stone from Riga (taken on August 21, old style) to Petrograd. Russian resistance ended shortly after the naval Battle of Moon Sound.

Wikipedia has details on the operation, including a map.

October 14 – October 1, 1917: Lenin on the State Power. Lenin’s pamphlet “Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?” is published. This detailed argument starts by quoting statements in the bourgeois and compromisist press to the effect that the Bolsheviks could not hold the power, even that the best way to get rid of them would be to let them try and see them fail. Lenin disputes the claims made to support these conclusions.

For example, to the claim the proletariat "will not be able technically to lay hold of the state apparatus," Lenin replies, first, why bother? The existing state apparatus, that of the Provisional Government, is broken and useless and deserves rather to be smashed up altogether. And second, what do you suppose the soviets are for? They are the new state apparatus, closer to the people and more democratic. They were already at work, and, I might add, the only difference between the existing power of the soviets and “All Power to the Soviets!” was one of degree.

Knowing that after an insurrection the Bolsheviks would be faced by the question of state power, Lenin took some of the time of his enforced exile to continue his work on The State and Revolution, an analysis of Marxist texts on the evolution of the state through and after a revolution. When he wrote the pamphlet, he said the book would hopefully be available soon, but it was not published until after the October Revolution. 

October 16 – October 3, 1917: A Moscow Resolution. The Bolshevik Central Committee learns of a resolution of the Moscow Regional Bureau condemning them for irresolution on the question of insurrection. Trotsky says that “beyond a doubt” Lenin was behind the resolution and its “bitter” tone.

The committee left the matter on the table for a time; the result will be seen in the sequel.

October 17 – October 4, 1917: Battle of Moon Sound. When they observe German minesweepers attempting to clear the minefields protecting the passage into the Gulf of Riga, the Baltic Fleet attacks, hoping to forestall the German amphibious assault on Moon Island. German battleships exchanged fire with the Russian battleship Slava, which was so badly damaged it had to be scuttled. Though seven German minesweepers were sunk, the German fleet gained control of the sound. This led to the final success of Operation Albion, and put another scare into Petrograd.

Wikipedia has details on the battle, including the timetable of engagements and a list of ships damaged or sunk.

The American journalist Reed says this was also the day the first number of Rabochy i Soldat (Worker and Soldier) was published.

October 18 – October 5, 1917: Change of Plans. The Bolshevik Central Committee votes, with only Kamenev dissenting, to reverse the decision of October 3 (September 20, old style) in favor of sending its delegates to the Pre-Parliament.

Beginning October 19 – October 6, 1917: Evacuate Petrograd? After the success of the German amphibious operation against the archipelago at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, the government floats the idea of evacuating itself to Moscow. Naturally the forces responsible for the defense of Petrograd objected. On October 19^th (October 6, old style), the soldiers section of the Petrograd Soviet adopted Trotsky’s resolution calling on the government, if it could not defend the capital, either to make peace or step aside.

Neither did the government’s proposal gain any traction with the Compromisers on the Central Executive Committee, who were told that in the event of a move they would have to fend for themselves. For their part, the workers considered Petrograd their fortress.

Within a week’s time, and after a subsequent demand by the delegates of the Pre-Parliament, the government decided to stay in the Winter Palace and convene the Constituent Assembly in the Tauride Palace.

October 20 – October 7, 1917: Pre-Parliament Meets. As the delegates to the Council of the Republic, or Pre-Parliament, prepare to assemble, its President, the Social Revolutionary Avksentiev, visits with Trotsky to ask what is going to happen. (Rumors had been circulating about the Bolsheviks withdrawing.) Trotsky says he answered, “A mere nothing, a little shot from a pistol.”

Problems for the Pre-Parliament had appeared on the horizon. Kerensky said long before that the Provisional Government would determine its organization and staff in its own discretion. The new Coalition Government was now a fait accompli. So much for the resolution of the Democratic Conference reserving to its permanent body the sanction of those choices. Moreover, if they had their way, the Cadets would not give the Pre-Parliament legislative powers either. But they feared the powers of a constituent assembly even more, such was their standing among the mass of voters. Note that, at this point, both the Bolsheviks and the Cadets still supported, at least verbally, holding elections for a constituent assembly, an organization that would normally have powers to form a constitution.

The delegates expected at the Mariinsky Palace were aligned by party as follows:

·         120 Social Revolutionaries

·         60 Mensheviks

·         66 Bolsheviks

·         156 from the bourgeois parties, half of them Cadets.

Some of them may have noticed that the Bolshevik seat on the five-member praesidium went unoccupied.

Kerensky gave the opening speech. Though the government, he said, possessed “the fulness of power,” he was nevertheless willing to listen to “any genuinely valuable suggestion.” This was, of course, more polite than it was democratic.

Under rules of order adopted from the now-defunct State Duma, the Bolsheviks were accorded ten minutes to address the council. Trotsky began by questioning the purpose and composition of the Pre-Parliament. He accused the bourgeoisie of plotting to “quash the Constituent Assembly.”

Pleased with the response to this, Trotsky continued with his prepared text. He denounced the policies of the Provisional Government as effectively “compelling the masses to insurrection,” and the government’s proposal to abandon Petrograd to the Germans as a step in a “counter-revolutionary conspiracy.”

This got an even bigger reaction. Finally Trotsky announced the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-Parliament. In his peroration he warned, “Petrograd is in danger! The revolution is in danger! The people are in danger! …We address ourselves to the people. All power to the soviets!” And he and the other Bolsheviks left the hall, leaving behind only a few as observers.

Foreign Minister Tereshchenko telegraphed the embassies of the Entente that the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks was “a mere scandal.” In his history of the revolution, the Cadet Miliukov more insightfully writes that the Bolsheviks spoke and acted “like people feeling a power behind them.”

There followed in the Pre-Parliament three days of discussion on the war. The American journalist Reed says he heard Martov speak in favor of at least raising the “question of peace,” but the debate ended lamely with a request that the Pre-Parliament be included in the delegation to the coming Paris Conference of the Entente. They planned to send the Menshevik Skobelev with instructions: no indemnities, no annexations, no secret diplomacy; neutralization of canals and straights, including those of Panama and Suez; gradual disarmament. Believing Skobelev would be ignored, the Cadets made no objection to these instructions.

This was also the day that General Cheremissov, the commander of the Northern Front, summoned representatives of the Petrograd Soviet to a meeting at Pskov. At lot was to happen before the meeting could take place. Meanwhile Cheremissov was in nominal command of the Petrograd garrison.

October 20 – October 7, 1917: “The Crisis is Ripe” Lenin publishes “The Crisis Is Ripe” in Rabochy Put on this day. Lenin’s articles had been anticipating the vote of the Central Committee on insurrection for some weeks. This particular article, among other things, draws a connection between the call for insurrection and both the agrarian and nationalities questions.

The Bolshevik policy on the agrarian question dated back to Lenin’s April Theses. As against the failure of either the Provisional Government or the Compromisers to act, he argued, it remains the correct policy for joining the workers’ insurrection to the on-going peasant revolt.

The importance of the nationalities question to the timing of the insurrection, Lenin also argued, is illustrated by the vote of their delegates in the Democratic Conference. The nationalities were second only to the labor unions in voting against coalition at the conference.

But these questions were secondary in Lenin’s mind to the question of the “world working-class revolution.” Trotsky says this had always been Lenin’s point of departure. Even though capitalism in Russia lagged behind Europe and America, the crisis had come in Russia first. The ripeness of the crisis meant precisely that the Russian insurrection should not be held back, lest the opportunity pass forever and for workers everywhere.

In Lenin’s opinion this meant not waiting for the Congress of Soviets, still two weeks off. He thought the forces in Finland, where the soviets and the Baltic Fleet were already in a state equivalent to insurrection, would be a sufficient reinforcement for those already in Petrograd and Moscow. Moreover, his doubts about parliamentary struggle and the ability of such institutions to bring about world proletarian revolution applied not only to the Pre-Parliament, but to the Congress of Soviets as well.

And then, to emphasize his point (in a portion of the letter not intended for publication), Lenin resigned from the Central Committee. Trotsky believes he can explain this action. Bolshevik party discipline called for members to accept and support the democratically decided line of the party. As a member of the Central Committee, Lenin was already approaching the limit set by this rule. If he resigned, perhaps, he would be freer to advocate what he thought was the correct line on insurrection. It was another instance of the masses being to the left of the party.

But the resignation was not accepted and nothing more came of it. Meanwhile Lenin’s wife, Krupskaya, travelled to the party’s district meetings and read this and his other letters to the rank and file.

October 21 – October 8, 1917: Lenin Agitates. In an address to the Bolshevik delegates of the Northern Regional Conference of Soviets, Lenin argues for the line he took in “The Crisis Is Ripe.” He did not want to put off the insurrection until the Congress of Soviets, still almost two weeks away. He wanted the revolutionary soldiers and sailors based in Finland to make “an immediate move on Petrograd.”

Once again, Trotsky says, as in April with his theses, Lenin had placed himself in isolation, ahead and to the left of the party and its leading organ, the Central Committee.

October 22 – October 9, 1917: Military Revolutionary Committee. Reacting to the German occupation of the Western Estonian Archipelago, the Compromisers in the Petrograd Soviet move for the creation of a Committee of Revolutionary Defense in the capital. The initial responsibility of the committee would be to decide questions about transfers from the Petrograd garrison to the front, now nearer to the capital than at any previous time in the war.

This solved a political problem for the Bolsheviks. How could the Soviet, which they controlled, refuse reinforcements from the garrison without appearing to have betrayed the soldiers at the front? The motion by the Compromisers put the onus of the decision on them.

The Compromisers were nevertheless a little surprised when the Bolsheviks supported the motion. A bit more parliamentary work would be required before the committee became a reality. In the end, it became a formidable tool, Trotsky says the “chief lever,” of the October Revolution.

At the same meeting Trotsky gave his report on the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-Parliament. He concluded, pretty unambiguously, “Long live the direct and open struggle for revolutionary power!”

October 23 – October 10, 1917: Northern Regional Conference. The Northern Regional Conference of Soviets opens in Petrograd under the presidency of Ensign Krylenko. Antonov had organized the meeting for the Bolshevik Central Committee – not coincidentally, as he was also working on the Military Revolutionary Committee.

Trotsky read the political report. The main issue had become the government’s renewed efforts to transfer revolutionary troops from the Petrograd garrison. But this question was connected to the question of power. By their votes, “the people are trusting us and authorizing us to seize the power.” The question of power had therefore become something for the whole body of soviets to decide. The conference adopted a resolution to this effect unanimously, with only three abstentions.

The military resources available to the Bolsheviks made themselves heard. A representative of the Latvian sharpshooters promised 40,000 rifles for the defense of the Congress of Soviets. The powerful radios of battleships in the Baltic Fleet broadcast appeals to “overcome all obstacles” to the convocation of the Congress. Smolny was openly the center of efforts to procure weapons wherever possible.

October 23 – October 10, 1917: The Vote for Insurrection. At the apartment of the Menshevik Sukhanov, his wife, a Bolshevik, receives a quorum of her party’s Central Committee. Twelve of the twenty-one members attended, including Lenin, disguised with a wig and spectacles, and shorn of his characteristic beard. The meeting lasted ten hours; Sukhanov’s wife served her guests bread, sausage, and tea “for reinforcement,” Trotsky says.

Sukhanov’s wife had encouraged him not to tire himself by the trip home from Smolny that evening. But one wonders if he missed the sausages or the household funds required to procure them.

Sverdlov opened the meeting in the usual way with a report on organization. He focused, apparently by previous arrangement with Lenin, on suspicious activities at the front, including an effort to surround the revolutionary garrison at Minsk with Cossack cavalry, and communication between the headquarters of the Minsk garrison and the general staff.

With that Lenin began to marshal his arguments. He spoke earnestly and extemporaneously; it was time to put an end to the waverings on the committee. The question came to a vote sooner than Lenin might have expected: ten to two in favor of insurrection. For the balance of the ten-hour meeting, one after another, the members favoring insurrection tried unsuccessfully to persuade the dissenters, Kamenev and Zinoviev, to change their minds. 

The resolution itself summarizes, somewhat elliptically, the arguments Lenin used and the committee accepted. Lenin wrote it out, Trotsky says, with the “gnawed end of a pencil” on a child’s notebook paper. The reasons given for immediate action begin, in Lenin’s preferred order of precedence, with the international situation:

·         Perceived progress in the “world-wide socialist revolution” combined with imperialist threats to its leading edge, the Russian Revolution

·         Kerensky’s machinations to abandon the military stronghold of the revolution, Petrograd, to the Germans

·         The scale and intensity of the peasant revolt

·         Bolshevik majorities in elections to the soviets, etc.

·         Counter-revolutionary preparations, including renewed efforts to break up the Petrograd garrison

Lenin might have added another argument he’d used before, that the people might lose confidence in the Bolsheviks just as they had in the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and sink back into indifference and despair. At any rate, the resolution says, “…all this places the armed insurrection on the order of the day.” Note that the resolution did not set a specific date for the insurrection. Trotsky recalled that Lenin wanted Kerensky to be deposed before the Congress of Soviets was to assemble, and so October 15^th (October 28, new style) was discussed and tentatively set.

The resolution concludes by putting the onus of action on the party, specifically for organizing the Northern Regional Conference of Soviets and for resisting the break-up of the Petrograd garrison.

Reed recounts a different story about how the vote was taken, one that has verisimilitude but not verity. He says the vote was taken twice, at first going against insurrection. Then a “rough workman” arose and warned the committee not to allow the destruction of the soviets. If they did, “we’re through with you!” Then another vote favorable to insurrection supposedly took place. Of course the public were not invited to this secret session of the Central Committee. But the rumor Reed picked up epitomizes the ripeness of the crisis, and the risk that the people were growing, again in the words of the committee, “tired of words and resolutions.”

The seven-member political bureau selected by the committee at this meeting, because it included Zinoviev and Kamenev and because they immediately tried to stir up opposition to the resolution, was still-born – it never met.

The Bolsheviks also took a decision to publish a paper, Beydnoth, addressed to the peasantry. Though the Social Revolutionaries were the strongest vote getters in rural areas, Lenin saw an opportunity to bring the peasants over to the party once the workers’ insurrection caught up with the peasant revolt.

Besides this, Trotsky gave a speech to a conference of Petrograd factory committees that day, calling for the workers to “break through [the] wall” between them and the peasants. On Trotsky’s motion, the conference created the “Worker to Peasant” program, under which workers would fabricate farm implements from the waste and scrap metal of the factories and distribute them in the provinces. But this was not the real solution to the peasants’ problem; the effort was primarily a form of agitation. The problem could only be addressed directly when the workers controlled the means of production.

Meanwhile, now that the harvest was passing, the peasant revolt was growing.

October 24 – October 11, 1917: Zinoviev and Kamenev State Their Views. Evidence that the party was not unanimously behind the resolution of the Bolshevik Central Committee for insurrection is not long to appear. Naturally Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke up first. Other members of the Central Committee who were not at the meeting of the 10^th (October 23, new style) joined in their reservations. Volodarsky also did.

On this day. Zinoviev and Kamenev circulated a lengthy pamphlet calling insurrection an unjustified gamble; the Bolsheviks, relying on their strength in the soviets, ought to work as an opposition party in the Constituent Assembly instead. They argued that the “mood” of the masses did not match that of the July Days, and that Bolshevik strength in the electorate would continue to grow.

But Lenin was not trying to win an election; he was trying to win a revolution. He and the members of the committee who had voted for insurrection did not want to re-establish the dual government in a new parliamentary body, and there carry on the debate until the people lost interest and gave up. On the contrary he thought “[t]he success of the Russian and world revolution depends upon a two or three days’ struggle.” This was his understanding of the mood of the people and the corresponding consequences of delay. And, as to the Russian Revolution at least, Lenin was right.

Meanwhile, the commander of the Northern Front, General Cheremissov, demanded a reinforcement of troops from the Petrograd garrison. In response, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet named the Military Revolutionary Committee and charged it with deciding questions of this kind. A left Social Revolutionary, Lazimir, headed the committee. His instructions were such that the regulations he was to draft would serve armed insurrection and the defense of the capital equally well.

The Correlation of Forces

October 25 – October 12, 1917: Regulations for Insurrection. After Trotsky spins them a little, the regulations drafted by Lazimir and his Military Revolutionary Committee come before the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet for approval. Despite Trotsky’s spin, the Mensheviks clearly perceived how useful the regulations would be to an insurrection. But the powers they gave the Soviet had ample precedent in the powers previously shared with the Provisional Government under the dual power scheme.

Another proposal, for the formation of a Garrison Conference, moved forward at this time. The conference would represent the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison in the way the factory committees represented the workers of the factories. It incidentally also enabled the Bolshevik leadership in the Soviet to better understand the purely military problems facing an insurrection.

Meanwhile, Kerensky sent a long letter to his fellow head of state Lloyd George of Great Britain. He promised that the Provisional Government would continue the war, hoping and begging for the financial credits necessary to do so.

October 25-26 – October 12-13, 1917: Northern Regional Conference Concludes. As the conference closes, the Central Committee advises the delegates to remain in Petrograd and await the Congress of Soviets. A handful returned to the provinces to further preparations for the insurrection.

October 26 – October 13, 1917: The Soldiers Section Approves. Dybenko, “a black-bearded giant” and president of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, addresses the soldiers section of the Petrograd Soviet on the question of the regulations of the Military Revolutionary Committee. He opened by telling the meeting that, when an admiral asked whether they would obey orders in the anticipated action in Moon Sound, the sailors replied that they would, but, “…if we see that the fleet is threatened with destruction, the commanding staff will be the first to hang from the mast head.”

This kind of talk played unexpectedly well in a section of the soviet hitherto dominated by the compromisist parties. Then Dybenko spoke of the transfer of units in the garrison to the front: “We will defend Reval ourselves. Stay here and defend the interests of the revolution.” The Military Committee’s regulations passed with nearly 300 in favor, one against, and a couple dozen abstaining. This consolidated the Committee’s control of the garrison as against headquarters and the government.

Meanwhile, Trotsky’s Executive Committee announced the renewed mobilization of the Red Guard. The special department then created would soon come under the Military Committee, integrating the military preparations of the workers with those of the soldiers.

This brought the problem of arming the workers to the fore. The attempt to disarm the workers after the July Days uncovered some of their weapons, “old rubbish,” Trotsky says, but “the very valuable weapons were carefully concealed.”

But they were not nearly enough. At about this time, some of the workers came to Trotsky asking for rifles. When he told them they party didn’t have control of the arsenals, they told him they’d just been to the factory and the factory would be happy to fill an order from the Soviet. The Soviet placed the order and the workers had 5,000 rifles by the end of the day.

Also on this day, Tseretilli having gone home to Georgia, the Menshevik Dan took it upon himself to ask in the Executive Committee whether the Bolsheviks intended to “come out.” The old Marxist Riazanov replied, inferably, “Yes.”

October 27 – October 14, 1917: Kerensky Takes Alarm. The cabinet of the Provisional Government ratifies headquarters plans and preparations to meet the possibility of insurrection. The district commander for Petrograd, General Polkovnikov, told the press, “In any case we are ready.”

The Central Executive Committee was also taking alarm. The Menshevik Martov warned them on this day, “We cannot expect the Bolsheviks to listen to us.” By “Bolsheviks,” Martov meant the mass following of the party, not the party members themselves.

October 28 – October 15, 1917: Support for the Congress. The Kiev Soviet joins its comrades of the Northern Regional Conference in declaring the coming Congress of Soviets “the sovereign organ of power.” On the following day, a regional conference of soviets in Minsk demanded that the Congress not be postponed. The Urals soviets did the same a few days after that.

On the other hand, Kalinin, though in favor of insurrection, spoke in the Petrograd Soviet as if it could and should be delayed indefinitely. Many party leaders in Moscow and elsewhere shared this attitude. Yet the party rank and file largely remained to the left of these leaders, supporting Lenin’s summons to insurrection.

October 28 – October 15, 1917: Reed’s Interviews at Smolny. The American journalist Reed interviews Kamenev and Volodarsky in the halls of Smolny Institute. They answered questions about the coming Congress of Soviets. Both of them spoke conditionally; neither was sure the Congress would actually take place.

Kamenev said that if it took place, the Congress would certainly represent the will of the masses, and probably have a Bolshevik majority. Of course, this was his preferred path for the transfer of power to the soviets.

Volodarsky said that the Compromisers were trying to see that the Congress did not come off. So the Bolsheviks “’were realists enough not to depend on that!’” But apparently he didn’t say, or Reed didn’t ask, what the Bolsheviks would do in such a case.

October 29 – October 16, 1917: The Garrison and the Executive Committee. Trotsky’s Executive Committee puts approval of the regulations of the Military Revolutionary Committee on the agenda of the Petrograd Soviet. Asked by the Mensheviks whether the Bolsheviks were preparing for a seizure of power, Trotsky said, “We make no secret of that.” The regulations were approved by a large majority. More and more left Social Revolutionaries were coming over to the Bolshevik program.

Yet the majority of the Bolshevik Military Organization was not confident in its operational readiness for insurrection, as Ensign Krylenko reported on this day. Another member of the organization, Lashevich, expressed similar doubts a couple of days later; Podvoisky joined in this opinion. Yet Uritsky, a member of the Central Committee and former Trotskyite, estimated the armed strength of the workers at 40,000 rifles. Lenin soon met with these leaders to stiffen their backs. 

That same day, General Polkovnikov again (and still quite incorrectly) reported that the garrison largely remained loyal to the government….

The Executive Committee also named representatives to the meeting General Cheremissov wanted. When they subsequently arrived at Pskov, they rebuffed the claim of the general and his staff that transfers from the garrison to the front were a strategic necessity. So much for another effort orchestrated by Kerensky to weaken the forces of the insurrection. 

October 29 – October 16, 1917: Why the Delay? Lenin, alarmed at the delay in launching the insurrection and, in isolation, not fully aware of the steps that were being taken, insists on a new meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee. The meeting, held in a suburb of Petrograd, included leaders of other organizations involved in preparations. Trotsky could not be present, as he was engaged in the business described in the previous entry.

Doubts and hesitation, to Lenin’s dismay, having been expressed, Ensign Krylenko took the lead in explaining the situation. He said, “the water is boiling hard enough,” so hard in fact that in essence the insurrection had already begun; there was no need to set a date for it.

Lenin did not respond. Kamenev claimed, “We have no machine of insurrection.” To this Lenin replied that the political decision had been made; the party must continue to build the operational basis for it. Only then could the people, led by the party, take the reins. Joffe, who sat on the Military Revolutionary Committee, emphasized that, for the last step, political work still remained to be done.

Lenin’s new resolution called for “an all-sided and vigorous preparation of armed insurrection.” It passed 20 to 2, with 3 abstentions and only Kamenev and Zinoviev against. But the real balance of opinion on the committee was revealed by the vote on Zinoviev’s resolution ruling out any action until the Congress of Soviets convened and the committee could meet with the Bolshevik caucus. It failed 15 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions. So even though the committee was moving to the left, Lenin’s line could only command some two-thirds of the votes.

The committee also received a report, on the whole favorable, on the attitude of the garrisons surrounding Petrograd.

Meanwhile, the American journalist Reed heard Foreign Minister Tereshechenko’s speech to the Pre-Parliament in the Mariinsky Palace. Apparently the instructions the Pre-Parliament gave Skobelev for presentation to the allied conference in Paris had caused some embarrassment. Reed says “Nobody was satisfied” with the speech, not even the Cadets.

October 30 – October 17, 1917: Congress Postponed. Today, three days before the Congress of Soviets is to convene, the Central Executive Committee puts it off by five days, until the 25^th (November 7, new style). The compromisist parties stepped up their efforts to recruit and elect delegates to the workers’ and soldiers’ soviets, and prepared to summon a congress of peasants’ soviets as a counterweight. But they were well not positioned to benefit from the delay.

The Bolsheviks instead gained the advantage. For example, the Semenovsky Regiment had the blood of revolutionary workers in 1905 on its hands. It hung back from the rest of the Petrograd garrison when they were declaring for the Bolshevik program. Yet at a regimental meeting during this time, Trotsky was permitted to speak; the representative of the Central Executive Committee, Skobelev, was not. In the result, the regiment joined with the bulk of the garrison in alignment with the Bolsheviks.

A rumor that the Bolsheviks would “come out” that day proved to be untrue. So the rumor was put off for a few days too.

Meanwhile, Kamenev published a letter in Gorky’s paper declaring insurrection “an inadmissible step.” Trotsky characterizes his reasoning as opportunism. The action was also another breach of party discipline by Kamenev. Hearing of this, Lenin composed a lengthy Letter to Comrades, refuting the arguments Kamenev and others were using against insurrection. The letter appeared in Rabochi Put the following day.

October 30 – October 17, 1917: Reed’s Interviews. Three journalists, including the American Reed, interview Kerensky – his last meeting with the press while still head of the Russian state. The man from the Associated Press wanted to know why the Russians had stopped fighting. In a bitter response, Kerensky blamed the tsarists for ruining the army, the British for not sending their fleet to fight the Germans in the Gulf of Riga, and the Allies generally, with whom, in their state of economic prostration, the people are “disillusioned.” The dispatch on this interview, returned by the U.S. State Department, had to be emended – over Kerensky’s objections – by the foreign ministry.

Reed says Kerensky had also “suspended capital punishment in the army” that day. That evening, Reed went to a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet; he records some lively observations of what workers and soldiers had to tell the committee.

On the same day Reed also interviewed Trotsky, if interview it was. After a few questions, Trotsky “talked rapidly for more than an hour.” He spoke of the feebleness of the Provisional Government, that the Compromisers were giving the bourgeoisie cover for what control they did have. To obtain real control the bourgeoisie would have to adopt the Kornilov method. But the army was with the revolution and the soviets.

The soviets would prevail in their fight with the Cadet counter-revolution, Trotsky continued. But he went further than that. He explained Lenin’s vision for world proletarian revolution. When the soviets came to power, they would make peace on the basis of solidarity with proletarians and their organizations in all the belligerent powers. They would create a European republic – a “United States of Europe” – on that basis. So Trotsky chose to express himself to an impressionable, left-leaning American journalist.

October 31 – October 18, 1917: Deadlocks in the Pre-Parliament and in the Baltic. After three days of debate, neither the right-socialist Compomisers nor the bourgeois Cadets can pass a resolution on reforming the army and continuing the war. The votes were symptomatic of general paralysis in the Pre-Parliament on every issue it attempted to address. The American journalist Reed heard the Cadet Miliukov give a speech denouncing Skobelov’s instructions. But this decision had already been taken over Cadet objections.

At about this time, Kerensky renewed his dispute with the Baltic Fleet and the soviets of Finland. The sailors sent a delegation to the Central Executive Committee demanding removal of “a person who is disgracing…the revolution with his shameless political chantage.” By this they meant Kerensky. The Regional Committee of the Finnish Soviets, taking sovereign powers, held up some of the government’s freight. Kerensky’s response, threats of arrest, left the soviets unimpressed.

Trotsky observes that the fleet and Finnish soviets were already in a state of insurrection; they had assumed state functions and administered them independently of the Provisional Government. In another connection Trotsky observes that the Finnish garrison and Baltic Fleet had become a dependable reserve for an insurrection of workers and soldiers in Petrograd.

Meanwhile, the Petrograd Soviet held elections for its delegates to the Congress of Soviets. The Bolshevik slate – Trotsky, Kamenev, Volodarsky, Yurenev, and Lashevich – received well over 400 votes. Just over 200 votes were cast for candidates from the compromisist parties.

The Day of the Petrograd Soviet

October 31 – October 18, 1917: The Garrison Conference. In a decisive development, the Garrison Conference renews the policy of the Soviet from the April Days: orders that have not been countersigned by a representative of the soldiers section of the Soviet are not to be obeyed. The Central Executive Committee tried to suppress the announcement of the meeting for this purpose, but it was successfully sent to all the units of the city garrison via a technology called a “telephonogram.” Apparently the device made a phonographic recording of the message, which could then be sent over the telephone as often as necessary.

The Conference consisted not of Bolshevik politicians, but of representatives from the units of the garrison itself. It took a muster-roll of these units on the question of coming out in case of an insurrection. Only one cavalry regiment and a military school were against it. A few other smaller units declared neutrality or obedience to the Central Executive Committee. The rest, including all the infantry regiments, would come out, as Trotsky says, “at a word from the Petrograd Soviet.”

The Central Executive, denied the opportunity to speak, walked out in frustration. The garrison had formerly been a source of strength for them. Now the president put the main question on the table: by adopting the countersign policy, the garrison placed itself effectively under the Petrograd Soviet’s control.

October 31 – October 18, 1917: Kamenev’s Trick. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet is again in session; with rumors flying about insurrection, the Bolsheviks have to give some sort of account of themselves. Trotsky spoke, admitting in the first place that he had signed an order for rifles that went to the Red Guard.

In the second place, he forged a link between the removal of the Petrograd garrison and the convocation of the Congress of Soviets. The Petrograd Soviet, he argued, would ask the Congress to seize the power; in the meantime, the Soviet would resist attempts, originating with the bourgeoisie, to break up the garrison – or for that matter the Congress. With the Garrison Conference and its countersign policy in place, the Soviet’s resistance had teeth.

Someone asked whether the Soviet had set a date for the insurrection. Trotsky replied that it had not, but that “if it became necessary to set one, the workers and soldiers would come out as one man.” Kamenev, sitting next to Trotsky, rose to make a comment that he “wanted to sign his name to Trotsky’s every word.” Of course this meant that he, Kamenev, did not think an insurrection would become necessary any time soon. But it was wrong to implicate Trotsky, and by extension the Bolshevik party, in that opinion. This episode was to have consequences.

Sukhanov’s motion to commemorate Gorky’s 50^th anniversary failed.

Trotsky relates an anecdote of Sukhanov’s observations after this session of the Executive Committee. First, Sukhanov says in his history, he saw Trotsky leave the meeting and approach the run-down, crowded automobiles the Central Executive Committee had made available to the Bolsheviks. After a moment, Trotsky “chuckled and…disappeared into the darkness” on foot. Then, boarding a passenger car, a smallish man with a goatee consoled Sukhanov on the discomforts of travel by rail. Sukhanov learned that the man’s name was Sverdlov, and that he was a “old party worker.” But he did not then know that Sverdlov and a quorum of the Bolshevik Central Committee had met in his apartments eight days before, nor could he know that in two weeks, Sverdlov would be President of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of All Russia.

Trotsky was apparently due at the All Russian Conference of Factory and Shop Committees that evening. There he spoke against “vacillation and wavering,” and everybody knew he was talking about Kamenev and Zinoviev. The conference also raised an issue that was being raised in Moscow factories and in the artillery factories. A resolution declaring worker control of production “in the interest of the whole country” passed with only five dissenting votes. Thus workers representing every Russian industry endorsed not just the theoretical validity of worker control but also their ability to manage the factories successfully, as in some cases they were already doing.

Beginning of November – End of October, 1917: Bolshevik Agitation. With the decision of the Central Committee in favor of insurrection, but awaiting a favorable opportunity, the Bolsheviks redouble their agitation in the capital. Trotsky lists some of the principal speakers:

·         Sverdlov

·         Volodarsky

·         Lashevich

·         Kollontai

·         Chudnovsky

·         Lunacharsky

·         “scores of agitators of lesser caliber”

Lenin was regrettably missing from the list, still waiting in Finland. Zinoviev and Kamenev were missing too – but they had voted against the insurrection in the Central Committee, and worked against it since then. Neither does Trotsky find any evidence Stalin ever spoke at mass meetings during this time.

Of course Trotsky himself was the leading figure. Somewhat modestly referring to himself as “president of the Petrograd Soviet” instead of by name, Trotsky somewhat immodestly reproduces a passage from Sukhanov’s history saying that his influence “was overwhelming,” and that “every [Petrograd] worker and soldier knew him and heard him personally.” Returning to modesty, Trotsky points out that the person-to-person “molecular agitation” of the workers and soldiers was “incomparably more effective.”

November 1 – October 19, 1917: “Lawful” Garrison Conference. Dismayed by the decision of the Garrison Conference the day before, the Central Executive Committee assembles its own meeting of the representatives of the Petrograd garrison. Several units not represented at the previous meeting sent delegates to this one. Two of them, the garrison of the Peter and Paul fortress and an armored car division, declared allegiance to the Central Executive.

The military importance of this development lay in the position of the Peter and Paul on an island in the Neva River. Though of course it could not maneuver, the fortress not only dominated a number of bridges in the middle of the city, but it also blocked the direct route to the Winter Palace, seat of the Provisional Government. There was also a substantial arsenal, coveted by the Red Guards, on the island.

Then the Central Executive asked the assembly to pass a cautiously worded resolution. The soldiers refused both the resolution and the notion that an assembly called by the Central Executive rather than the Petrograd Soviet would have authority to take any such decision. After this failure, the Central Executive, with the cooperation of headquarters, tried to appoint a commissar over the Petrograd military district. This the Petrograd Soviet in turn rejected. General Polkovnikov, in his turn, issued general orders for the suppression of demonstrations. Reed reproduces them in his book; Polkovnikov’s lack of urgency is remarkable.

Meanwhile, hearing of agitation for the convocation of a constituent assembly in and for the Ukraine, Kerensky summons its General Secretary to Petrograd for an explanation. This did not create much of a ripple in the Ukraine. The American journalist Reed says Kerensky also told the Pre-Parliament that the government would be able to handle any Bolshevik insurrection, even though he himself was “a doomed man.”

November 2 – October 20, 1917: Military Revolutionary Committee at Work. The Military Revolutionary Committee, with Trotsky presiding, begins preparations for defending the Congress of Soviets. Delegates aligned with the Compromisers boycotted the meeting, leaving the Bolsheviks, with their new left Social Revolutionary allies, completely in control. The Social Revolutionary Lazimir continued in charge of operations; Sverdlov assumed a role corresponding to that of chief of the general staff.

The committee assigned commissars to all the units of the garrison. Among their responsibilities was taking control of stores of arms; distributions of weapons were to take place only by consent of the commissars. In this way, the commissar for Peter and Paul fortress prevented a shipment of 10,000 rifles to the Cossacks of the Don, as well as distributions to junkers and other counter-revolutionary organizations in the capital.

The typographical workers came forward to report an increase of Black Hundreds propaganda to the committee. Such reports gave the committee an opportunity to control counter-revolutionary agitation.

The rumors about a Bolshevik insurrection that day proved again to be untrue. Nevertheless the government continued its own preparations, which it still considered adequate. The Petrograd Soviet, in a preparation of its own, announced that on Sunday the 22^nd (November 4, new style), it would conduct a review of its forces. The counter-revolution responded by promising a religious procession on that day.

Also on this day, Kerensky’s Minister of War, Verkhovsky, made the mistake of advocating a separate peace to a committee of the Pre-Parliament. Even people who might have agreed in private that this was advisable attacked him publicly, coupling his policy to that of Trotsky. The minister had to take an enforced vacation.

Finally, as the nationalities question in Russia extended to the Cossacks, on this day they declared the unity of their armies with the Caucasian mountaineers and the people of the steppes. This proved to be the foundation for the Cossack state formed to oppose the Bolshevik government the following spring.

November 2 – October 20, 1917: Kamenev’s Resignation, etc. The Bolshevik Central Committee meets in the absence of both Lenin and Kamenev. After his “trick” (Lenin’s word) at the Petrograd Soviet, Kamenev offered his resignation from the Central Committee, making himself freer to oppose its decisions. Trotsky obliged him by putting the item on the agenda.

Trotsky moved the resignation be accepted. Sverdlov read a letter from Lenin criticizing Kamenev and Zinoviev as “strikebreakers,” and characterizing the way Kamenev had twisted Trotsky’s words as “plain petty cheating.” Stalin spoke against acceptance, but the motion passed five votes to three, with Stalin among those against. The committee also forbade Kamenev’s and Zinoviev’s agitation against the party’s policies, again over Stalin’s dissent.

This was but one of a number of signs of fissures in the party as the pressure of the coming insurrection mounted. On the day of the committee meeting, the party paper printed a letter from Zinoviev saying that he had moved closer to Lenin’s views and accepted what Trotsky said in the Soviet. The editor, Stalin, printed it over comments that this was also the meaning of Kamenev’s “declaration” in the Petrograd Soviet (though no-one believed this but Stalin) and that the “sharpness of tone” of Lenin’s article obscured the agreement of the party “in fundamentals” (though, as Trotsky says, the fundamental question at that time was the imminence of the insurrection, over which Kamenev, at any rate, was still fighting).

Stalin offered to resign from the editorial board, but the offer was not accepted.

The American journalist Reed got the story on the insurrection from Volodarsky the next day. But because Volodarsky was not on the Central Committee, and might not have been at the meeting, the version Reed reports has a touch of the fabulous. Lenin, Volodarsky said, ruled out the 6^th, because the insurrection needed an all-Russian basis, and the Congress of Soviets would not yet have assembled. Lenin ruled out the 8^th, because though the Congress would already be in session, it would be unable to reach a sudden decision democratically. This left the 7^th (October 25, old style).

But of course Lenin was not even there….

November 3 – October 21, 1917: Resolution of the Garrison Conference. With representatives of two of the three Cossack regiments in the garrison present, the Garrison Conference accepted three proposals made by Trotsky: that the garrison would support the Military Revolutionary Committee, that the garrison would take part in the review of forces planned for the following day, and that the Congress of Soviets should “take the power in its hands.” Trotsky also welcomed the Cossacks to the conference.

The committee named three commissars, including Lazimir, to the district military headquarters of General Polkovnikov. They informed the general about the Garrison Conference’s decision requiring military orders to be countersigned by the Soviet. The car the staff had sent to bring the commissars to the meeting was withdrawn when they left.

In a special session at 11:00 a.m., the conference decided to make an accomplished fact official. They summoned Trotsky and Sverdlov, and told them of their plan to break from headquarters entirely and in the open. The resolution then adopted gave the reason: “[H]eadquarters is a direct instrument of the counter-revolutionary forces.” The decision was communicated to the district soviets and soldiers committees; steps were taken to prevent surprise action by the enemy.

The decision of the Garrison Conference forestalled the plans Polkovnikov and the Central Executive Committee wanted to implement at a meeting set for 1:00 p.m. By then the Garrison Conference had already taken, Trotsky says, “a decisive step on the road to insurrection.”

Another Smolny delegation went to headquarters with word of the conference resolution. Staff somewhat wishfully thought it might be just another instance of the dual government, or that the Central Executive Committee could fix things.

It got more difficult to get into Smolny that day; passes were changed every few hours. The American journalist Reed tells how he saw Trotsky run afoul of this when he had lost his pass and neither the guard nor the commander of the guard recognized him. Trotsky and his wife were eventually admitted.

Meanwhile Miliukov’s Cadet paper asserted that if the Bolsheviks were to come out, they would be suppressed “immediately and without difficulty.”

November 4 – October 22, 1917: The Day of the Petrograd Soviet. The Bolshevik press sums up the declarations of revolutionary organizations throughout the country: 56 such organizations are demanding the transfer of power to the soviets.

Meanwhile, the Menshevik Dan reported on behalf of the Central Executive Committee that only 50 out of over 900 soviets had thus far made the decision to send delegates to the Congress of Soviets. Trotsky speculates that this number indicated low morale in the compromisist parties rather than lack of interest across the country as a whole. Those soviets that were attending for the most part did not bother to tell the Central Executive.

This was the day for the review of the revolutionary forces of the Petrograd Soviet. It did not take the form of mass demonstration in the streets. Instead there were meetings in the public halls and squares. One audience would assemble, listen to the speeches, then depart. Then another audience would file in.

All the speakers were Bolsheviks, bolstered by the left Social Revolutionaries who were now joining them. Trotsky addressed the crowd at the House of the People. He read out the resolution and called for their assent. Sukhanov wrote, “Thousands and thousands raised their hands as one man.” They held them up, eyes burning, as Trotsky made the resolution an oath. “They took the oath”: Loyalty to the Soviet, immediate answer to its summons.

Trotsky says, “Each side was satisfied with the other. The leaders were convinced: We can postpone no longer! The masses said to themselves: This time the thing will be done!”

On the request of General Polkovnikov, the “religious” procession of counter-revolutionists did not come off. But the bourgeois press, like the boy who cried wolf, again predicted a bloody demonstration. Miliukov writes in his history that “the frightened population” stayed home. By “population” he meant the bourgeoisie.

As for the refusal of the Garrison Conference to accept orders, Kerensky reportedly said, “I think we can easily handle this.” Later he was asking whether the government ought to arrest the Military Revolutionary Committee. Not necessary, General Polkovnikov thought, given the forces he had in hand. The Compromisers on the Central Executive thought they could deal with the committee’s commissars.

Meanwhile, the American journalist Reed was keeping count of arrivals to the Congress of Soviets:

·         November 2, 15 delegates

·         November 3, 100

·         November 4, 175, “of whom one hundred and three were Bolsheviki!”

November 5 – October 23, 1917: The Peter and Paul Comes Over. General Polkovnikov and his staff try to open a negotiation with the Garrison Conference. They offered to accept the conditions the conference had declared, that is, the policy that orders from headquarters would not be considered valid unless countersigned by the Soviet. But the conference would have to withdraw the order categorically breaking from the headquarters chain of command. Headquarters signed and delivered an agreement to that effect, but the conference never troubled to answer.

It was busy with other things. The Soviet assigned commissars with plenary powers to each military unit and to strategic points in the city. It applied the tactic of “crowding out” government functions and replacing their people with agents of the Soviet at every opportunity.

But the commandant at the Peter and Paul fortress in the Neva River threatened to arrest the commissar, Corporal Blagonravov, who arrived there. Hearing of this at Smolny, the Bolsheviks wondered what to do. Trotsky, thinking the troops themselves must be sound, offered to negotiate. When he and his delegation got there at about 2:00 p.m., a meeting was in progress. The right-wing orators spoke cautiously; the soldiers listened to Trotsky’s delegation instead.

Thus this strategic point and its garrison came over to the Soviet. Blagonravov set up his office and his communications with Smolny. The arsenal and its 100,000 rifles became available to the Military Committee and the Red Guard.

The Preobrazhentsky Regiment of the garrison came over too, protesting rumors (based on their credulity during the July slanders about Lenin and German money) that they were still with the government. As for government troops from the front, cavalry was being held up on the railways at Pskov; the 17^th Infantry Division simply refused orders to march on Petrograd. Delegates from the front itself appeared at the Petrograd Soviet demanding peace. The soldiers of the Fifth Army replaced the Compromisers on their committee with Bolsheviks.

The Red Guards also made their presence felt. A conference of 100 delegates representing 20,000 armed workers from all over the city, convened the previous day, now adopted a resolution for organizing and deploying their forces. Riflemen were organized into squads, companies, battalions, and divisions, and supported by engineers, bicyclists, telegraphers, machine gunners, and artillerists. Women established hospitals and first aid stations. Patrols and guards protected the factories and strategic points.

On Nevsky Prospect, the American journalist Reed bought a copy of Lenin’s pamphlet, “Will the Bolsheviks Be Able to Hold the State Power?” Then he went to Smolny, where Lazimir, head of the Military Revolutionary Committee, told him the Peter and Paul had come over. And that a regiment the government had sent to the capital stopped at the Gatchina Station, passed a resolution in favor of power to the soviets, and sent a delegation to Lazimir’s committee. The committee returned a message welcoming them as comrades and telling them to remain where they were until further instructions from the committee.

Reed saw the organizers of the insurrection at work: Podvoisky, Antonov, Krylenko, Dybenko….

Meanwhile, Kerensky’s Provisional Government issued a decree proclaiming “in principle” the independence of Finland. Both the bourgeoisie and the proletarians of Finland wanted this – though for different reasons. The grant of independence did not extend to military matters and foreign policy. It did not create much of a ripple in Finland.