On the Brink of Red October

 

One hundred years ago this week, plus three, it was still October in Russia, because they were still using the old-style Julian calendar. Today there will be one entry for the whole eventful week that led up to Red October.

The Week beginning October 31 – October 18, 1917: “Vigorous Preparations.” With intensified Bolshevik agitation, led by Trotsky, in the background, forces aligned with that party vigorously gathered the political and physical resources that would be necessary for a successful insurrection, the date of which had not and could not yet be fixed. When Trotsky refused to answer a question in the Petrograd Soviet (where rumors were flying) about the date, Kamenev’s comment made it seem like the Bolsheviks thought an insurrection might not even be necessary. But this of course was not the case; it was Kamenev’s opinion. Kamenev well knew how the votes in the Bolshevik Central Committee had gone. Read about it here and here.

November 2 – October 20, 1917: Kamenev Resigns. Hearing of this, Lenin denounced it as a ”trick.” Accordingly Kamenev offered to resign from the Bolshevik Central Committee. The offer was accepted, and Kamenev was further admonished to remain silent on the issue. Under the pressure of events, cracks were appearing in the wall of party solidarity! Read about it here.

November 3 – October 21, 1917: Resolution of the Garrison Conference. The Garrison Conference accepted three proposals made by Trotsky: that the garrison would support the Military Revolutionary Committee, that the garrison would take part in the review of forces planned for the following day, and that the Congress of Soviets should “take the power in its hands.” Even the Cossack regiments agreed. These proposals were of course consistent with and essential to the overall plan of insurrection. Read about it here. 

November 4 – October 22, 1917: The Day of the Petrograd Soviet. As the delegates to the Congress of Soviets began to assemble, the Petrograd Soviet held a review of its revolutionary forces, now to include those of garrison who had agreed to take part the day before. There were meetings in the public halls and squares. One audience would assemble, listen to the speeches, then depart. Then another audience would file in. Read about it here.

November 5 – October 23, 1917: The Peter and Paul Comes Over. The Garrison Conference having definitely broken the chain of command that led back to the Coalition Government, the Bolsheviks began to appoint commissars who sought to fill the power vacuum thus created. When the commissar sent to the Peter and Paul fortress and prison in the middle of the Neva River was resisted by the officer in command, Trotsky went over to talk to the soldiers themselves. In the result, the fortress, its artillery, and 100,000 rifles for the Red Guards came over to the insurrection. Read about it here.

You can read the whole chapter on the Day of the Petrograd Soviet here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

 

Zinoviev and Kamenev Dissent

 

One hundred years ago today, plus three, Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, the two members who opposed the Bolshevik Central Committee vote for insurrection, published a pamphlet stating their views of the matter – though of course remaining silent on the actual  Bolshevik vote. Lenin called them “deserters,” but they recovered his good graces and were made members of the Politburo after the revolution.

 

Read about it here. Or read the whole chapter on Lenin’s Insurrection here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link. 

  

Lenin’s Insurrection

October 5 – September 22, 1917: Bolsheviks Will Attend. Riazanov, a Marxist of long standing, announces that the Bolsheviks will attend the Pre-Parliament in order to “expose all attempts at a new coalition with the bourgeoisie.”

Meanwhile, delegates of the disbanded Democratic Convention brought the question of convening the Congress of Soviets before the Central Executive Committee. The Bolsheviks demanded that it convene within two weeks, otherwise they would call their own congress of delegates from the Moscow and Petrograd soviets, where they had majorities. The Central Executive agreed to call the All Russian Congress on October 20 (November 2, new style).

October 6 – September 23, 1917: Bolsheviks Will Not Attend. In a letter, Lenin argues forcefully in favor of a Bolshevik boycott of the Pre-Parliament. Not only would participation send a mixed message to the party’s adherents about the goals of the party, it would mean working in the wrong direction. The party should be working where it has strength, in the soviets, factory committees, trade unions, soldiers committees; not in a forum got up by the Compromisers and bourgeoisie to cover up their weakness.

This view of the matter gained acceptance within the party as the meeting of the Pre-Parliament approached.

October 7 – September 24, 1917: Railroad Strike. The frustration of railroad workers over a long-awaited raise boils over into a strike. Nothing had been done about the raise since the February Revolution. With numerous railroad lines paralyzed, the government offered concessions a few days later.

The strike was symptomatic of increasing difficulty with industrial production and in the food supply. The overall effect was to shift the railroad workers to the left. 

Meanwhile the Bolshevik Central Committee appointed Sverdlov to monitor the Central Executive Committee’s attitude towards the Congress of Soviets and to administer the party’s campaign for the selection of delegates.

October 8 – September 25, 1917: The Last Coalition and the New Soviet. Kerensky announces a new coalition government, destined to be the last one and consisting in large measure of substantial capitalists. The Cadet Konovalov was made Kerensky’s second in command, and given the portfolio for Commerce and Industry. Kerensky also recruited the president of the Moscow stock exchange and the president of the Moscow Military Industrial Committee to the cabinet. Tereshchenko, who drew his wealth from the sugar trade, remained as Foreign Minister. Several Mensheviks held portfolios, but none of them had been of any importance in the Petrograd Soviet. A Social Revolutionary was made Minister of Agriculture.

Kerensky also mended fences with the Entente, keeping their preferred ambassador to London and naming a new one, a Cadet, to Paris.

On the same day, the Petrograd Soviet elected Trotsky as its President. Then it named a new Executive Committee consisting of thirteen Bolsheviks, six Social Revolutionaries, and three Mensheviks. Trotsky introduced and passed a resolution calling on the coalition to resign: the soon to be convened All-Russian Congress of Soviets would “create a genuinely revolutionary government.”

Thus the Bolsheviks continued to be quite open about their claims on the state power. The step missing from Trotsky’s resolution, of course, is armed insurrection.

Trotsky also adduces evidence about the deterioration of Kerensky’s mental condition during this time. Miliukov, for example, called it “psychic neurasthenia.” He later wrote that Kerensky’s friends had observed him pass from “extreme failure of energy” to “extreme excitement under the influence of drugs” during the course of a day. Kerensky was under the treatment of his own Minister of Public Welfare, Kishkin, professionally a psychiatrist, politically a Cadet.

October 9 – September 26, 1917: Second Thoughts. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets discovers it would be impolitic to hold the Congress of Soviets as early as two weeks thence. The compromisist parties saw they could not campaign effectively for the Constituent Assembly if they had to be campaigning for the Congress of Soviets as well.

The Menshevik Dan moved for a delay. Trotsky responded for the Bolsheviks that if the Central Executive would not call the Congress under its constitution, the Bosheviks would call it on behalf of the revolution. The motion carried, for a delay until October 20 (November 2, new style); the result will be seen in the sequel.

October 9-10 – September 26-27, 1917: September Theses. Lenin publishes “Tasks of the Revolution,“ a kind of September version of the April Theses, in Rabochy Put. There are seven tasks; though some of them address issues already addressed in the April Theses, they all take account of developments in the interim.

The first two tasks lead to forming the new revolutionary state: all power must pass to the workers, soldiers and peasants through their representatives in the soviets; no compromise with the bourgeoisie or their political apparatus is possible.

The third reiterates the party’s war policy against indemnities, annexation, and defensism. Lenin lays out specific actions against contingencies during the lead up to, and after, the insurrection.

The agrarian policy of the Bolsheviks does not change, but acquires new force in light of the inaction of the Compromisers and the peasant revolt.

The fifth task recognizes that the progress of the revolution and the soviets has given the workers more ability to control the means of production. Therefore this, not as in April just the development of the soviets, becomes the task.

The last two tasks offer measures for combating the counter-revolution, something that had already been done successfully once with the defeat of Kornilov.

On the 10^th (September 27, new style), Lenin, still anxious about putting off the insurrection until the Congress of Soviets could be convened some two weeks thence, wrote to Smilga, the President of the Finnish Regional Committee and a member of the Central Committee. Lenin let Smilga know that the revolutionary troops in Finland and the Baltic Fleet might be called upon to advance on Petrograd. He asked Smilga do to a number of other things, both in the political open and underground. One, interestingly, was to prepare identification papers for him in the name of Konstantin Petrovich Ivanov. That’s how he signed the letter.

October 10 – September 27, 1917: Resolution in Reval. The soviets of Reval (now Tallinn), the capital of Estonia and the next line of defense if the Germans should decide to march on Petrograd, demand that the Pre-Parliament disband and that a congress of soviets be called to form the government. This was one of a number of similar resolutions in a battle of resolutions between the Bolsheviks and the Compromisers on the Central Executive Committee.

On another front, the resolution also demanded that the soviets must agree to troop transfers. This policy would prevent, for example, the government from transferring troops loyal to the revolution out of the Petrograd garrison. It was to become an issue as the Bolsheviks prepared for insurrection. In theory, Trotsky observes, the maintenance and deployment of armed forces is a fundamental right of the state. But the policy the resolution advocates had been a feature of the dual government since the February Revolution. Now it would become a feature of preparation for insurrection.

After October 10 – September 27, 1917: Northern Regional Conference of Soviets. In another “well calculated blow” (according to Trotsky) in the battle over the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Bolsheviks arrange for a conference of soviets of the northern region. This was a region of Bolshevik strength; the soviets of Petrograd, its suburbs, Moscow, Kronstadt, Helsinki, and Reval would send delegates, to arrive on October 13 (October 26, new style), a week before the declared date for the Congress of Soviets.

October 12-October 20 – September 29-October 7, 1917: Operation Albion. Germany launches an amphibious operation to secure the West Estonian Archipelago. These islands lay at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga; they were a stepping stone from Riga (taken on August 21, old style) to Petrograd. Russian resistance ended shortly after the naval Battle of Moon Sound.

Wikipedia has details on the operation, including a map.

October 14 – October 1, 1917: Lenin on the State Power. Lenin’s pamphlet “Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?” is published. This detailed argument starts by quoting statements in the bourgeois and compromisist press to the effect that the Bolsheviks could not hold the power, even that the best way to get rid of them would be to let them try and see them fail. Lenin disputes the claims made to support these conclusions.

For example, to the claim the proletariat "will not be able technically to lay hold of the state apparatus," Lenin replies, first, why bother? The existing state apparatus, that of the Provisional Government, is broken and useless and deserves rather to be smashed up altogether. And second, what do you suppose the soviets are for? They are the new state apparatus, closer to the people and more democratic. They were already at work, and, I might add, the only difference between the existing power of the soviets and “All Power to the Soviets!” was one of degree.

Knowing that after an insurrection the Bolsheviks would be faced by the question of state power, Lenin took some of the time of his enforced exile to continue his work on The State and Revolution, an analysis of Marxist texts on the evolution of the state through and after a revolution. When he wrote the pamphlet, he said the book would hopefully be available soon, but it was not published until after the October Revolution. 

October 16 – October 3, 1917: A Moscow Resolution. The Bolshevik Central Committee learns of a resolution of the Moscow Regional Bureau condemning them for irresolution on the question of insurrection. Trotsky says that “beyond a doubt” Lenin was behind the resolution and its “bitter” tone.

The committee left the matter on the table for a time; the result will be seen in the sequel.

October 17 – October 4, 1917: Battle of Moon Sound. When they observe German minesweepers attempting to clear the minefields protecting the passage into the Gulf of Riga, the Baltic Fleet attacks, hoping to forestall the German amphibious assault on Moon Island. German battleships exchanged fire with the Russian battleship Slava, which was so badly damaged it had to be scuttled. Though seven German minesweepers were sunk, the German fleet gained control of the sound. This led to the final success of Operation Albion, and put another scare into Petrograd.

Wikipedia has details on the battle, including the timetable of engagements and a list of ships damaged or sunk.

The American journalist Reed says this was also the day the first number of Rabochy i Soldat (Worker and Soldier) was published.

October 18 – October 5, 1917: Change of Plans. The Bolshevik Central Committee votes, with only Kamenev dissenting, to reverse the decision of October 3 (September 20, old style) in favor of sending its delegates to the Pre-Parliament.

Beginning October 19 – October 6, 1917: Evacuate Petrograd? After the success of the German amphibious operation against the archipelago at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, the government floats the idea of evacuating itself to Moscow. Naturally the forces responsible for the defense of Petrograd objected. On October 19^th (October 6, old style), the soldiers section of the Petrograd Soviet adopted Trotsky’s resolution calling on the government, if it could not defend the capital, either to make peace or step aside.

Neither did the government’s proposal gain any traction with the Compromisers on the Central Executive Committee, who were told that in the event of a move they would have to fend for themselves. For their part, the workers considered Petrograd their fortress.

Within a week’s time, and after a subsequent demand by the delegates of the Pre-Parliament, the government decided to stay in the Winter Palace and convene the Constituent Assembly in the Tauride Palace.

October 20 – October 7, 1917: Pre-Parliament Meets. As the delegates to the Council of the Republic, or Pre-Parliament, prepare to assemble, its President, the Social Revolutionary Avksentiev, visits with Trotsky to ask what is going to happen. (Rumors had been circulating about the Bolsheviks withdrawing.) Trotsky says he answered, “A mere nothing, a little shot from a pistol.”

Problems for the Pre-Parliament had appeared on the horizon. Kerensky said long before that the Provisional Government would determine its organization and staff in its own discretion. The new Coalition Government was now a fait accompli. So much for the resolution of the Democratic Conference reserving to its permanent body the sanction of those choices. Moreover, if they had their way, the Cadets would not give the Pre-Parliament legislative powers either. But they feared the powers of a constituent assembly even more, such was their standing among the mass of voters. Note that, at this point, both the Bolsheviks and the Cadets still supported, at least verbally, holding elections for a constituent assembly, an organization that would normally have powers to form a constitution.

The delegates expected at the Mariinsky Palace were aligned by party as follows:

·         120 Social Revolutionaries

·         60 Mensheviks

·         66 Bolsheviks

·         156 from the bourgeois parties, half of them Cadets.

Some of them may have noticed that the Bolshevik seat on the five-member praesidium went unoccupied.

Kerensky gave the opening speech. Though the government, he said, possessed “the fulness of power,” he was nevertheless willing to listen to “any genuinely valuable suggestion.” This was, of course, more polite than it was democratic.

Under rules of order adopted from the now-defunct State Duma, the Bolsheviks were accorded ten minutes to address the council. Trotsky began by questioning the purpose and composition of the Pre-Parliament. He accused the bourgeoisie of plotting to “quash the Constituent Assembly.”

Pleased with the response to this, Trotsky continued with his prepared text. He denounced the policies of the Provisional Government as effectively “compelling the masses to insurrection,” and the government’s proposal to abandon Petrograd to the Germans as a step in a “counter-revolutionary conspiracy.”

This got an even bigger reaction. Finally Trotsky announced the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-Parliament. In his peroration he warned, “Petrograd is in danger! The revolution is in danger! The people are in danger! …We address ourselves to the people. All power to the soviets!” And he and the other Bolsheviks left the hall, leaving behind only a few as observers.

Foreign Minister Tereshchenko telegraphed the embassies of the Entente that the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks was “a mere scandal.” In his history of the revolution, the Cadet Miliukov more insightfully writes that the Bolsheviks spoke and acted “like people feeling a power behind them.”

There followed in the Pre-Parliament three days of discussion on the war. The American journalist Reed says he heard Martov speak in favor of at least raising the “question of peace,” but the debate ended lamely with a request that the Pre-Parliament be included in the delegation to the coming Paris Conference of the Entente. They planned to send the Menshevik Skobelev with instructions: no indemnities, no annexations, no secret diplomacy; neutralization of canals and straights, including those of Panama and Suez; gradual disarmament. Believing Skobelev would be ignored, the Cadets made no objection to these instructions.

This was also the day that General Cheremissov, the commander of the Northern Front, summoned representatives of the Petrograd Soviet to a meeting at Pskov. At lot was to happen before the meeting could take place. Meanwhile Cheremissov was in nominal command of the Petrograd garrison.

October 20 – October 7, 1917: “The Crisis is Ripe” Lenin publishes “The Crisis Is Ripe” in Rabochy Put on this day. Lenin’s articles had been anticipating the vote of the Central Committee on insurrection for some weeks. This particular article, among other things, draws a connection between the call for insurrection and both the agrarian and nationalities questions.

The Bolshevik policy on the agrarian question dated back to Lenin’s April Theses. As against the failure of either the Provisional Government or the Compromisers to act, he argued, it remains the correct policy for joining the workers’ insurrection to the on-going peasant revolt.

The importance of the nationalities question to the timing of the insurrection, Lenin also argued, is illustrated by the vote of their delegates in the Democratic Conference. The nationalities were second only to the labor unions in voting against coalition at the conference.

But these questions were secondary in Lenin’s mind to the question of the “world working-class revolution.” Trotsky says this had always been Lenin’s point of departure. Even though capitalism in Russia lagged behind Europe and America, the crisis had come in Russia first. The ripeness of the crisis meant precisely that the Russian insurrection should not be held back, lest the opportunity pass forever and for workers everywhere.

In Lenin’s opinion this meant not waiting for the Congress of Soviets, still two weeks off. He thought the forces in Finland, where the soviets and the Baltic Fleet were already in a state equivalent to insurrection, would be a sufficient reinforcement for those already in Petrograd and Moscow. Moreover, his doubts about parliamentary struggle and the ability of such institutions to bring about world proletarian revolution applied not only to the Pre-Parliament, but to the Congress of Soviets as well.

And then, to emphasize his point (in a portion of the letter not intended for publication), Lenin resigned from the Central Committee. Trotsky believes he can explain this action. Bolshevik party discipline called for members to accept and support the democratically decided line of the party. As a member of the Central Committee, Lenin was already approaching the limit set by this rule. If he resigned, perhaps, he would be freer to advocate what he thought was the correct line on insurrection. It was another instance of the masses being to the left of the party.

But the resignation was not accepted and nothing more came of it. Meanwhile Lenin’s wife, Krupskaya, travelled to the party’s district meetings and read this and his other letters to the rank and file.

October 21 – October 8, 1917: Lenin Agitates. In an address to the Bolshevik delegates of the Northern Regional Conference of Soviets, Lenin argues for the line he took in “The Crisis Is Ripe.” He did not want to put off the insurrection until the Congress of Soviets, still almost two weeks away. He wanted the revolutionary soldiers and sailors based in Finland to make “an immediate move on Petrograd.”

Once again, Trotsky says, as in April with his theses, Lenin had placed himself in isolation, ahead and to the left of the party and its leading organ, the Central Committee.

October 22 – October 9, 1917: Military Revolutionary Committee. Reacting to the German occupation of the Western Estonian Archipelago, the Compromisers in the Petrograd Soviet move for the creation of a Committee of Revolutionary Defense in the capital. The initial responsibility of the committee would be to decide questions about transfers from the Petrograd garrison to the front, now nearer to the capital than at any previous time in the war.

This solved a political problem for the Bolsheviks. How could the Soviet, which they controlled, refuse reinforcements from the garrison without appearing to have betrayed the soldiers at the front? The motion by the Compromisers put the onus of the decision on them.

The Compromisers were nevertheless a little surprised when the Bolsheviks supported the motion. A bit more parliamentary work would be required before the committee became a reality. In the end, it became a formidable tool, Trotsky says the “chief lever,” of the October Revolution.

At the same meeting Trotsky gave his report on the withdrawal of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-Parliament. He concluded, pretty unambiguously, “Long live the direct and open struggle for revolutionary power!”

October 23 – October 10, 1917: Northern Regional Conference. The Northern Regional Conference of Soviets opens in Petrograd under the presidency of Ensign Krylenko. Antonov had organized the meeting for the Bolshevik Central Committee – not coincidentally, as he was also working on the Military Revolutionary Committee.

Trotsky read the political report. The main issue had become the government’s renewed efforts to transfer revolutionary troops from the Petrograd garrison. But this question was connected to the question of power. By their votes, “the people are trusting us and authorizing us to seize the power.” The question of power had therefore become something for the whole body of soviets to decide. The conference adopted a resolution to this effect unanimously, with only three abstentions.

The military resources available to the Bolsheviks made themselves heard. A representative of the Latvian sharpshooters promised 40,000 rifles for the defense of the Congress of Soviets. The powerful radios of battleships in the Baltic Fleet broadcast appeals to “overcome all obstacles” to the convocation of the Congress. Smolny was openly the center of efforts to procure weapons wherever possible.

October 23 – October 10, 1917: The Vote for Insurrection. At the apartment of the Menshevik Sukhanov, his wife, a Bolshevik, receives a quorum of her party’s Central Committee. Twelve of the twenty-one members attended, including Lenin, disguised with a wig and spectacles, and shorn of his characteristic beard. The meeting lasted ten hours; Sukhanov’s wife served her guests bread, sausage, and tea “for reinforcement,” Trotsky says.

Sukhanov’s wife had encouraged him not to tire himself by the trip home from Smolny that evening. But one wonders if he missed the sausages or the household funds required to procure them.

Sverdlov opened the meeting in the usual way with a report on organization. He focused, apparently by previous arrangement with Lenin, on suspicious activities at the front, including an effort to surround the revolutionary garrison at Minsk with Cossack cavalry, and communication between the headquarters of the Minsk garrison and the general staff.

With that Lenin began to marshal his arguments. He spoke earnestly and extemporaneously; it was time to put an end to the waverings on the committee. The question came to a vote sooner than Lenin might have expected: ten to two in favor of insurrection. For the balance of the ten-hour meeting, one after another, the members favoring insurrection tried unsuccessfully to persuade the dissenters, Kamenev and Zinoviev, to change their minds. 

The resolution itself summarizes, somewhat elliptically, the arguments Lenin used and the committee accepted. Lenin wrote it out, Trotsky says, with the “gnawed end of a pencil” on a child’s notebook paper. The reasons given for immediate action begin, in Lenin’s preferred order of precedence, with the international situation:

·         Perceived progress in the “world-wide socialist revolution” combined with imperialist threats to its leading edge, the Russian Revolution

·         Kerensky’s machinations to abandon the military stronghold of the revolution, Petrograd, to the Germans

·         The scale and intensity of the peasant revolt

·         Bolshevik majorities in elections to the soviets, etc.

·         Counter-revolutionary preparations, including renewed efforts to break up the Petrograd garrison

Lenin might have added another argument he’d used before, that the people might lose confidence in the Bolsheviks just as they had in the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and sink back into indifference and despair. At any rate, the resolution says, “…all this places the armed insurrection on the order of the day.” Note that the resolution did not set a specific date for the insurrection. Trotsky recalled that Lenin wanted Kerensky to be deposed before the Congress of Soviets was to assemble, and so October 15^th (October 28, new style) was discussed and tentatively set.

The resolution concludes by putting the onus of action on the party, specifically for organizing the Northern Regional Conference of Soviets and for resisting the break-up of the Petrograd garrison.

Reed recounts a different story about how the vote was taken, one that has verisimilitude but not verity. He says the vote was taken twice, at first going against insurrection. Then a “rough workman” arose and warned the committee not to allow the destruction of the soviets. If they did, “we’re through with you!” Then another vote favorable to insurrection supposedly took place. Of course the public were not invited to this secret session of the Central Committee. But the rumor Reed picked up epitomizes the ripeness of the crisis, and the risk that the people were growing, again in the words of the committee, “tired of words and resolutions.”

The seven-member political bureau selected by the committee at this meeting, because it included Zinoviev and Kamenev and because they immediately tried to stir up opposition to the resolution, was still-born – it never met.

The Bolsheviks also took a decision to publish a paper, Beydnoth, addressed to the peasantry. Though the Social Revolutionaries were the strongest vote getters in rural areas, Lenin saw an opportunity to bring the peasants over to the party once the workers’ insurrection caught up with the peasant revolt.

Besides this, Trotsky gave a speech to a conference of Petrograd factory committees that day, calling for the workers to “break through [the] wall” between them and the peasants. On Trotsky’s motion, the conference created the “Worker to Peasant” program, under which workers would fabricate farm implements from the waste and scrap metal of the factories and distribute them in the provinces. But this was not the real solution to the peasants’ problem; the effort was primarily a form of agitation. The problem could only be addressed directly when the workers controlled the means of production.

Meanwhile, now that the harvest was passing, the peasant revolt was growing.

October 24 – October 11, 1917: Zinoviev and Kamenev State Their Views. Evidence that the party was not unanimously behind the resolution of the Bolshevik Central Committee for insurrection is not long to appear. Naturally Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke up first. Other members of the Central Committee who were not at the meeting of the 10^th (October 23, new style) joined in their reservations. Volodarsky also did.

On this day. Zinoviev and Kamenev circulated a lengthy pamphlet calling insurrection an unjustified gamble; the Bolsheviks, relying on their strength in the soviets, ought to work as an opposition party in the Constituent Assembly instead. They argued that the “mood” of the masses did not match that of the July Days, and that Bolshevik strength in the electorate would continue to grow.

But Lenin was not trying to win an election; he was trying to win a revolution. He and the members of the committee who had voted for insurrection did not want to re-establish the dual government in a new parliamentary body, and there carry on the debate until the people lost interest and gave up. On the contrary he thought “[t]he success of the Russian and world revolution depends upon a two or three days’ struggle.” This was his understanding of the mood of the people and the corresponding consequences of delay. And, as to the Russian Revolution at least, Lenin was right.

Meanwhile, the commander of the Northern Front, General Cheremissov, demanded a reinforcement of troops from the Petrograd garrison. In response, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet named the Military Revolutionary Committee and charged it with deciding questions of this kind. A left Social Revolutionary, Lazimir, headed the committee. His instructions were such that the regulations he was to draft would serve armed insurrection and the defense of the capital equally well.

The Day of the Petrograd Soviet

October 31 – October 18, 1917: The Garrison Conference. In a decisive development, the Garrison Conference renews the policy of the Soviet from the April Days: orders that have not been countersigned by a representative of the soldiers section of the Soviet are not to be obeyed. The Central Executive Committee tried to suppress the announcement of the meeting for this purpose, but it was successfully sent to all the units of the city garrison via a technology called a “telephonogram.” Apparently the device made a phonographic recording of the message, which could then be sent over the telephone as often as necessary.

The Conference consisted not of Bolshevik politicians, but of representatives from the units of the garrison itself. It took a muster-roll of these units on the question of coming out in case of an insurrection. Only one cavalry regiment and a military school were against it. A few other smaller units declared neutrality or obedience to the Central Executive Committee. The rest, including all the infantry regiments, would come out, as Trotsky says, “at a word from the Petrograd Soviet.”

The Central Executive, denied the opportunity to speak, walked out in frustration. The garrison had formerly been a source of strength for them. Now the president put the main question on the table: by adopting the countersign policy, the garrison placed itself effectively under the Petrograd Soviet’s control.

October 31 – October 18, 1917: Kamenev’s Trick. The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet is again in session; with rumors flying about insurrection, the Bolsheviks have to give some sort of account of themselves. Trotsky spoke, admitting in the first place that he had signed an order for rifles that went to the Red Guard.

In the second place, he forged a link between the removal of the Petrograd garrison and the convocation of the Congress of Soviets. The Petrograd Soviet, he argued, would ask the Congress to seize the power; in the meantime, the Soviet would resist attempts, originating with the bourgeoisie, to break up the garrison – or for that matter the Congress. With the Garrison Conference and its countersign policy in place, the Soviet’s resistance had teeth.

Someone asked whether the Soviet had set a date for the insurrection. Trotsky replied that it had not, but that “if it became necessary to set one, the workers and soldiers would come out as one man.” Kamenev, sitting next to Trotsky, rose to make a comment that he “wanted to sign his name to Trotsky’s every word.” Of course this meant that he, Kamenev, did not think an insurrection would become necessary any time soon. But it was wrong to implicate Trotsky, and by extension the Bolshevik party, in that opinion. This episode was to have consequences.

Sukhanov’s motion to commemorate Gorky’s 50^th anniversary failed.

Trotsky relates an anecdote of Sukhanov’s observations after this session of the Executive Committee. First, Sukhanov says in his history, he saw Trotsky leave the meeting and approach the run-down, crowded automobiles the Central Executive Committee had made available to the Bolsheviks. After a moment, Trotsky “chuckled and…disappeared into the darkness” on foot. Then, boarding a passenger car, a smallish man with a goatee consoled Sukhanov on the discomforts of travel by rail. Sukhanov learned that the man’s name was Sverdlov, and that he was a “old party worker.” But he did not then know that Sverdlov and a quorum of the Bolshevik Central Committee had met in his apartments eight days before, nor could he know that in two weeks, Sverdlov would be President of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of All Russia.

Trotsky was apparently due at the All Russian Conference of Factory and Shop Committees that evening. There he spoke against “vacillation and wavering,” and everybody knew he was talking about Kamenev and Zinoviev. The conference also raised an issue that was being raised in Moscow factories and in the artillery factories. A resolution declaring worker control of production “in the interest of the whole country” passed with only five dissenting votes. Thus workers representing every Russian industry endorsed not just the theoretical validity of worker control but also their ability to manage the factories successfully, as in some cases they were already doing.

Beginning of November – End of October, 1917: Bolshevik Agitation. With the decision of the Central Committee in favor of insurrection, but awaiting a favorable opportunity, the Bolsheviks redouble their agitation in the capital. Trotsky lists some of the principal speakers:

·         Sverdlov

·         Volodarsky

·         Lashevich

·         Kollontai

·         Chudnovsky

·         Lunacharsky

·         “scores of agitators of lesser caliber”

Lenin was regrettably missing from the list, still waiting in Finland. Zinoviev and Kamenev were missing too – but they had voted against the insurrection in the Central Committee, and worked against it since then. Neither does Trotsky find any evidence Stalin ever spoke at mass meetings during this time.

Of course Trotsky himself was the leading figure. Somewhat modestly referring to himself as “president of the Petrograd Soviet” instead of by name, Trotsky somewhat immodestly reproduces a passage from Sukhanov’s history saying that his influence “was overwhelming,” and that “every [Petrograd] worker and soldier knew him and heard him personally.” Returning to modesty, Trotsky points out that the person-to-person “molecular agitation” of the workers and soldiers was “incomparably more effective.”

November 1 – October 19, 1917: “Lawful” Garrison Conference. Dismayed by the decision of the Garrison Conference the day before, the Central Executive Committee assembles its own meeting of the representatives of the Petrograd garrison. Several units not represented at the previous meeting sent delegates to this one. Two of them, the garrison of the Peter and Paul fortress and an armored car division, declared allegiance to the Central Executive.

The military importance of this development lay in the position of the Peter and Paul on an island in the Neva River. Though of course it could not maneuver, the fortress not only dominated a number of bridges in the middle of the city, but it also blocked the direct route to the Winter Palace, seat of the Provisional Government. There was also a substantial arsenal, coveted by the Red Guards, on the island.

Then the Central Executive asked the assembly to pass a cautiously worded resolution. The soldiers refused both the resolution and the notion that an assembly called by the Central Executive rather than the Petrograd Soviet would have authority to take any such decision. After this failure, the Central Executive, with the cooperation of headquarters, tried to appoint a commissar over the Petrograd military district. This the Petrograd Soviet in turn rejected. General Polkovnikov, in his turn, issued general orders for the suppression of demonstrations. Reed reproduces them in his book; Polkovnikov’s lack of urgency is remarkable.

Meanwhile, hearing of agitation for the convocation of a constituent assembly in and for the Ukraine, Kerensky summons its General Secretary to Petrograd for an explanation. This did not create much of a ripple in the Ukraine. The American journalist Reed says Kerensky also told the Pre-Parliament that the government would be able to handle any Bolshevik insurrection, even though he himself was “a doomed man.”

November 2 – October 20, 1917: Military Revolutionary Committee at Work. The Military Revolutionary Committee, with Trotsky presiding, begins preparations for defending the Congress of Soviets. Delegates aligned with the Compromisers boycotted the meeting, leaving the Bolsheviks, with their new left Social Revolutionary allies, completely in control. The Social Revolutionary Lazimir continued in charge of operations; Sverdlov assumed a role corresponding to that of chief of the general staff.

The committee assigned commissars to all the units of the garrison. Among their responsibilities was taking control of stores of arms; distributions of weapons were to take place only by consent of the commissars. In this way, the commissar for Peter and Paul fortress prevented a shipment of 10,000 rifles to the Cossacks of the Don, as well as distributions to junkers and other counter-revolutionary organizations in the capital.

The typographical workers came forward to report an increase of Black Hundreds propaganda to the committee. Such reports gave the committee an opportunity to control counter-revolutionary agitation.

The rumors about a Bolshevik insurrection that day proved again to be untrue. Nevertheless the government continued its own preparations, which it still considered adequate. The Petrograd Soviet, in a preparation of its own, announced that on Sunday the 22^nd (November 4, new style), it would conduct a review of its forces. The counter-revolution responded by promising a religious procession on that day.

Also on this day, Kerensky’s Minister of War, Verkhovsky, made the mistake of advocating a separate peace to a committee of the Pre-Parliament. Even people who might have agreed in private that this was advisable attacked him publicly, coupling his policy to that of Trotsky. The minister had to take an enforced vacation.

Finally, as the nationalities question in Russia extended to the Cossacks, on this day they declared the unity of their armies with the Caucasian mountaineers and the people of the steppes. This proved to be the foundation for the Cossack state formed to oppose the Bolshevik government the following spring.

November 2 – October 20, 1917: Kamenev’s Resignation, etc. The Bolshevik Central Committee meets in the absence of both Lenin and Kamenev. After his “trick” (Lenin’s word) at the Petrograd Soviet, Kamenev offered his resignation from the Central Committee, making himself freer to oppose its decisions. Trotsky obliged him by putting the item on the agenda.

Trotsky moved the resignation be accepted. Sverdlov read a letter from Lenin criticizing Kamenev and Zinoviev as “strikebreakers,” and characterizing the way Kamenev had twisted Trotsky’s words as “plain petty cheating.” Stalin spoke against acceptance, but the motion passed five votes to three, with Stalin among those against. The committee also forbade Kamenev’s and Zinoviev’s agitation against the party’s policies, again over Stalin’s dissent.

This was but one of a number of signs of fissures in the party as the pressure of the coming insurrection mounted. On the day of the committee meeting, the party paper printed a letter from Zinoviev saying that he had moved closer to Lenin’s views and accepted what Trotsky said in the Soviet. The editor, Stalin, printed it over comments that this was also the meaning of Kamenev’s “declaration” in the Petrograd Soviet (though no-one believed this but Stalin) and that the “sharpness of tone” of Lenin’s article obscured the agreement of the party “in fundamentals” (though, as Trotsky says, the fundamental question at that time was the imminence of the insurrection, over which Kamenev, at any rate, was still fighting).

Stalin offered to resign from the editorial board, but the offer was not accepted.

The American journalist Reed got the story on the insurrection from Volodarsky the next day. But because Volodarsky was not on the Central Committee, and might not have been at the meeting, the version Reed reports has a touch of the fabulous. Lenin, Volodarsky said, ruled out the 6^th, because the insurrection needed an all-Russian basis, and the Congress of Soviets would not yet have assembled. Lenin ruled out the 8^th, because though the Congress would already be in session, it would be unable to reach a sudden decision democratically. This left the 7^th (October 25, old style).

But of course Lenin was not even there….

November 3 – October 21, 1917: Resolution of the Garrison Conference. With representatives of two of the three Cossack regiments in the garrison present, the Garrison Conference accepted three proposals made by Trotsky: that the garrison would support the Military Revolutionary Committee, that the garrison would take part in the review of forces planned for the following day, and that the Congress of Soviets should “take the power in its hands.” Trotsky also welcomed the Cossacks to the conference.

The committee named three commissars, including Lazimir, to the district military headquarters of General Polkovnikov. They informed the general about the Garrison Conference’s decision requiring military orders to be countersigned by the Soviet. The car the staff had sent to bring the commissars to the meeting was withdrawn when they left.

In a special session at 11:00 a.m., the conference decided to make an accomplished fact official. They summoned Trotsky and Sverdlov, and told them of their plan to break from headquarters entirely and in the open. The resolution then adopted gave the reason: “[H]eadquarters is a direct instrument of the counter-revolutionary forces.” The decision was communicated to the district soviets and soldiers committees; steps were taken to prevent surprise action by the enemy.

The decision of the Garrison Conference forestalled the plans Polkovnikov and the Central Executive Committee wanted to implement at a meeting set for 1:00 p.m. By then the Garrison Conference had already taken, Trotsky says, “a decisive step on the road to insurrection.”

Another Smolny delegation went to headquarters with word of the conference resolution. Staff somewhat wishfully thought it might be just another instance of the dual government, or that the Central Executive Committee could fix things.

It got more difficult to get into Smolny that day; passes were changed every few hours. The American journalist Reed tells how he saw Trotsky run afoul of this when he had lost his pass and neither the guard nor the commander of the guard recognized him. Trotsky and his wife were eventually admitted.

Meanwhile Miliukov’s Cadet paper asserted that if the Bolsheviks were to come out, they would be suppressed “immediately and without difficulty.”

November 4 – October 22, 1917: The Day of the Petrograd Soviet. The Bolshevik press sums up the declarations of revolutionary organizations throughout the country: 56 such organizations are demanding the transfer of power to the soviets.

Meanwhile, the Menshevik Dan reported on behalf of the Central Executive Committee that only 50 out of over 900 soviets had thus far made the decision to send delegates to the Congress of Soviets. Trotsky speculates that this number indicated low morale in the compromisist parties rather than lack of interest across the country as a whole. Those soviets that were attending for the most part did not bother to tell the Central Executive.

This was the day for the review of the revolutionary forces of the Petrograd Soviet. It did not take the form of mass demonstration in the streets. Instead there were meetings in the public halls and squares. One audience would assemble, listen to the speeches, then depart. Then another audience would file in.

All the speakers were Bolsheviks, bolstered by the left Social Revolutionaries who were now joining them. Trotsky addressed the crowd at the House of the People. He read out the resolution and called for their assent. Sukhanov wrote, “Thousands and thousands raised their hands as one man.” They held them up, eyes burning, as Trotsky made the resolution an oath. “They took the oath”: Loyalty to the Soviet, immediate answer to its summons.

Trotsky says, “Each side was satisfied with the other. The leaders were convinced: We can postpone no longer! The masses said to themselves: This time the thing will be done!”

On the request of General Polkovnikov, the “religious” procession of counter-revolutionists did not come off. But the bourgeois press, like the boy who cried wolf, again predicted a bloody demonstration. Miliukov writes in his history that “the frightened population” stayed home. By “population” he meant the bourgeoisie.

As for the refusal of the Garrison Conference to accept orders, Kerensky reportedly said, “I think we can easily handle this.” Later he was asking whether the government ought to arrest the Military Revolutionary Committee. Not necessary, General Polkovnikov thought, given the forces he had in hand. The Compromisers on the Central Executive thought they could deal with the committee’s commissars.

Meanwhile, the American journalist Reed was keeping count of arrivals to the Congress of Soviets:

·         November 2, 15 delegates

·         November 3, 100

·         November 4, 175, “of whom one hundred and three were Bolsheviki!”

November 5 – October 23, 1917: The Peter and Paul Comes Over. General Polkovnikov and his staff try to open a negotiation with the Garrison Conference. They offered to accept the conditions the conference had declared, that is, the policy that orders from headquarters would not be considered valid unless countersigned by the Soviet. But the conference would have to withdraw the order categorically breaking from the headquarters chain of command. Headquarters signed and delivered an agreement to that effect, but the conference never troubled to answer.

It was busy with other things. The Soviet assigned commissars with plenary powers to each military unit and to strategic points in the city. It applied the tactic of “crowding out” government functions and replacing their people with agents of the Soviet at every opportunity.

But the commandant at the Peter and Paul fortress in the Neva River threatened to arrest the commissar, Corporal Blagonravov, who arrived there. Hearing of this at Smolny, the Bolsheviks wondered what to do. Trotsky, thinking the troops themselves must be sound, offered to negotiate. When he and his delegation got there at about 2:00 p.m., a meeting was in progress. The right-wing orators spoke cautiously; the soldiers listened to Trotsky’s delegation instead.

Thus this strategic point and its garrison came over to the Soviet. Blagonravov set up his office and his communications with Smolny. The arsenal and its 100,000 rifles became available to the Military Committee and the Red Guard.

The Preobrazhentsky Regiment of the garrison came over too, protesting rumors (based on their credulity during the July slanders about Lenin and German money) that they were still with the government. As for government troops from the front, cavalry was being held up on the railways at Pskov; the 17^th Infantry Division simply refused orders to march on Petrograd. Delegates from the front itself appeared at the Petrograd Soviet demanding peace. The soldiers of the Fifth Army replaced the Compromisers on their committee with Bolsheviks.

The Red Guards also made their presence felt. A conference of 100 delegates representing 20,000 armed workers from all over the city, convened the previous day, now adopted a resolution for organizing and deploying their forces. Riflemen were organized into squads, companies, battalions, and divisions, and supported by engineers, bicyclists, telegraphers, machine gunners, and artillerists. Women established hospitals and first aid stations. Patrols and guards protected the factories and strategic points.

On Nevsky Prospect, the American journalist Reed bought a copy of Lenin’s pamphlet, “Will the Bolsheviks Be Able to Hold the State Power?” Then he went to Smolny, where Lazimir, head of the Military Revolutionary Committee, told him the Peter and Paul had come over. And that a regiment the government had sent to the capital stopped at the Gatchina Station, passed a resolution in favor of power to the soviets, and sent a delegation to Lazimir’s committee. The committee returned a message welcoming them as comrades and telling them to remain where they were until further instructions from the committee.

Reed saw the organizers of the insurrection at work: Podvoisky, Antonov, Krylenko, Dybenko….

Meanwhile, Kerensky’s Provisional Government issued a decree proclaiming “in principle” the independence of Finland. Both the bourgeoisie and the proletarians of Finland wanted this – though for different reasons. The grant of independence did not extend to military matters and foreign policy. It did not create much of a ripple in Finland.

Red October: The Winter Palace

November 6-7 – October 24-25, 1917: The Winter Palace Defended. When Kerensky returns to the Winter Palace from the Pre-Parliament (the session of November 6 – October 24), he finds Commissar Stankevich there, back from headquarters at the front. Stankevich was skeptical about whether an insurrection was actually taking place – too quiet. Kerensky thought it was; he was waiting on the resolution of the Pre-Parliament before taking certain steps against it. Stankevich went to Mariinsky Palace to see how things stood there.

Kerensky did not like the news Stankevich brought back at about 9:00 p.m. – particularly the resolution demanding that the Pre-Parliament should run the fight against the insurrection through its own committee of public safety. Kerensky summoned the Pre-Parliament’s leaders to a cabinet meeting at the palace, at which he threatened to resign – again. Avksentiev explained that the resolution was “purely theoretical” and admitted that maybe the wording wasn‘t apt. The Menshevik Dan wanted the government to proclaim it had proposed peace negotiations to the Entente, and publish it on posters throughout the city.

A delegation of Cossack officers came in next. They believed their three regiments of cavalry would be willing and able not only to defend the government, but also to destroy the Bolsheviks. Kerensky seems to have liked this pretty well, but said he regretted he had not arrested Trotsky before then.

Of course none of this was based on the realities of the situation. After the meetings broke up at 2:00 a.m. (November 7 – October 25), Kerensky was left alone with his deputy Konovalov. General Polkovnikov came in with a plan to capture Smolny, but he could not specify what forces he intended to use. Maybe the commander in chief could find them. Only then did Kerensky realize that all Polkovnikov’s reports on the preparedness and loyalty of the garrison were not just mistaken, but self-deluded.

Further proof that the situation was more dangerous than imagined came from a commissar of the city government: ships of the Baltic Fleet in the Neva, bridges taken, Bolshevik movements “meeting nowhere the slightest resistance….” Now Kerensky and his deputy knew they needed troops – lots of them, and fast.

They went to Polkovnikov’s nearby headquarters and found it stuffed with officers hiding from troops they could no longer command. Not much help. Kerensky telephoned his party’s headquarters; maybe the Social Revolutionaries could arm the membership. Miliukov observes that this was sure to alienate military elements aligned with the right. But unlike the Bolsheviks, the Social Revolutionaries had made no effort to arm the party rank and file.

Now it was time to call in the Cossack regiments. But cavalry cannot operate without support, the Cossacks said. They must have armored cars, machine guns, and especially infantry to back them up. Kerensky promised these things, but they were things he could not deliver. Only squadrons, not regiments, of Cossacks ever came to the defense of the Winter Palace.

People in headquarters and at the palace were beginning to sense an oncoming fiasco.

Kerensky summoned a War Ministry official to headquarters. He was stopped, taken to the barracks of the Pavlovsky Regiment, then permitted to go on his way. Commissar Stankevich too was allowed to pass into headquarters during this time (later going on his mission to the telephone exchange). That at least was something.

It was 5:00 a.m. New conversations with the headquarters of the Northern Front brought new promises and assurances. But troops were not arriving. Kerensky and Konovalov returned to the palace to rest, only to find the phones had been cut off. And there in the river, across the courtyard from the palace, revolutionary marines stood guard on the Dvortsovy bridge.

November 7 – October 25, 1917: Kerensky Goes for Help. Their rest cut short by disturbing news. Kerensky and Konovalov return to General Polkovnikov’s headquarters. Maybe the phones were working there….

But the situation was deteriorating. The junkers were nervous: the Bolsheviks had told them to move off. Armored cars intended for the defense of the Winter Palace seemed to have gone missing. No news from the front. At any rate the officers ejected from their regiments had found somewhere else to hide.

Now Kerensky wanted the cabinet to join him at headquarters. Most of them, for one reason or another, didn’t have automobiles; only Kishkin and one other minister paid attendance. Though he didn’t have a quorum of the cabinet, Kerensky did have one last card to play: he himself would go forth and hasten the echelons advancing to the rescue of the Provisional Government. They sent for Kerensky’s touring car.

Then another automobile arrived, bearing the stars and stripes of the American embassy. In Kerensky’s version of events, the American and British embassies had heard of his plan to go to the front, and put the car at his disposal. The American ambassador’s version is less generous. A Russian officer followed the car to the embassy and demanded to use it for Kerensky’s trip to the front. That much, the ambassador said, the embassy might be willing to acquiesce in, but then the Russian officer left the American flag in place.

Kerensky got into his own car; the embassy car followed. People seemed to recognize him; Kerensky says he saluted “a little carelessly and with an easy smile.” The Red Guards did not know what to make of it as the cars rushed past; at any rate they did not fire.

In the result, the Third Bicycle Battalion, expected at the Winter Palace, telegraphed Smolny instead and were invited to send a delegation there. Kerensky did not find them and so was unable to change their minds. He did find some troops at the Gatchina station at about 10:00 a.m., but his harangue was unsuccessful. Thereafter his movements are lost to history. The next day General Kornilov, supposedly under guard in Bhykov, also dropped out of sight. Trotsky says Kerensky must have tipped Kornilov off.

November 7 – October 25, 1917: The Winter Palace Encircled. The Military Revolutionary Committee launches its plan to encircle the Winter Palace and trap the ministers of the Provisional Government inside. Lashevich at Smolny, Podvoisky and Antonov in the front lines, and Chudnowsky, lately arrived from the front, were in charge. The plan involved joint operations between naval and ground forces. Moreover, the ground forces included marines, garrison infantry, and detachments of the Red Guards. So the field headquarters were in the Peter and Paul, with subordinate commands on the cruiser Aurora, in the Pavlovsky Regiment, and in the barracks of the marines.

By its very nature, encirclement is a difficult maneuver, even for competent generals with experienced staffs – not to mention practiced coordination between the different branches of the service. Needless to say the politicians on the Military Committee encountered difficulties and delays.

At first the committee promised it to take the palace by 10:00 a.m. This would have made the announcement at that hour true without qualification. As it was, Petrograd had been taken, but not the Provisional Government – even though the government was, as the War Ministry wired the front, “in the capital of a hostile state.”

Trotsky thinks a coup de main would have worked late that morning or even that afternoon – just rush the main entrance with the troops on hand. Two considerations, I believe, must have militated against this tactic. The first was political: the insurrection had been bloodless up until then; an assault would have drawn blood. This consideration was apparently later dropped. The second consideration was strategic: the object was to capture the Provisional Government alive and whole; in the confusion of an assault, some of them, maybe someone brave or clever enough to continue the resistance, might have got away. Moreover it would have been a very bad thing for the insurrection to kill a socialist minister by mistake.

At any rate, the Military Committee went ahead with its plan. Different kinds of detachments, under differing chains of command, had to take their places in the line. Though this complicated movements still further, the committee assembled the encirclement out of sight of the palace. Action was planned for 10:00 a.m., but a naval force of ships and marines from Kronstadt failed to arrive in time. 

The committee decided to wait on the Kronstadters. It took time: noon passed; 3:00 p.m. passed. All afternoon, Podvoisky and Antonov were under pressure from Smolny. The Bolshevik’s political plan called for the liquidation of the Provisional Government before the Congress of Soviets was convened. That would clear the way for the Congress to assume the state power on behalf of the soviets. But the delegates had been summoned for the 25^th (November 7, new style). So Smolny was under pressure too. After 6:00 p.m., even though the Kronstadters had arrived and were at their posts, Podvoisky and Antonov stopped making promises about when the palace would be taken.

November 7 – October 25, 1917: Inside the Winter Palace. The Provisional Government – minus Kerensky – is getting nowhere in its efforts to find reinforcements while the insurrection’s encirclement is still fairly porous. General Polkovnikov was too discouraged to act. General Alexiev, once commander in chief under the tsar, came to headquarters as an advisor. He soon realized the game was up and left.

That morning insurrectionary troops had not yet encircled the Winter Palace, nor had they occupied the streets nearby or the square in which it stood. They’d watched Kerensky’s car drive off and let Stankevich pass in and out again. Now they were stopping cars and dispossessing the riders. Somehow they missed the cars of the ministers summoned to the palace for a cabinet meeting. Only one minister was stopped and arrested, and he was later released.

The cabinet was thus able to meet and try what Polkovnikov could not find the energy for. At about 11:00 a.m., finding no-one else in the cabinet willing, they appointed Kishkin, a Cadet and a civilian, to coordinate the defense. Trotsky observes this can hardly have induced troops from the front, who hated the Cadets, to come to the cabinet’s rescue. Kishkin relieved Polkovnikov and appointed an equally ineffective replacement.

If he wanted more defenders, Kishkin would have to find more junkers and persuade the Cossacks to come in. The defense also needed armored cars, they had six, but five departed and did not return. Fortunately the palace still had a direct wire to district military headquarters. There was also a telephone line the insurrection had overlooked.

At noon the palace was defended by ensigns from two junker schools and a section of field artillery from a third, an engineering school. The junkers piled up cordwood in the courtyard as a barricade for their riflemen.

Difficulties arose. Passers-by brandished revolvers and disarmed the surprised sentries. There did not appear to be sufficient rations for the day, much less for a siege. Agitators so played on their nerves that the junkers demanded a council of war with the ministers. Konovalov granted it; the whole cabinet was there with him.

An hour’s meeting gave reassurance. The chief of the engineering school took command of the whole junker contingent; his actions made the defense seem more substantial. So did rifle fire from behind the barricades, meant to clear the square. This gave the Military Committee pause. Deciding to bring up more reserves, mainly the still-expected Kronstadters, the committee called off a planned advance.

Now there was time to bring in more defenders too. Note that the encirclement had to face both ways: inward to hold the defenders, and outward to prevent reinforcements. Neither circle was complete. The Cossacks, after much internal debate, resolved to send in two squadrons of cavalry and some machine gun crews. They arrived towards evening. Shortly afterwards some forty Cavaliers of St. George, crippled war veterans, came up, and after them a company of the Women’s Battalion, widows of men killed in the war. If this was their infantry support, the Cossacks did not like the looks of it. At no time, Trotsky estimates, did the garrison defending the palace number more than 2,000.

November 7 – October 25, 1917: The Winter Palace Bombarded. At about 4:00 p.m., ships from Kronstadt join the cruiser Aurora. They came much later than planned, but of course the officers did not share the feelings of the sailors towards the revolution.

One of the ships, another cruiser, took a position menacing the Baltic railroad, in case the government should send reinforcements in that way. The others, two destroyers and two gunboats, sailed up the Neva River. They still had to debark their marines, and then the marines had to take their place in the encirclement. From the Winter Palace, says Trotsky, the reinforcement must have looked to the Minister of the Marine, Admiral Verderevsky, formidable.

By 5:00 p.m., the Keksgolmsky Regiment had occupied the War Ministry. By 6:00 p.m., the palace was at last surrounded. Armored cars took up positions at the entrances to the Palace Square; one of them ran up and disarmed the junkers at the main gate.

But the next step in the Military Committee’s plan, an increasingly menacing series of bombardments, was also complicated – perhaps a bit more than necessary. We’ll return to this part of the story in a moment.

Meanwhile, inside the palace, if they couldn’t get anything else, the cabinet was at least trying to get news. At 4:00 p.m., Kerensky’s deputy Konovalov called a meeting with party leaders to see what they could do. Only one attended, expressed “sympathy,” as Trotsky says, and hastily left. A secret telephone line was still working, but no good news could be had from the front. Officers without commands drifted into the palace; they made the staff prepare dinner and serve it with wine.

The junkers demanded and received a new conference with the cabinet. But the news the cabinet could share would at this point could hardly have given satisfaction. While this was going on, Kishkin came in with an ultimatum from Antonov. The encirclement was complete, naval guns were trained on the palace; the cabinet should surrender and the garrison should give up its arms. The ministers of war and marine advised their civilian colleges to give in. This the latter would not do; they made no answer and appealed to the city duma instead. The duma was, after all, the only legitimate authority in the city…!

Now the cabinet heard from the district military headquarters: the commanding general there offered to resign. Half an hour later a detachment of soldiers, marines, and Red Guards advanced on headquarters, met no resistance, and arrested the general instead. Then the general who had replaced Polkovnikov stood down. Demoted and ordered to leave by Kishkin, he fell into the hands of some marines. But Podvoisky took custody before he could come to any harm. It was about 5:00 p.m.

The junker riflemen crouched behind the cordwood barriers in front of the palace could see that the siege was tightening. They began to fire more rapidly, with rifles and machine guns; the besiegers did the same; casualties, the first of the whole day anywhere in the city, were suffered.

The cabinet grew apprehensive about the view from the room where they were meeting, called the Malachite Room. If they could see the ships in the river, the ships could fire at them – directly. So they moved to an interior room and papered over the windows overlooking the courtyard. Then the lights went off: the insurrection was in control of the electricity. The cabinet had to content themselves with a lamp.

The palace staff found this a good moment to absent themselves. The displaced officers ordered those who remained to bring more wine. Word of the debauch reached the defenders; it had a demoralizing effect. The junker artillerymen announced they had received orders to return to their school. At least they left a couple of their guns behind. The Pavlovsky Regiment captured and disarmed them on their way out, taking two of their guns and turning them around to bear on the Winter Palace.

At last the Cossack regiments, despairing of infantry support, resolved to withdraw their squadrons. Their machine gunners too, though the guns were left behind. The besiegers let the Cossacks out through a passage the defenders did not know about. This was at about 9:00 p.m.

Infiltration tactics began to have an effect that evening. Troops armed with words entered the palace through the passage the Cossacks used to leave. They did not find it difficult to demoralize the junker guards and patrols in the halls; they advised that anybody who wanted to leave could do so freely.

The plan for bombarding the palace was at last coming together. Like the plan of encirclement, it took longer to hatch than hoped. Corporal Blagonravov got some field guns up onto the parapets of the Peter and Paul by noon, but the insurrection had not found any gunners. There was a company of gunners in the garrison, but they were not revolutionists. Reluctant to fire on the government, they made difficulties about the guns: they were rusty, the compressors needed oil.

Antonov, waiting for the agreed signal from the fortress, grew cross at the delay. He went to see Blagonravov; they lost the way; Antonov suspected treachery for a moment. When they finally found the guns, Antonov dismissed the artillerists and sent for men from the Aurora. Then a messenger hurried up: the palace has surrendered…! But it was only headquarters, taken by the insurrection at about 5:00 p.m.

Blagonravov also had to explain that the agreed signal for beginning the bombardment, a red lantern hoisted above the rampants of the Peter and Paul, could not be given. A red lantern was nowhere to be had. Never mind. Lashevich sends over gunners from the Aurora; they began anew to prepare the guns.

Meanwhile Chudnovsky also found his way into the palace and persuaded some junkers to give up. Then Chudnovsky was arrested and the junkers had to persuade the commandant to let him go. A few junkers went with him and some of the Cavaliers of St. George too; their exit created confusion in the courtyard, where the junker riflemen still kept up their fire.

The lights went back on, making a good target of the junkers. Somebody switched them off, then they went back on again. The junkers fired at the light; an officer threatened the palace electrician. But the marines had taken control of the current.

Then the soldiers of the Women’s Battalion, thinking that the tsarist General Alexiev was held captive and, moreover, that his life must in the interest of the Russian land and people be preserved, sortied to his rescue. Their advance broke up under fire and the greater part of them surrendered. This was at about 10:00 p.m.

Then a lull, for about an hour. Trotsky says, “The besiegers are busied with the preparation of artillery fire.” The surrounded government, under the impression that the besiegers were weak and that their assault had failed, was sending defiant messages: “’Let the army and the people answer!’”

At length the guns and cannon were ready. The plan of bombardment called for a series of escalations: first blanks, then light caliber guns, then the six-inch guns of the Aurora would open up. The blanks made a huge sound and flash. Maybe this would change the defenders’ minds. Antonov again proposed that the defenders give up. Some of them do, including junkers and the rest of the Women’s Battalion, leaving their weapons on the sidewalk.

The bombardment was renewed – somewhat. The rate of fire was not all the Aurora was capable of: thirty-some shots over the course of nearly two hours. Only two hits. Trotsky wonders, “Is lack of skill the real cause?”

Perhaps the commander of the Red Army in the Russian Civil War has overlooked some things about naval gunfire. During World War II, a cruiser with six-inch guns could open fire on an enemy ship at nearly 10,000 yards. A broadside every minute would not be considered a very rapid rate of fire. Not all the shells could be counted on to hit; the target, say another cruiser, would have been about 600 feet long and 55 or more feet abeam. It was also moving. Nevertheless it was possible for one cruiser to hit and, after repeated hits, sink another.

The Winter Palace was not moving. It was, say, a block or more long. The range for Aurora’s six-inch guns was point blank. On Wikipedia, it looks as if she could bring a broadside of eight guns to bear. So consider the story Trotsky relates of the Minister of Marine, Admiral Verderevsky, in light of these facts. The commandant brought the admiral a shard of metal from somewhere on the palace grounds. The admiral inspected it and said, yes, the shard came from a shell fired by the Aurora. Now the government knew that its own navy was willing to fire at it.

Trotsky finds reason to doubt the story about the shard. But it is true that a shell can be fitted with a fuse, and the fuse can ignite the explosive in the shell at any desired range. It seems to me this shard must have come from a shell that exploded over the palace, not in it.

That is, the gunners were not shooting at the palace at all. Neither did the sailors want to cause any more casualties than absolutely necessary, nor the officers to deface a monument of tsarist Russia. On this account, the two “hits” Trotsky mentions were actually misses.

As little effect as the barrage had on the Winter Palace, it caused plenty of consternation and anxiety in other parts of the city, as the next entries show.

November 7 – October 25, 1917: The March of the City Duma. One of the last outbound telephone calls from the Winter Palace’s regular lines that evening goes to the city duma in their headquarters on the Nevsky Prospect. It sparked a considerable discussion, not so much about what to do, but about what unkind fate had in store for the Bolsheviks. Minister of Supplies Prokopovich, briefly detained by the Bolsheviks that morning on the way to the cabinet meeting at the Winter Palace, expressed the desire to join his colleagues in their fate. The duma, dominated by the bourgeois parties, was sympathetic.

Now gunfire could be heard from the direction of the palace. Something must be done! In Trotsky’s words, “The duma must march in a body to the Winter Palace in order to die there, if necessary, with the government.” It was, at any rate, a plan. But it had to be ratified. More discussion. The delegates from the Compromiser parties were ready to march; the Cadets would join them. The advice of the Bolshevik delegates – to stay off the streets and suggest to the government that they ought, in order to avoid bloodshed, to surrender – was ignored.

The duma took a roll-call vote: sixty-two of the delegates were prepared to die “if necessary.” Then the duma got word that the Executive Committee of the Deputies of the Peasants Soviets wanted to march with them. Another round of speeches was now required.

The palace defenders heard of the march: to them “a miracle,” Trotsky suggests. By the time it passed from mouth to mouth, the rumor sounded like a miracle indeed: “The people with the clergy at their head,” where “people” again means “bourgeoisie.”

The streets around the Nevsky Prospect were dark and pretty quiet when the marchers, bearing lanterns and umbrellas, got underway. The fourteen Bolshevik delegates went off to Smolny and the Congress of Soviets, leaving three Menshevik-Internationalists quite alone in the halls of the duma. The American journalist Reed saw the minister Prokopovich, the mayor of Petrograd, and Avksentiev, lately the President of the Pre-Parliament, in the procession, but no clergy.

No people either, of any social condition. The whole crowd numbered no more than 400 marchers, mainly all politicians. They sang the Marseillaise to keep up their morale. Where the Nevsky Prospect crosses over the Ekaterininsky Canal, the march encountered an ensign’s guard of marines. Reed recounts the conversation. The marines did not propose to allow anyone to interfere with the insurrection’s business at the Winter Palace. The marchers could see that the marines would halt their march by force. Prokopovich made a new proposal, “’Let us return to the duma and talk over methods of saving the country and the revolution.’”

And this proposal was very sensibly adopted. On the return they did not feel much like singing the Marseillaise.

Overnight November 7-8 – October 25-26, 1917: Congress of Soviets in Session. The delegates who assemble in Smolny for the October Congress of Soviets do not resemble those of the June Congress – neither in party alignment nor, Trotsky says, in appearance. Worn soldiers, peasants, and workers in worn clothing who represented the Bolshevik soviets in October replaced the well-turned-out intellectuals who represented the leadership of the compromisist parties in June. Of the 832 delegates to the June Congress, some 600 were Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. Of the 650 arriving for the first session of the October Congress, 390 were with the Bolsheviks, 80 were Mensheviks, and of the 159 Social Revolutionaries, three-fifths were “left,” that is, were aligned with the Bolsheviks. Other delegates, to the number of 900, would arrive later.

The delegates took a straw poll on the preferred shape of the government they expected – most of them – to form:

·         505 for a government of the soviets

·         86 for a government of the “democracy”

·         55 for a coalition government

·         21 for a coalition government excluding the Cadets.

Party caucuses began in the morning. The city was quiet and in the hands of the insurrection; the Winter Palace was fairly quiet too, but it still held the Provisional Government. This gave the caucuses plenty to talk about.

The right- and left-Social Revolutionaries split over the question on taking a page from the Bolsheviks’ book by withdrawing from the Congress. Sixty on the right wanted to withdraw; 92 on the left were against it. By evening the two camps were sitting in separate caucuses.

The Mensheviks had trouble deciding what their attitude should be. Lots of views were being aired. They were still being aired at 8:00 p.m., when their caucus requested that the opening of the Congress be put off.

It was, until 10:40 p.m. The hall filled up to overflowing in clouds of tobacco smoke. The American journalist Reed squeezed in, but certain people who were important in the June Congress – Cheidze, Tseretilli, Chernov – were missing. The Menshevik Dan called the meeting to order on behalf of the Central Executive Committee chosen by the June Congress. He did not want to make a political speech but he can’t help referring to the compromisist ministers holed up in the Winter Palace.

Hardly anybody liked this. The Congress passed to the first order of business: selecting a new praesidium. A Bolshevik from Moscow moved that representation be proportional to the party identification of the delegates. The right-Social Revolutionaries refused their seats; the left-SRs were happy to take them (seven seats). For the time being the Mensheviks, guided by Martov, stayed in the game (three seats).

Sverdlov had drawn up the Bolshevik list of fourteen. He put Kamenev and Zinoviev, who’d voted in the Bolshevik Central Committee against starting the insurrection, on it, but modestly left himself off. Naturally Lenin was on the list, but he did not yet come forward. He was still in disguise – wig, spectacles, and make up – trying to gauge the mood of the Congress. The Mensheviks Dan and Skobelev saw him in a passageway and, recognizing him, stared. Lenin did not acknowledge them.

Kamenev took the chair. He announced the agenda, but the guns of the Aurora and the Peter and Paul were making another announcement….

The agenda was to be:

·         Organization of the new government

·         Peace policy

·         Role of the constituent Assembly

…but it was derailed by the evident incompletion of the insurrection. The Congress seated some delegates from the peasants soviets who, as this was officially a congress of workers and soldiers deputies, had not been invited. Then the Menshevik Martov spoke. To considerable applause, he moved to halt all military action and begin negotiations with the government. This promised to split the Congress before it could get well started. Luncharsky made the reply for the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks have “’absolutely nothing against Martov’s proposal.’” It passed unanimously.

Delegates from the soldiers committees – officers – now took the floor one after another, speaking against the insurrection, the Bolsheviks, and even the Congress itself. Then a Menshevik actually proposed forming a coalition with the Provisional Government – just then entering upon its last few minutes of existence. It was impossible to work with the Bolsheviks, he continued, and moreover the Congress lacked any lawful authority. The speech – what could be heard of it over booing and catcalls – was not received sympathetically.

Now a Latvian rifleman rose to speak. The officers do not represent the troops on the front. The day of the Compromisers is done. “’The Revolution has had enough gab! We want action!’” Reed says the audience “knew [his words] for the truth.”

The next speaker, another right socialist from the Bund, declared the events in Petrograd “’a misfortune,’” and invited his colleagues to walk out. Seventy of them, about half, did, leaving the other half wondering whether it was possible to work with the Bolsheviks. Some of them apparently joined with the left Social Revolutionaries in alignment with the Bolsheviks. The half that left, some of them, joined the march of the city duma.

Apparently, in spite of Martov’s motion, the sounds of gunfire can still be heard. Martov rose to speak again. He demanded adjournment of Congress until the motion had been acted upon and realized. The Bolsheviks from the city duma turned up right at this moment and were greeted enthusiastically.

Lenin and Trotsky were taking a rest in a room nearly bare of furnishings except some cushions thrown on the floor. Someone called for Trotsky to make a reply to Martov. The first premise of his argument is – well – uncompromising: “’An insurrection of the popular masses needs no justification.’” The present insurrection happened to have been victorious. Ought it to compromise victory? Compromise “’[w]ith whom? … With that pitiful handful who just walked out?’” The question answered itself. Trotsky ended by inviting the advocates of compromise “’into the rubbish-can of history!’”

“’Then we will go!’” answered Martov. He took the Mensheviks with him out of the Congress. The vote was fourteen for Martov to withdraw, twelve for Sukhanov to stay on. Trotsky moved a resolution condemning the Compromisers for their actions from the June offensive on down. Another interruption. Then a sailor from the cruiser Aurora came to assure the Congress that the ship was only throwing blanks.

A speaker for the left Social Revolutionaries said they could not support Trotsky’s resolution against their departed colleagues on the right. Lunacharsky, in answer, softened the Bolshevik tone – a little. Trotsky’s resolution was left on the table.

It was approaching 2:00 a.m. October 26. The Congress took a half-hour’s recess….

Overnight November 7-8 – October 25-26, 1917: The Provisional Government Arrested. The Winter Palace is beset inside and out: infiltrators in the halls agitating for the surrender of the defending garrison, and naval gunfire exploding menacingly but mostly harmlessly outdoors. Together these tactics minimized casualties while maximizing the demoralization of the defense.

As the numbers of infiltrators grew, so did their boldness. Singly and then in groups they called on the junker sentries to surrender. They dropped a couple of grenades from a gallery; Kishkin the physician-minister tended to a couple of lightly wounded junkers. If infiltrators happened to be captured – and some of them just gave themselves up – they continued to agitate with their captors. After a time, Trotsky says, nobody knew who were the captives and who were the captors.

Kishkin made one last phone call on the secret line: the Cadets must arm the party and relieve the palace at once. But this worked no better with Kishkin’s Cadets late that night than it had worked with Kerensky’s Social Revolutionaries early that morning.

Now peremptory word came from Smolny: have done with the Winter Palace so the Congress of Soviets can get on with its business. Doubt about the result threatened to split the Congress and isolate the Bolsheviks. Even Lenin was sending angry notes. Only the guns of the Aurora could meet the need. The Peter and Paul sent an order to fire point-blank. On the Aurora, the Bolshevik Fleurovsky had a hunch; he held fire for a quarter of an hour. It was just as well…

…for at that moment a great rush of soldiery sweeps past the junker riflemen and through the main entrance of the palace. The junkers behind their cordwood barricades do not fire because they think it might be the approach of the miracle march of the city duma. Then some of them have to surrender; the rest take to their feet.

The insurrection, armed to the teeth, confronts the defenders in the stairways and halls: pistols are not fired; grenades are not thrown. It’s a standoff. The rest of the encircling force advances, followed closely by Antonov and Chudnovsky. The commandant, seeing the game is up, offers to surrender the palace and asks terms for his junkers.

That much Antonov is willing to grant, but not to the cabinet. He and Chudnovsky are led to the room where the ministers huddle; the ministers have not ordered their sentries to resist. And so in this interior room, at 2:10 a.m. October 26, the Military Revolutionary Committee, in the person of the Bolshevik Antonov, places the ministers of the Provisional Government under arrest. Kerensky’s deputy Konovalov signifies that the government, under the threat of force, will submit.

A hand-picked guard of twenty-five led the captives into the square. Soldiers in the crowd called for their heads; some tried to strike them. Trotsky says the Red Guards told them, “Do not stain the proletarian victory,” and formed a protective ring around the ministry’s guard. Once an errant shot made everybody flatten. A minister later gave Antonov much of the credit for getting them through.

The insurrection took a roll call of the cabinet and put them up in the Peter and Paul for the rest of the night. The surrendered junkers were paroled, but Trotsky doubts whether most of them kept their promise never to bear arms against the new socialist government. Back in the palace the American journalist Reed saw looters at work – until somebody reminded them that the valuables were now the property of the people. Guards were placed at the doors to recover and record items found stashed in pockets. Chudnovsky was made commandant of the Winter Palace.

Reed took quite a tour of the palace before he and his journalist colleagues were invited to leave. They even got into the Malachite Room. There Reed found ministerial drafts of proclamations and plans, drifting off into anxious doodles. He pocketed one that appeared to be in Konovalov’s handwriting.

Word went out, first about the capture of the palace and then about the arrest of the government, to the Aurora and to Smolny….

Early Morning November 8 – October 26, 1917: Victory for the Congress. During the recess that started at 2:00 a.m., delegates to the Congress of Soviets trade rumors about the fall of the Winter Palace and the capture of the cabinet of the Provisional Government; when it reconvenes, Kamenev, to bitter cheers, reads Antonov’s list of arrested ministers. The name of Foreign Minister Tereshchenko, a better friend to the capital markets of the Entente than to the soldiers at the front, was received with pronounced hostility.

A left-Social Revolutionary spoke up on behalf of the imprisoned socialist ministers. Another deputy said it would be ironic if the Minister of Agriculture should “’turn up in the same cell’” he had occupied under the tsar. This cut no ice with Trotsky, who had already been held in Kresty prison both under the tsar and under the government of the minister in question. The socialist ministers would be held under house arrest, Trotsky answered, due to “’considerations of expediency’” until the revolution’s grip on its new government was secure.

Next a representative of the Third Bicycle Battalion appeared before the Congress to announce that his unit, chosen out of all the troops at the front to ride against the revolution, had met with the Fifth Bicycle Battalion on the way, and together with them decided not to do it: “’[W]e will not give the power to a government at the head of which stand the bourgeoisie and the landlords!’” Trotsky says this speaker was “greeted with a storm, a whirlwind, a cyclone.” The bicyclist gave evidence that the front, which might have replaced the deposed Provisional Government as the greatest of the threats the revolution faced, would not become its enemy.

Then a Menshevik spoke up. The Congress thought they had left. Now the threat of troops from the front inspired no doubts or fears. So they left again, seemingly for good.

At 5:17 a.m. Krylenko came in to read a message received by the Military Revolutionary Committee: The 12^th Army, holding the Northern Front nearest Petrograd in Estonia, had, with its commanding General Cheremissov, placed itself at the disposal of the committee. The commissar appointed by the Provisional Government had resigned. “Pandemonium,” says the American journalist Reed.

The rivals of the Bolshevik program having taken themselves out of the picture, Lunacharsky now came forward to read a proclamation and move that it be adopted and published by the Congress. By it, the Congress took the power of the state into its own hands, gave all local power to the soviets, and adopted all the other essentials of the Bolshevik program. The proclamation anticipated the decrees on peace and land that would come the next day.

Peasant delegates, admitted to the Congress but not given votes, now, because it promised the redistribution of lands, wanted to subscribe to the proclamation. So they were given votes. The proclamation frightened those few remaining delegates who thought the Bolsheviks were headed to disaster. A last group of Mensheviks withdrew – some of them apparently for the third time. Only fourteen votes out of hundreds were cast against the resolution.

The Congress adjourned at about 6:00 a.m.