The Revolution is Over…

…or it might as well be. I wonder what the people of Yemen will have gotten for their trouble.

The dialectical analysis of an historical entity fails when a larger such entity intervenes, to some degree removing its possibility of self-determination. The smaller entity is no longer free to work out its own contradictions – among other things redoubling the difficulty of dialectical analysis. Now any movement for changes in the state is or may be at the instance, or subject to the approval, of the larger entity and its interests. It’s not a new pattern. What usually happens when the United States, or any other such power, feel they have something to fear about, or gain from, the goings on in a sovereign, independent nation?

So when I posted that the revolution in Yemen was in a dangerous place, the devolution into tribal, prerevolutionary conflict was one danger. The result is worse still, because the first success of that phase was won by al Qaida, when forces under their influence gained control of some provincial capital in the south.

Since then, the U.S. has been exploring the resumption of military aid to the regime, which, apart from procuring the absence of Saleh, gives no appearance whatever of having a revolutionary agenda. It’s too busy struggling with al Qaida, and the tribes who think al Qaida represents their interests – though, to be sure, not their economic interests.

Next, the regime managed to drive al Qaida out of some of the positions they had captured. But at a philosophical distance, the action resembles nothing more than the historical norm of tribal conflict.

So the internal forces are pushing the country backward, and so is the external force majeure being applied by the U.S. To an extent, Yemen still is self-determining, but in a movement that is fundamentally counter-revolutionary. At the end of this movement lies another strongman – at least one strong enough to alternately conciliate and cow the tribes, if not to make himself universally feared.

The revolution in Libya is not in much better condition, though the retrograde movement has not been so rapid. Things seem to have stabilized at a point short of more or less continuous armed conflict. There are reasons to think someone with strong political, nationalist instincts could still overcome a provincialism that cannot be in the interest of the Libyan people as a whole.

In a Dangerous Place

Libya is in a dangerous place. Some countries seem too need a strong man who is strong enough to keep them from flying apart from the outside in. That situation has been reached by the revolutionary militias and their rivals, which are local, in some cases tribal, and in the worst cases, still loyal to the family of the despot.

At least Libya has oil. Oil grounds the possibilities of the middle class, which in turn grounds the possibilities for political and civil liberties in Libya.

This much can’t be said for Yemen. It was chosen by al Qaida for the same reason they choose all their other bolt holes (Iraq excepted, but Iraq was a mistake): it has little or no economic life. Tribal and regional rivalries antedate the Saleh regime – by centuries, even millennia. They drove the very course of the revolution. Saleh’s mastery of those relations was the prime reason he was so difficult to oust.

Worse still, with Saleh gone, what does the revolution do next? Is there anything on its agenda, the demand for which is strong enough to overcome the tendency to relapse into conflicts based on ancient rivalries? The people still carry rifles so they can protect their water holes from rival bands and tribes. Even if the revolution could coalesce around principles and programs, would it be able to govern until they were achieved?

All of which just goes to show that the departure of the despot in normally closer to the beginning than the end of a revolution – particularly a successful one.

The Slain

 [Composed October 26, 2011]

Gaddafi didn’t look any better dead than Hussein did when they caught him alive. Both cowards hiding in holes in the ground. Maybe they didn’t start out that way.

Which makes me wonder whether Mubarak is subject or will be sentenced to the death penalty.

It’s probably fortunate the world was spared the sight of the dead bin Laden. Not sure how many of his confederates were photographed. It’s a big success. The revolution will have to proceed without them. They were counter-revolutionaries one and all.

It hasn’t been a good season for Arab despots and ringleaders.

Who’s next? The people know.

They (not sure who) tried at Saleh and missed. He’s not likely to give them another chance.

My (metaphorical) money says the juvenile Bashar won’t live long enough to mature. But I wouldn’t bet any real money on it. He’s been doing better (growing?) as a counter-revolutionary lately.

The smartest one was Ben Ali, who left the country when he still had his life, his health…and his money.

And so, apart from royalty and aristocracy, the way has been largely cleared for democratic revolution in the Arab world – at least of the persons who stood in the way.

So long, Saleh!

Seemingly, the tribes woke up and found they were strong – strong enough to strike a mortal blow, not as chance would have it to Saleh personally, but to his physical ability to maintain his regime. With Saleh in a Saudi hospital, is there anyone left to carry on the civil war in his name? That seems doubtful. The Vice President says he will, but I suppose he’s got a job and would like to keep it.

Power that is built on the weakness of and divisions between one’s enemies rather than the strength of one’s support tends to evaporate in one’s absence.

That leaves the tribes face-to-face with the students and their allies in the capital. We’ll see if they can find common revolutionary ground.

Of course, U.S. insistence on hunting down al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would tend to resolve this conundrum in favor of another, new strongman in Yemen, someone capable of carrying on the hunt. The choice is between our fears for ourselves, and the bare possibility, slim in itself but scarcely able to resist outside pressure, that the revolution in Yemen might actually be able to gain something for the political and civil liberty of its people.

In the past, confronted with a similar choice, we’ve taken counsel of our fears – more than once in Vietnam, for example.