War Correspondents and Other Misnomers

Journalists who know as little about the science of war as those who have been reporting on the Syrian civil war today would likely never have been able to keep a job during World War II. Their ignorance would quickly have been exposed by their peers and their access to reliable sources would equally quickly have dried up. Such individuals apparently do not belong on this “beat.” Almost every report I read on the military events in Syria makes at least one more or less blatant error of this kind. I’ll give two examples in this post.

Just last week, for one example, in a report that the Taftanaz helicopter base had been taken by the opposition, a reporter expressed doubt whether it could be held because the regime continues to make air strikes on rebel positions. I suppose if the pilot of one such plane were to land and raise Bashar’s flag, he could retake the base for the regime. But no! only ground troops can take military possession of places on the ground. Possession of the air above any such space lasts only as long as aircraft are in flight there. It does not extend to the ground below. The notion of air superiority applies only to the conflict of air forces.

The Kosovo war might be considered a counterexample, but it is out of scope here for me fully to explain why it is not.

The other mistake is the repeated denomination of the war as a “stalemate.” It’s not blitzkrieg, but it’s not a stalemate ether. When all the successes are being recorded by one side, all the initiative is on one side, all the striking power is on one side, it’s not a stalemate.

Note that air strikes do not count as “striking power” for the reason explained in example #1. The fact is, the regime has so little striking power on the ground it cannot keep the roads to its garrisons open. That’s why they have had to be supplied by helicopter. But not anymore. Further, if Bashar still had an armored formation capable of taking the initiative, much less carrying out an offensive, even the journalists would have noticed by now. My guess is, whatever he’s got left is being reserved for the gotterdammerung in the capital – and not out of considerations of state, but rather personal ones.

That’s another story. Anyway, these are the two most frequent gaffes of reporters who have no real background or experience to cover a war. Maybe they suffer from not being “embedded.”

Another source of anxious handwringing, and not just among journalists, is the success in battle of the al Qaida-affiliated al Nusra Front. Two observations: one, they’re Muslims killing Muslims. Bin Laden would not approve. Two, they’re not afraid to die. That’s part of the jihadist mentality. The concentration of fire in this war is not, on either side, to all appearances very great. A little bravery goes a long way in Syria if you’re not afraid to expose yourself.

To be sure, they’re auxiliaries fighting for reasons of their own, the way auxiliaries do. But it’s hard to say whether their reasons are ideological or not, or if they are, what that ideology might be. Cyberspace is crowded with inconsistent assertions. We’ve already seen that their actions don’t align with Bin Laden’s vision for al Qaida. If they wanted to restore the Caliphate, wouldn’t they fight for Bashar? That’s his politics, but his economics are consumer, even luxury, oriented. Instead they’ve chosen the side of the freedom fighters, fighters for civil and political rights. Don’t they know that’s a tough atmosphere for al Qaida? That’s what it became in democratic Iraq. That’s the tendency in any country that has a real economy and a real petit bourgeoisie. The list of al Qaida’s temporary successes is limited to places where tribal, and not bourgeois, politics are predominant.

Maybe they just want to participate in violence. If so, that’s what they’ll do in Syria after the civil war, until they’re driven out of Syria too. The middle class is plenty strong there, and was once a bulwark of the regime, until Bashar drove them from his side by his excesses. If they stay and fight, there will be plenty of handwringing about the Muslims they kill during that process too.

For now, they’re an extremely tough, high-morale formation well able to confront and defeat Bashar’s Alawite units. Maybe it’s too bad is it considered risky for the West to arm them properly. But maybe they have been arming themselves.

Revolutions in Review: Syria

I blogged some months ago that it appeared the opposition had been able to force a stalemate with the Syrian regime. Even in a stalemate, Bashar’s days would be numbered. But now it appears the rebels are winning. At any rate, even the journalists can see that at best for Bashar, it’s already a stalemate.

My view can be demonstrated with some confidence by matching up accepted principles of military science with news from the front. Let’s begin with some Che would recognize.

·         The opposition forces have the support of the people in the countryside. This confers several military advantages. For one, they will never starve unless the people themselves are starving. For another, spontaneous, immediate intelligence of enemy movements in the controlled territory. Lastly a source of recruits.

·         They are arming themselves with the weapons of the regime. That is, weapons taken from the soldiers of the regime by movement or combat.

·         They have the initiative against enemy columns penetrating the countryside. The columns are subject to ambush – rather they were subject to ambush. It’s doubtful the regime has sufficient resource to pursue this line of attack – the penetration of opposition-held territory – at all anymore. And this indicates it’s no longer a guerilla war anymore.

All the foregoing has been true for some time now. Which brings us beyond the principles of guerilla warfare to more general principles of military science.

·         Because now the opposition forces have the initiative at the point of attack. That is, not only the ability to attack enemy bases, but also to dictate the strategic focus of combat – I mean the struggle for Aleppo. And this suggests further…

·         …that lines for purely military supplies have been established and are in regular operation. The first step in this direction was to acquire border posts along lines of transportation – a step of great strategic importance that the regime could not prevent and cannot recover (even by expanding the war, qv). Clearly a strategic offensive of some weeks’ duration could not have been undertaken without reasonably secure lines of supply.

·         It’s equally true the offensive could not have been sustained without command and control resources significantly better – seemingly by an order of magnitude – than those the Libyan opposition was able to defeat Gaddafi with. Insofar as they’ve contributed to this result, the defections are striking the regime where it hurts.

·         On the flip side, the regime’s resources of heavy weapons can hardly be increasing. The opposition’s monitors would have noticed if more tanks, helicopters, fighter-bombers were being brought in. Each one lost, one-by-one, is irreplaceable. So for the same reason and to the same extent that the opposition’s supply of ordnance is improving – territorial control of entry points and routes – the regime’s situation must be deteriorating.

·         Anecdotal evidence also suggests the regime forces face morale problems. I suppose a man would fight desperately rather than face his accusers with blood on his hands. But desperation is its own morale problem.

Speaking of desperation, mistakes have been made. On still another set of general principles, they tend to weaken the position of the party that makes them.

·         Use of auxiliaries. The Hezbollah from Lebanon have a strategic interest in Syria: it’s on the line of supply from Iran. So they’re not fighting for the regime. Moreover, as soon as they conceive the line of supply to be lost, they’ll abandon the fight. This kind of conflict of interest, as Machiavelli knew, makes auxiliary troops unreliable.

·         Use of mercenaries. The Chechens have no strategic interest in Syria. If they’re fighting there, most likely, it’s only to obtain money and arms for their own struggles, which, as Machiavelli knew, is even more unreliable for the employer.

·         Expanding the war – especially one you are losing. Shelling Turkey was a bad mistake. Though their response has been measured, it has been persistent, and they determine the measure. If you wanted to shell the opposition’s supply lines, why choose one that comes through your border with a member of NATO?

·         Dispersal of forces. It remains to be seen, but my hunch is the late barrage on Homs is a diversion intended to draw troops out of Aleppo. If so, first of all, it’s an admission that the opposition troops are free to move, cannot be prevented from moving, from front to front, combat to combat. Second, an artillery barrage is one thing, armor is another. The former has destructive power, the latter has striking power. If it’s a diversion, it’s recklessly, and if it has no striking power uselessly, destructive.

It’s too bad the U.S. won’t let the Saudis and Qataris give the opposition weapons effective against aircraft. The military leaders of the opposition think this kind of thing would be decisive. Of course, a rocket that can shoot down a helicopter or fighter can, in the wrong hands, also shoot down an airliner. But that is the policy of fear; we’ve been following it too long.

What if the Free Syrian Army had taken counsel of their fears? Obviously they haven’t.