Kerensky Prime Minister

One hundred years ago today, plus three, a cabinet reshuffle having been made necessary by the resignation of the bourgeois liberal Cadet ministers some days before, Alexander Kerensky was given another promotion, this time to Prime Minister. He also retained his post as War Minister. A crackdown on the Bolsheviks was part of the program of the new government; Lenin took Stalin’s advice and went into hiding.

Read about it here. Or read the whole chapter on Kerensky’s Government here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

Stalin in Petrograd

One hundred years ago today, plus three, the capital of Petrograd had become open to socialists who had been imprisoned or in exile. Josef Stalin was among the first to arrive.

Read about it here. Or read the whole chapter on the Dual Power here. Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

Stalin Arrives

One hundred years ago today, plus two, Stalin, having been released from detention in Siberia, made his way to Petrograd by train. Find out what he did next here.  

Or read the whole story from the beginning by following this link.

Dual Power

March 17 – March 4, 1917: Dual Government. The Bolshevik Central Committee states its opinion of the dual government shared by the Soviet and the Provisional Government: the latter is counter-revolutionary. But on the same day, the Petrograd committee of the Bolshevik party resolved not to oppose the Provisional Government, contrary to the wishes of the Bolshevik left, including the Vyborg workers.

In the spread of the revolution through the armed forces, officers of the Baltic Fleet were arrested or drowned.

March 18 –  March 5, 1917: Pravda. First issue of Pravda, central organ of the Bolshevik Party. By order of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, the workers printed only those publications approved by the Soviet. That meant no more “right press” for the time being; the decision was reversed some days later under pressure from the bourgeoisie.

Among Pravda’s first editors was the left-Bolshevik Molotov.

Meanwhile, the workers returned to work under conditions, including eight-hour days, proposed by the Soviet. Word of the revolution began filtering through to the soldiers at the front, where the Bolshevik peace policy was not widely accepted.

March 19 – March 6, 1917: A Declaration. The Provisional Government issues a declaration promising to summon a Constituent Assembly and to carry the war through to victory. Trotsky observes that neither promise meant want it seemed to mean, nor indeed anything at all. The Provisional Government hadn’t summoned the Constituent Assembly months later when the October Revolution overtook it. The promise about the war was addressed more to Britain and France than to the people of Russia; the Provisional Government wanted business as usual with its allies of the Entente.

The Soviet voted to appoint commissars to each regiment of the army. The soldiers were gravitating towards the view that they would fight to defend the revolution, but refuse to take the offensive. The defensist position was also that of a majority of the Soviet, but not necessarily of the Bolsheviks.

From Switzerland, Lenin cabled the Petrograd Bolsheviks advice on tactics. His “Letters from Afar,” opposing accommodation with the Provisional Government, began to appear in Pravda during this time.

March 20 – March 7, 1917: A Separate Peace? The war continues to be a problem for the Provisional Government. Making a separate peace is discussed. But just two weeks later, Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, hatched a plot to seize the Dardanelles by betraying Serbia.

March 21 – March 8, 1917: The Tsar Arrested. Kerensky declares the tsar is “in my hands”; he wants to escort him to England. What really happened is that the railroad workers would not let the tsar pass. A Menshevik delegated by the Soviet placed the tsar under arrest at Moghilev, near the front.

Meanwhile, the Provisional Government declared amnesty for political prisoners, most of whom had already been freed anyway.

March 22 – March 9, 1917: Under House Arrest. At the insistence of the Soviet, and against the recommendation of Kerensky for exile to England, the tsar and his family are detained in the Winter Palace. The soldiers would have preferred that he be held in the Peter and Paul fortress.

The Council of the United Nobility put its resources at the disposal of the Provisional Government. This, coming immediately after the arrest of the tsar, completed the realignment of big bourgeoisie and landowning elements from the autocracy to the liberal-bourgeois government.

March 23 – March 10, 1917: Eight-Hour Days. The Manufacturers Association agrees to recognize the union shops and to limit the working day to eight hours. They had little choice, as the Petrograd workers were simply leaving the factories after eight hours of work. The same conditions prevailed in Moscow; the Moscow Soviet there made them official some ten days later.

March 25 – March 12, 1917 Stalin arrives. Bolsheviks released from detention in Siberia arrive in Petrograd by train. Stalin, Kamenev, and Muranov were greeted by the local, mostly younger, leadership of the party. Stalin deposed the local trio Molotov, Schliapnikov, and Zalutsky as senior member of the 1912 Central Committee then named by Lenin.

Meanwhile, the Provisional Government outlawed the death penalty, though it was later restored in the army.

March 27 – March 14, 1917: A Manifesto. The Soviet issues a manifesto “to the people of the whole world” declaring for peace without annexations or indemnities. But until that should happen the war against Germany and her allies was to continue. The manifesto had carried the Soviet unanimously.

Meanwhile Trotsky left New York for Russia on a Norwegian vessel. At Halifax, Nova Scotia, he was detained by officials of the British navy and held with the Germans in a prisoner of war camp. His speeches there won the support of many of the enlisted men, but drew the ire of the German officers, not to mention the British commandant.

The soviets pressured the Provisional Government to secure Trotsky’s release, with the result to be seen in the sequel.

March 28 – March 15, 1917: Pravda Turns Right. Stalin and Kamenev take over as co-editors of Pravda. They adopted, among other views, the defensist position taken by the Manifesto of the Soviet the day before.

This was contrary to Lenin’s views. Lenin considered the defeat of Russia the lesser of two evils, the greater one being participation in an imperialist war, by and for the capitalist classes of the belligerents.

March 29 – March 16, 1917: The Soviet and the Dual Government. Delegates from the fleets to the Soviet announce that they will recognize the Provisional Government as a partner in the dual government. But only if it carries out the program of the Soviet.

In general, soviets in all the principal towns and industrial centers were taking the same position during this time. They also acknowledged the leadership of the Petrograd Soviet in this role.

March 30 – March 17, 1917: Lenin Writes. Lenin writes Pravda criticizing the defensist views published there. He blamed Kamenev, not Stalin.

March 31 – March 18, 1917: “The army is sick.” So it is said at a conference of the high officers in command. Desertions reached 8,000 weekly by mid-April.

April 1 – March 19, 1917: Tseretilli Arrives. The Menshevik émigré Tseretilli, like Stalin a native of Georgia, arrives in Petrograd. He, along with Martov and Dan, took over the leadership of the party in the Soviet, and helped steer the Soviet to the right. He favored sharing the government with the bourgeois-liberal parties the Provisional Government was then made up of, and the defensist position on the war.

April 2 – March 20, 1917: War News. A German offensive obtains a certain degree of success before petering out in the mud of the spring thaw. Trotsky says the bourgeois press of Petrograd made it seem like a threat of military disaster.

Meanwhile Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, hatched his (unsuccessful) plot to seize the Dardanelles by betraying Serbia.

April 3 – March 21, 1917: Eight-hour Day. The Moscow Soviet promulgates the eight-hour day in the factories of the city.

April 7 – March 25, 1917: The United States Enters the War. The United States House and Senate cast votes declaring war on Germany and its allies.

In Petrograd, a funeral march honoring the victims of the February Revolution was held. Some 800,000 filed past the graves.

April 9 – March 27, 1917: Lenin Entrains. Lenin boards a train in Berne, Switzerland, en route for Russia. He and his wife Krupskaya are part of a group of 30 Bolsheviks travelling via Stuttgart, Stockholm, and, partly in horse-drawn sleighs, Finland.

Because he was travelling through Germany, the itinerary appeared vaguely treasonous. The train itself was said to have been sealed, but really Lenin had demanded that it not be subject to the routine intrusions travelers normally suffer. Lenin and other revolutionary emigres had tried without success to obtain passage with the help of the French and British, who had their own reasons to keep them from reaching Petrograd.

April 10 – March 29, 1917: All Russia Conference of Soviets. A conference of all the soviets of revolutionary Russia convenes in Petrograd. Attending Bolsheviks voted along with the rest of the conference in favor of sharing power with the Provisional Government.

The Bolsheviks also discussed reunification with the Mensheviks, something that was already taking place in the provinces. Some favored reunification without conditions. Molotov objected, as the Mensheviks had taken the defensist position for keeping Russia in the war. Stalin favored negotiating the terms of reconciliation with the Mensheviks. The negotiations continued until Lenin’s arrival the following week.

July 24 – July 11, 1917: Lenin Spirited Away

Lenin, shorn of his beard and moustache, is escorted by Stalin and the workman Allilulev to a suburban train station, whence he eventually makes his way to Finland.

It became Stalin’s job to maintain liaison with Lenin while he was in hiding.

This is a supplementary post. Follow the link to the next one in chronological order.

Early Morning November 9 – October 27, 1917: A New Government

The Bolsheviks do not propose a constitution to the Congress of Soviets; that is a matter for the Constituent Assembly, then set to meet in December. Instead they put forward a brief statement or abstract of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government for the consideration of the Congress.

Kamenev took the floor and read the draft. Under this proposal, the functions of government were allocated to departments, and the departments were placed under committees. The soviets, local and provincial, of workers, soldiers, and peasants, would closely advise and work with the committees. The heads of the committees would be commissars, and have seats in the Soviet of People’s Commissars.

So far, the American journalist Reed says, silence. Now Kamenev read the names of the commissars. I’ll only provide the names with which the readers of these posts will be familiar; visit Wikipedia for the whole list. The names on it are all given names, not the well-known noms de guerre:

·         Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), as head of government, without portfolio

·         Antonov, Dybenko, and Krylenko, as a triumvirate for the military and navy

·         A.V. Lunacharsky, as commissar for Education

·         L.D. Bronstein (Trotsky), as commissar for Foreign Affairs

·         I.V. Djugashvili (Stalin), as commissar for Nationalities

Fifteen commissars in all were named. Applause greeted the new commissars, especially Lenin and Trotsky, but also Lunacharsky, a well-known agitator. Kamenev became president of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, and Zinoviev was made publisher of the official organ of the government.

Avilov, one of the right socialists who’d stayed behind when the others left, renewed his role as a gadfly. The new government must face all the old questions. Bread is hard to find; peace may be even harder. It was a lengthy speech, at first met with hostility, finally raising doubts. Both Avilov and the left Social Revolutionary who spoke next called for a government of the “entire democracy,” including the parties and persons who had walked out of the Congress the day before. Avilov even advocated joining with the city duma in its Committee on Public Safety.

Trotsky, a superb debater, again gave the answer for his party. First of all, the insurrection was a success; it was virtually bloodless. The Bolsheviks alone had judged the correlation of forces realistically and correctly. Moreover, and now especially with the Decrees on Peace and Land, the party represented the meeting point of all the revolutionary masses, workers, soldiers, and peasants. So the party already has a coalition. Is Avilov proposing a “’coalition of newspapers’” instead? Further, bread doesn’t come from coalitions; the right socialist walkouts offer nothing more for the solution of that problem.

The insurrection destroyed the Provisional Government, Trotsky continued, and handed the power to the Congress of Soviets. No thanks to the walkouts! They refused the gift. “’They are traitors to the revolution with whom we will never unite!’”

Neither would a coalition do anything for peace. The diplomats of the Entente laughed the Menshevik Skobelev out of court when he presented them the Pre-Parliament’s peace proposals. The Decree on Peace is not all that different, but it is addressed to the peoples as well as the governments. “’We rest all our hope on the possibility that our revolution will unleash the European revolution.’” For otherwise, ‘”…the capitalists of all countries will crush our revolution.’” The party is not an isolated Russian faction, but a champion of the oppressed everywhere. The Congress, says Reed, accepted Trotsky’s speech in that spirit.

Before a vote to confirm the Soviet of Peoples’ Commissars could be taken, the praesidium acceded to the demand of another gadfly to speak. This was a representative of the railroad workers union, called the Vikzhel. The union had already adhered to the Committee of Public Safety; now it wanted to threaten the Bolsheviks and the Congress. The union did not recognize the authority of the Congress. Unless the Congress includes the walkout socialists in the government, the union will not transport troops of the Military Revolutionary Committee. If the government tries to repress the union, it will not transport food into the capital either.

This troubled the praesidium for a moment. But really the Vikzhel overestimated their influence; the tail was wagging the dog. Delegates to the Congress who were themselves railway workers pointed out that the Vikzehl represented clerks, not workers. The workers had already endorsed the transfer of power to the Congress, as well as the actions the Congress had taken and was about to take. In the end, Kamenev dismissed the claims as out of order: “’There can be no questioning the legal rights of this congress.’”

Now the vote could be taken. The Congress elected the slate of Bolshevik commissars by a large majority, but by no means unanimously. Sukhanov estimates Avilov’s resolution calling for a coalition with the walkout socialists got 150 votes; Trotsky thinks this is too many. On the other hand, the new Central Executive Committee of 62 Bolsheviks and 29 left Social Revolutionaries was confirmed without dissent.

The agenda was complete. Kamenev closed the Congress at 5:15 a.m. Now the October Revolution must be spread to the cities and provinces of Russia and announced to the world….

November 2 – October 20, 1917: Kamenev’s Resignation, etc.

The Bolshevik Central Committee meets in the absence of both Lenin and Kamenev. After his “trick” (Lenin’s word) at the Petrograd Soviet, Kamenev offered his resignation from the Central Committee, making himself freer to oppose its decisions. Trotsky obliged him by putting the item on the agenda.

Trotsky moved the resignation be accepted. Sverdlov read a letter from Lenin criticizing Kamenev and Zinoviev as “strikebreakers,” and characterizing the way Kamenev had twisted Trotsky’s words as “plain petty cheating.” Stalin spoke against acceptance, but the motion passed five votes to three, with Stalin among those against. The committee also forbade Kamenev’s and Zinoviev’s agitation against the party’s policies, again over Stalin’s dissent.

This was but one of a number of signs of fissures in the party as the pressure of the coming insurrection mounted. On the day of the committee meeting, the party paper printed a letter from Zinoviev saying that he had moved closer to Lenin’s views and accepted what Trotsky said in the Soviet. The editor, Stalin, printed it over comments that this was also the meaning of Kamenev’s “declaration” in the Petrograd Soviet (though no-one believed this but Stalin) and that the “sharpness of tone” of Lenin’s article obscured the agreement of the party “in fundamentals” (though, as Trotsky says, the fundamental question at that time was the imminence of the insurrection, over which Kamenev, at any rate, was still fighting).

Stalin offered to resign from the editorial board, but the offer was not accepted.

The American journalist Reed got the story on the insurrection from Volodarsky the next day. But because Volodarsky was not on the Central Committee, and might not have been at the meeting, the version Reed reports has a touch of the fabulous. Lenin, Volodarsky said, ruled out the 6^th, because the insurrection needed an all-Russian basis, and the Congress of Soviets would not yet have assembled. Lenin ruled out the 8^th, because though the Congress would already be in session, it would be unable to reach a sudden decision democratically. This left the 7^th (October 25, old style).

But of course Lenin was not even there….

Beginning of November – End of October, 1917: Bolshevik Agitation

With the decision of the Central Committee in favor of insurrection, but awaiting a favorable opportunity, the Bolsheviks redouble their agitation in the capital. Trotsky lists some of the principal speakers:

·         Sverdlov

·         Volodarsky

·         Lashevich

·         Kollontai

·         Chudnovsky

·         Lunacharsky

·         “scores of agitators of lesser caliber”

Lenin was regrettably missing from the list, still waiting in Finland. Zinoviev and Kamenev were missing too – but they had voted against the insurrection in the Central Committee, and worked against it since then. Neither does Trotsky find any evidence Stalin ever spoke at mass meetings during this time.

Of course Trotsky himself was the leading figure. Somewhat modestly referring to himself as “president of the Petrograd Soviet” instead of by name, Trotsky somewhat immodestly reproduces a passage from Sukhanov’s history saying that his influence “was overwhelming,” and that “every [Petrograd] worker and soldier knew him and heard him personally.” Returning to modesty, Trotsky points out that the person-to-person “molecular agitation” of the workers and soldiers was “incomparably more effective.”

September 27 – September 14, 1917: Democratic Conference Convenes

Given their failures in the Soviet, the Compromisers cast about for a means to recover lost ground. After the Kornilov insurrection was defeated, they settled on a “Democratic Conference,” which was to be packed in such a way as to prevent the Bolsheviks from carrying their program.

For this purpose, a new constituency was heard from: the Cooperators. Ostensibly representing the peasantry, they in fact petit bourgeois administrators of agriculture who happened to live in the same villages as the peasants. The Compromisers credentialed some 150 of them.

Lenin and Zinoviev were also credentialed, but the Compromisers did not give them safe-conducts. All Kerensky would promise was that he would not arrest them in the hall where the conference was being held. He’d arrest them at the entrance. Safe-conduct or not, Lenin did not plan to attend; he opposed Bolshevik participation altogether.

The conference convened on September 14 (September 27, new style) in a Petrograd theater. Kerensky decided to attend. When he greeted the praesidium, the Bolsheviks on it refused to shake hands. So did the Kornilovists. Kerensky seems to have pretended they did.

Then Kerensky spoke extemporaneously, knowing he would have to address his role in the Kornilov conspiracy. “I knew what they wanted,” he said incautiously. “Before they went to Kornilov they came to me and suggested I take the same course.” The left of course wondered who “they” were, and what they had “suggested,” but Kerensky shifted topics rather than answer their shouted questions.

Kerensky committed another verbal blunder in response to another shouted question, this one about the death penalty. Both the Petrograd Soviet and the Menshevik party had passed resolutions against restoration of the death penalty in the military. Kerensky responded that he hadn’t ordered any executions, and when he did, “then I will permit you to curse me.” Of course this admitted that the death penalty was not necessary; nor did it make sense to restore the death penalty based on Kerensky’s unspoken promise not to use it. In a later speech, Trotsky pointed this out to anyone who might have missed it.

What the Bolsheviks would do was on everybody’s mind, including Kerensky’s. He expected “the forces of the democracy” to support him in case of an insurrection, warning, “Do not think that I am hanging in the air,” and claiming that he could stop the railroads and the telegraphs. The Bolsheviks in the hall just laughed: what an odd expression, “hanging in the air,” for a dictator to use of himself!

Tseretilli said he thought the government, meaning in particular Kerensky, was getting “a little dizzy” on the heights.

At one point, after a number of speeches by individuals who were part of the government, Trotsky observed, “I have not heard a single speaker here who would...[defend] the directory or its president.” Nor could any of these speakers articulate the policies of the government; nothing was being done to revive the economy, to end the war, or anything else.

The Bolsheviks called on Trotsky to read their declaration of the policy of the party and Central Committee. Tseretilli had framed the issue in one of his speeches: instead of putting the Soviet forward, why don’t the Bolsheviks take the power themselves? This challenge was whispered on the praesidium and repeated in the lobbies. Ten days before, the Cadet paper printed an editorial theorizing that maybe the Bolsheviks could best be got rid of if they were given the power. They would fail and fade to insignificance.

The Bolshevik declaration was neither evasive nor misleading. The party would not seize power “against the organized will of the majority of the toiling masses of the country.” This meant that if the soviets, in many of which the Bolsheviks were now the majority, willed it, the party would seize the power. The declaration also refused to recognize any decision of the Democratic Conference that was not subsequently ratified by the next All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

When they heard the declaration’s call for arming the workers, members of the centrist majority cried in alarm, “What for?” Trotsky replied they would be the revolutionary country’s best defense against both imperialism and counter-revolution.

The Bolshevik attitude towards the future of the Russian state being known, the conference proceeded to debate which policy it would endorse.

Meanwhile it had fallen to Stalin, as liaison between the party and Lenin, to bring Lenin's letters from Finland to Petrograd. Lenin had taken a position against participation in the conference. His first letter on insurrection, addressed to the Bolshevik Central Committee and the committees of Petrograd and Moscow, took the party by surprise. It was just a sketch of points he would continue to make in the weeks to come. But the Central Committee, on Kamenev’s motion but over Stalin’s objections, decided to burn it anyway. (One copy was kept for posterity.)

In another letter, written at about the same time, Lenin begins to add detail to his plan of insurrection, and grounds it in Marxist theory. Trotsky expresses part of the plan this way: “To leave the Alexandrinsky Theater [scene of the Democratic Conference] with an ultimatum and return there at the head of the armed masses.”

August 8 – July 26, 1917: Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party Convenes

The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party assembles its Sixth Congress in Petrograd “semi-legally,” as Trotsky says. The Central Committee elected by this Congress later voted for the armed insurrection now known as the October Revolution.

About the first thing the Congress did was pass unanimously a resolution that Lenin and the other Bolsheviks who had been indicted should not turn themselves in. Stalin had argued they should, but only “If, however, power is wielded by an authority which can safeguard our comrades against violence and is fair-dealing at least to some extent ....” But no-one believed these conditions would ever be met. Lenin himself was still in hiding, so the Congress named him “honorary” chairman instead.

The report on party organization revealed membership had tripled, to 240,000, in the previous three months.

The main business of the Congress was to rethink the party’s program in light of the July days and other recent events. For example, since the Compromisers had led the Petrograd Soviet into complicity with the counter-revolutionary tendencies of the Kerensky ministry, the Bolsheviks dropped the slogan “All Power to the Soviets!” The Congress also adopted a resolution identifying the conditions under which an insurrection would be the correct response. Lenin’s underground writings, and communications through a secret liaison, usually Stalin, contributed to the result.

The Inter-District Organization of United Social-Democrats or Mezhraiontsy (sometimes translated “Interdistrictites,” though I have been calling them “Trotskyites” after their most prominent member) joined the Bolshevik party while the Congress sat. The Mezhraiontsy had at last dropped their project of union between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks; the latter were now deeply involved with the Compromisers. Among the prominent social democrats who then became Bolsheviks were (the links lead to Wikipedia) Leon Trotsky, Adolf Joffe, Anatoly Lunacharsky, Moisei Uritsky, David Riazanov, V. Volodarsky, Lev Karakhan, Dmitry Manuilsky, and Sergey Ezhov (Tsederbaum).

Early August (old style) also saw the convocation of the bourgeois-aligned Congress and Trade and Industry and Congress of Provincial Commissars. The latter consisted mainly of Cadets, while the opening speaker at the former happened indiscreetly to mention the “bony hand of hunger” in a tirade against taxes on commerce. As this was a not very thinly veiled threat of factory lock-outs, Trotsky says, the phrase “entered...into the political dictionary of the revolution,” and eventually “cost the capitalists dear.”

July 20 – July 7, 1917: Kerensky Prime Minister

The Provisional Government takes steps to resolve the cabinet crisis precipitated by the resignation of the bourgeois-liberal Cadet ministers on July 15 – July 2. Some of the ministries that had belonged to the Cadets were given to right-socialist members of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. The Menshevik Tseretilli, for example, was made Minister of the Interior; this put him in charge of what to do about the Bolsheviks.

Kerensky was rewarded, for his efforts if not his results, by being made Prime Minister. He also retained the Ministries of War and the Marine. The reshuffled cabinet (Trotsky designates it a “transitional government”) launched two lines of policy: the right-socialist Compromisers, in the absence of the Cadets, wanted to enact whatever parts of the program of the recent Soviet Congress they could; Kerensky sought to gratify his friends further to the right by breaking up centers of Bolshevik influence.

Meanwhile, a decree subjecting Lenin to arrest had already been issued. Likewise Zinoviev. According to Deutscher, Stalin’s biographer, Stalin took the leading role in the ensuing intrigue. Lenin, says Deutscher, thought perhaps he should turn himself in, to do otherwise would be considered an admission of guilt. Stalin pointed out to him the risks of putting himself in the hands of the Provisional Government. Stalin brought the matter to the Executive Committee, but found they were unable to guarantee Lenin’s safety. Instead Lenin took refuge in the home of the workman Alliluyev for a few days. There Stalin served as barber, removing Lenin’s characteristic beard and moustache. A few days later Alliluyev and Stalin guided Lenin to a suburban train station, whence he travelled under cover to suburban villages and eventually to Finland. Alliluyev later became Stalin’s father in law.

Trotsky omits this, saying instead that from his hiding place, Lenin sent to the Inquiry Commission of the Soviet to ask for a meeting. Lenin and Zinoviev waited all day at the agreed place, but the Soviet’s representatives never appeared.

July 19 – July 6, 1917: Bolsheviks Evicted

At 3:00 a.m., elements of the Petrograd garrison loyal to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets take up positions around Bolshevik headquarters. (In an interesting digression, Trotsky explains how the palace of the ballerina Kshesinskaia came to be their headquarters, and how this circumstance became an element of propaganda against the party.) A Social Revolutionary spokesman for the Soviet ordered the occupants to leave. Obligingly, a hundred or more Kronstadt sailors dashed out and made it over the Neva River to the Peter and Paul fortress.

When the troops entered the palace, they found no-one there but a few of the party’s employees. That left the Peter and Paul, and its garrison of soldiers of the Machine Gun regiment, Kronstadters, and Red Guards from Vyborg to be dealt with. The Bolshevik Central Committee sent Stalin to conduct this negotiation; he and his Menshevik comrade were successful. This episode marked the end of the July Days.

Except in the provinces. The spirit of the July Days caught on in Moscow, where, though moderate Bolsheviks carried a vote against insurrection, there were demonstrations on July 19 (July 6, old style). The Riga Soviet adopted the slogan, “All power to the soviets!” on that day, and Ekaterinburg a few days later. There was also a work stoppage in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Clashes occurred then and in the days that followed in Riga, Nizhni-Novogorod, Kiev, and even Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. But it was not enough to make a proletarian revolution possible that summer.

Meanwhile in Petrograd, the workers went back to the factories. The only people demonstrating in the streets were the soldiers Kerensky had sent from the front. Gunfire and looting continued. Trotsky again states that machine gun fire from “experienced provocateurs” was aimed at the newly arrived troops in an effort to stir them up against the workers. On this occasion, unlike on similar occasions during the February Revolution, officers stood between the soldiers and the workers, who were not permitted to explain that they had not fired the guns.

July 16 – July 3, 1917: July Days: The Central Committee

When the envoys of the Machine Gun regiment arrived at Bolshevik headquarters in the former palace of the ballerina Kshesinskaia that afternoon, the Central Committee could not immediately decide whether the regiment’s armed manifestation was a threat or an opportunity. The party had been calling for restraint, saying that the press of events would offer a better time for action of this kind. The reaction would be weaker if the government were weaker.

On the other hand was the opportunity. Tomsky expounded what Lenin, who was absent in Finland, might have thought, “It is impossible to talk of a manifestation at this moment unless we want a new revolution.” That is, a proletarian revolution to overthrow the bourgeois-liberal Provisional Government. But the risks of premature action appeared too great. Volodarsky told the regimental envoys that the machine gunners “must submit to the decisions of the party”; they were sent back to the regiment. An appeal for restraint was prepared for front page of Pravda the next morning.

The meeting broke up at about 4:00 p.m. and those attending dispersed to the workers’ neighborhoods and the factories with the same message. Stalin was dispatched to the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviet with the news. He remained the party’s liaison with the Executive Committee throughout the July Days.

May 12 – April 29, 1917: All Russia Bolshevik Party Conference Ends

Besides the resolutions described in prior entries, the conference considered reports and resolutions on the party’s attitude toward the provincial soviets, revisions to its program, the agrarian and nationalities questions, and the current situation of the international proletarian revolution. Stalin delivered the report on the nationalities question. The tsars had made Russia the overlord of numerous peoples; Stalin was becoming the party’s expert on the issues this raised.

The party’s agrarian policy sought to align the peasants in the countryside with the workers in the cities under the Bolshevik banners. It called for confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility, church, and crown, nationalization of the lands, and transfer of the lands to the peasantry under leasehold. The party also undertook to organize the peasants in an independent arm, and support their efforts in existing peasant soviets and land committees.

A new Central Committee was also elected; Lenin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Stalin, and Sverdlov were among those given seats.

After the April Days, the votes in elections to the soviets begin to shift, favorably to the Bolsheviks.

March 30 – March 17, 1917: Lenin Writes

Lenin writes Pravda criticizing the defensist views published there. He blamed Kamenev, not Stalin.

March 28 – March 15, 1917: Pravda Turns Right

Stalin and Kamenev take over as co-editors of Pravda. They adopted, among other views, the defensist position taken by the Manifesto of the Soviet the day before.

This was contrary to Lenin’s views. Lenin considered the defeat of Russia the lesser of two evils, the greater one being participation in an imperialist war, by and for the capitalist classes of the belligerents.

A supplementary post follows this one in the chronological order.

March 25 – March 12, 1917 Stalin arrives

Bolsheviks released from detention in Siberia arrive in Petrograd by train. Stalin, Kamenev, and Muranov were greeted by the local, mostly younger, leadership of the party. Stalin deposed the local trio Molotov, Schliapnikov, and Zalutsky as senior member of the 1912 Central Committee then named by Lenin.

Meanwhile, the Provisional Government outlawed the death penalty, though it was later restored in the army.

March 8 – February 23, 1917: International Women’s Day

A strike by female textile workers celebrating International Women’s Day begins the February Revolution. The Women’s Day observance had been created in 1909 by the Socialist Party of America to commemorate a strike by the Ladies Garment Workers the previous year.

The want of bread continued to be an issue. Though the Bolsheviks had not called for strikes, the women asked the metal workers of the Vyborg district to support theirs. Soon, with the Bolshevik, Menshevik, and Social Revolutionary party machineries behind them, 90,000 workers were in the streets. The demonstrations began on the mainly industrial Vyborg side of the frozen Neva River. Later they poured over to the Petersburg side, which held the imperial palace and the seats of government.

Meanwhile, the tsar Nicholas II is at the front with his marshals. He is not sent word of the strikes until the third day.

At this time, Lenin was an émigré in Berne, Switzerland, Trotsky in New York. Stalin, having flunked the physical for induction into the Russian army, was held a political prisoner in Krasnoyarsk on the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Revolutionary Vengeance

What a lot of ways there are to go wrong when a revolution begins seeking vengeance! And most of them just clear the path for the next strongman.

So why would this be the first thing a revolution would want to do once it had got control of the state?

The people one would initially like to punish are normally, as in the current Egyptian case, charged with specific, notorious crimes: economic crimes that occurred before, and occasioned, the revolution, or crimes of violence, etc., in the attempt to suppress it. Those who commit the former crimes place themselves above the laws they violate; those who commit the latter, use a lawful power wrongly.

It’s easy for a revolution to identify its principal opponents and specify the crimes of these individuals. What’s difficult is to decide when, and with which individuals, the passion for vengeance must stop. The difference between a high-official thief and the people he does business with is only a matter of degree, as is the difference between the general who gives orders and the officers and soldiers who obey them.

The question is, how far will revolutionary vengeance pursue the accomplices of the principal criminals – not just the willing accomplices who are thieves or brutes themselves, but also the unwilling accomplices, and those who are merely similarly situated and are guilty only by association?

There are two questions really, and the second one is, how many enemies, real or imagined, does the revolution want to make? Because if you imagine an enemy where there is none, not only does that one become a real enemy, but anyone who can imagine you making the same mistake about them might too. That is the tendency of fears, and people begin with a certain natural fear of revolutions.

It’s at this point that the vengeance of revolutions begins a dialectical movement, one that can be fatal to the revolution if it is weak.

A few historical instances may help to illustrate the principle.

Many a tumult goes by the name of revolution until the capital is taken and it gains control of the state, but that is when the strongman comes forth and, beginning with the formal enemies of the “revolution” (those who were in power), continues to practice revolutionary vengeance until all his rivals (including some of his former colleagues) are consumed by it. This doesn’t happen in Latin America much anymore, but it still happens in Africa. I’m afraid Che Guevara himself was involved in one such revolution, until he realized it was a fake and went home to Cuba. They’ve had any number of fake revolutions and real purges in the Congo since then.

In these cases revolutionary vengeance leads directly to the establishment of the strongman as despot, and so it is not really “revolutionary” at all, but rather personal.

The Terror of the French Revolution epitomizes another species of revolutionary vengeance, in which, starting with regicide, and having disposed of all the real criminals, the revolution begins to dispose of other supposed criminals on the basis of status alone, that is, revolutionary vengeance as an extension or instrument of class war. And so, aristocrats or high churchmen might be sent to the guillotine without ever having raised a hand against the revolution.

Some aristocrats, like Lafayette, were immune on grounds of their revolutionary credentials; others were condemned merely because their near relations were in exile and known to be negotiating combinations and raising troops among foreign powers. It got so that all the aristocrats were suspect, if only because their forebears had profited from the arrangements under the Ancien Regime for as many generations as they themselves could claim noble birth. At length the Terror began consuming the Revolution itself – Danton, for example – and finally, when Robespierre was executed, the Terror itself.

And so vengeance passed from the notoriously guilty, to the possibly guilty, to those guilty by inference, to those guilty by association, to those who at first were not guilty at all, but later became guilty in the eyes of the revengers, who themselves became liable to the same judgment.

It’s a dangerous path, and not just a slippery slope, but a law of dialectics. For it leads to…

…the reappearance of the strongman as the only remedy for fear and uncertainty – though to be sure, Napoleon was more than that besides.

In the example of the Russian Revolution, revolutionary vengeance becomes a state institution, and political acts become crimes, crimes against the state, or merely against the interests of the individual strongman who happens to be at the head of the state, rather than the laws. This includes:

·         Stalin and the NEPmen – in which the privileged position certain businessmen enjoyed under Lenin to rebuild the Russian economy became a status crime under Stalin, who was rebuilding it again as a centrally-planned Soviet economy.

·         Stalin and the army – a purge, if I’m not mistaken, of left-opposition elements in the Red Army still loyal to their commander in the civil war of the Reds and the Whites, the exiled Trotsky.

On the other hand, we also know how the Radical Republications punished the leaders, military and political, of the Confederacy. Truly they – and not the Confederates, who were merely rebels – were the revolutionaries of that epoch. But they did not take their vengeance in blood, and took it only after the power to resist of the class being punished had been destroyed.

Nor did the Fathers of the first American Revolution, unlike the Radical Republications, find it necessary to deprive Tory Loyalists even of ordinary political rights, much less life and property.

For this is the dialectical risk of revolutionary vengeance: as an object of fear, it tends to make enemies for the revolution among any class whose members are being punished. When a revolution is weak, the difference between a passive enemy and an active counter-revolutionary can be very small. When a revolution is strong, can it have any real need to punish the mere accomplices of the biggest thieves? Those guilty by association? Those guilty only of what I have called “status crimes”?

The institutionalization of revolutionary vengeance in Stalinist and Maoist states is only a symptom of more fundamental contradictions in such states – contradictions that are out-of-scope for this blog. But the consequences of pressing vengeance too prematurely or too hard is not.

The big bourgeoisie makes a good example. They are, most of them, very likely the accomplices of the Arab despots. (One such is ready to be tried in Egypt.) They also have resources sufficient to make them formidable if they were to instigate or join a counter-revolution. Moreover, they are influential with people who would like to think they are or might become big bourgeoisie, and those people are susceptible to fear – the more so as they are the weaker.

The further you work down the list, from known accomplices, to people who fit the same description as the people who associate with possible accomplices, the greater the risk of adding to the possibility or strength of the counter-revolution. It is still worse too do this before the objects of the revolution – civil and political liberties – are well in hand, because in that case people who might worry about being subjected to revolutionary vengeance have two fewer reasons to side with the revolution.

Vengeance on the persons of those even notoriously guilty of crimes against the revolution is not, strictly speaking, a class interest of the revolutionary classes: it has no direct bearing on their economic activity. Getting the money back from the thieves, on the other hand, does.

And so does securing the political and civil liberties the middle classes have always found necessary to their growth as economic beings. Anything that damages the prospects for these gains should in principle be put off until they are won.