The fact that there are laws of dialectics means it’s possible for historical actors to make mistakes, not just from, say, a political or military standpoint, but from a dialectical standpoint. Just so, the counter-revolution in Syria has seized upon a position that appears to be one of strength, its control of the army, and employed it as its principal weapon in the fight. Even if one’s only objective were to maintain oneself in power, it’s by no means clear that grasping this possibility is the surest path to success.
On the one hand, there is no civil war in Syria – that is, the army is entirely in the hands of the regime. It’s a sure weapon, for political as well as, seemingly, ethnic and sectarian reasons.
But on the other hand, what are armies for? Finally, the destruction of things. The law of dialectics, that if you would destroy something, you will first make it stronger, at this point comes into play.
People who don’t understand dialectics may tend to think the quickest way to end a threat is to destroy it openly and physically. I am thinking, not just of the juvenile Assad, but also of the U.S. administration that wanted to make war on al-Qaida, but ended as an occupier of foreign nations. Al-Qaida got stronger for a time, just because we declared a war, and in a war there are two sides, and people can be induced to take one side or another, and therefore both sides get incrementally stronger.
This is just an instance, but as I say it is a law of dialectics.
Just as a human entity has, an historical entity slated for destruction has awareness of the danger and freedom to resist it; it also has objective possibilities – no matter how few or weak – for resolving favorably to itself the contradiction with the forces seeking its destruction. These it immediately grasps and wields by every available means, as its very existence is at stake. Inevitably, before it can be destroyed, it becomes stronger in this way.
Sensible people do not push too hard when they want to destroy something that, however dangerous, is still relatively weak. And here, for another instance, I could point out the successes of the current administration against al-Qaida, and how they were achieved, in contrast to the failures of the previous, which only led to occupations of nations we would really prefer to give back to their true owners.
Now, the juvenile Assad, even if he can assure the revolution will not arm itself, is nevertheless assuring it the maximum possible number of adherents. On this path, there is only one remaining question: how much blood does he want on his hands?
The other day, after a particularly bloody one, he was reported to be sending emissaries to the revolution – but then it was already too late, and anyhow, there’s been no news since even of the emissaries’ existence, much less of their success. But the revolution always was against the despot – Daraa might have been bought off by a promise of jobs, but it wasn’t, and things shortly became personal. Even if it weren’t always against him, the despot acted so as to ensure it would be. So: not only more adherents, but more adherents firmly against him personally, his family, and his whole crowd of dependants.
If they were sent, would his emissaries met with…
…cries for mercy? No, the revolution is not nearly destroyed yet.
…moderate offers of compromise? No, he’s started the movement the other way.
…further resistance? intransigence? And then he will have to rely on the army again, until the army is the only thing left to him. But only then could he really and actually destroy the revolution.
It’s better for counter-revolutionaries if they wait their time…and then peacefully and easily break up the bloc of revolutionary parties by separating the one from the other – along cleavages that pre-exist their temporary alliances – just as Saleh is doing in Yemen.
As for Syria, while journalists can report that the revolution is or may be getting stronger, dialectics can say it is and will be getting stronger – and necessarily so.
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