The next day, people
ransack bakeries in several parts of Petrograd.
As you can see, Mr. Marx is well read in the theory of revolutions. You can also see that, between the two of us, he's the leftist. Now we are starting a new series to commemorate the Russian Revolution: 100 Years Ago Today, in Russia. See the right-hand column below to learn how the posts are organized.
Marx's Theory of Revolutions
Sunday, March 5, 2017
Saturday, March 4, 2017
March 4 – February 19, 1917: Bread
Within a few
days after rationing starts, people – mostly women – mass around Petrograd shops demanding bread.
Wednesday, March 1, 2017
March 1 – February 16, 1917: Bread Rationing
Authorities issue
cards for rationing bread in Petrograd. Food shortages were widespread in
Russia during World War I. Not only had many agricultural workers been
conscripted into the armies, but the armies themselves still had to be fed.
Monday, February 20, 2017
February 27 – February 14, 1917: Last State Duma
The last State Duma assembles. The Duma had first been convened
in May 1906 as part of a program of civil and political reforms addressing the
issues raised by the failed 1905 revolution. Tsar Nicholas II granted this
elective body certain legislative and oversight functions. However, he retained
all executive powers, including the power to appoint state ministers and to
dismiss the Duma itself. The Russian state remained effectively an autocracy.
The workers were already
aroused. Some 90,000 were on strike in Petrograd, and others had closed plants
in Moscow.
Thursday, August 22, 2013
What the Secretary-General Said…
…about “political clocks” not running backwards applies
in spades when the times are revolutionary. In fact, in such times, this is a
necessary law of historical
dialectics. The law applies precisely to the counter-revolutionary moments (in
the sense of turnings, as of a pendulum) that follow moments of revolutionary synthesis.
The Brotherhood’s
revolution represented such a synthesis. It stood as an endpoint of the actions
of all the revolutionary parties of the Arab Spring in Egypt when it achieved
fundamental, thus revolutionary, change in the state. But the Brotherhood’s
grasp of the state apparatus never grew strong, and at the same time, its basis
as a revolution of the whole people grew narrower. The resulting contradictions
– on the one side between the Brotherhood and the pre- or counter-revolutionary
state apparatus, and on the other side between them and the secular/liberal revolutionists
– created a new synthesis, and this was the lever El Sissi pulled.
The lever the
Brotherhood pulled in the first place, the lever that came into existence in
Tahrir Square, doesn’t exist anymore. Perforce it can’t be pulled again. That is, as the Secretary-General says, in
politics you can’t go backwards.
The Brotherhood
did not pause at disbelief before going over to anger, and they would do well
to move on to acceptance equally quickly. Staying with anger will not restore
the former situation. They need a new synthesis, and they can’t do it by
holding onto old contradictions with elements that will only become more
opposed the longer opposition is kept up. They’re already in danger of being
outlawed again.
Frankly, the
longer the Brotherhood stays in the past and fails to seek a new revolutionary
synthesis, the surer the success of the counter-revolution.
The Counter-Revolution Puts Forth Its Strength
One of the things you can say about counter-revolutions
is that they are often bloodier than revolutions. A spike in the effusion of human
blood is almost always a sign that the counter-revolution is putting forth its
strength. And that’s just because the strength of the reaction normally
consists in control over armed elements
of the former, pre-revolutionary state.
When this sort of
thing starts happening, any revolutionary elements the counter-revolution
happens to be aligned with for the time being start to look like a front, a
puppet, a dupe, a tool, or an accomplice. What they as individuals actually are
depends on their own subjective relations with the forces of reaction, and on
the kinds and degree of objective control the latter exercises over them. All
this can play out in many ways, but for now, in Egypt, the police, the military,
and the courts are the players, not the interim executive, nor the disbanded
legislature.
Did I say they
were dupes? The reaction didn’t dupe El Baradei for long. And now that they’ve
entered on the path for freeing Mubarak altogether, nobody can be fooled any
longer. Only the tools and accomplices are left.
Look for the
counter-revolution to assume a face. It’s a little early yet, but if it does,
it will already be too late for the revolution, because that will be the face
of the next strongman.
Monday, July 22, 2013
Bashar has a dream…
I’m happy for the
people of Egypt. They have another shot at democracy and maybe they can even
pull it off themselves, without our help. Though $8 billion of Saudi money won’t
hurt.
Syria, on the other
hand, is in a mess that’s just getting worse. The pressure the regime has been
able to put on the revolution with the help or Russian and Iranian arms and
ordnance has begun to split it along the lines of its internal contradictions –
contradictions I’ve been thinking about but didn’t blog about because, well,
the situation has become too sad to contemplate.
What happened?
The splits between the Islamist and secular parties in the Egyptian revolution
do not appear to have hardened so much that they have no recourse other than
physical confrontation. At least that’s true this week.
In Syria, the
same set of contradictions is not between parties, but between seasoned combat
units that do not really happen to effectively be under the same chain of
command. On the one side, I imagine, the patriotic, liberal youth of Syria are
pretty much all mobilized already, and, even though their general says there
are sufficient of them to the task at hand, their numbers can only go down. The
other side continues to recruit from jihadist fundamentalism across the whole
Islamic world.
So not only is
the Islamic side of the revolution in Syria more radical than the Brotherhood
in Egypt, it is already fully armed and ready to fight whomever it is God’s
will they should fight. Moreover they have an independent territorial basis and
an ad hoc state apparatus in hand. To the extent they are non-Syrian jihadists,
this resembles conquered territory. So if Bashar were to resign today, only force majeure could keep these splits
from bursting wide open and could give the Syrian people something resembling a
nation to dwell in.
In other words,
the time for the self-determination of the Syrian revolution is over. That way
lies oblivion. The alternative would be an army of occupation under the auspices
of the U.N. maybe or even NATO. Something like this was, I believe, in planning
under the previous Secretary of State. What’s still missing is some really
compelling inducement for Bashar to step down. Sad that that’s not in the
offing; the reverse is the case. But it’s just as hard to see what would induce
the Russians to change their policy. Certainly the sufferings of the Syrian people
have made no impression.
...Bashar’s dream?
Oh, that he prevails against a “revolution” that really just consists of
terrorists and the hirelings of foreigners.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)