The Revolution is Over…

…or it might as well be. I wonder what the people of Yemen will have gotten for their trouble.

The dialectical analysis of an historical entity fails when a larger such entity intervenes, to some degree removing its possibility of self-determination. The smaller entity is no longer free to work out its own contradictions – among other things redoubling the difficulty of dialectical analysis. Now any movement for changes in the state is or may be at the instance, or subject to the approval, of the larger entity and its interests. It’s not a new pattern. What usually happens when the United States, or any other such power, feel they have something to fear about, or gain from, the goings on in a sovereign, independent nation?

So when I posted that the revolution in Yemen was in a dangerous place, the devolution into tribal, prerevolutionary conflict was one danger. The result is worse still, because the first success of that phase was won by al Qaida, when forces under their influence gained control of some provincial capital in the south.

Since then, the U.S. has been exploring the resumption of military aid to the regime, which, apart from procuring the absence of Saleh, gives no appearance whatever of having a revolutionary agenda. It’s too busy struggling with al Qaida, and the tribes who think al Qaida represents their interests – though, to be sure, not their economic interests.

Next, the regime managed to drive al Qaida out of some of the positions they had captured. But at a philosophical distance, the action resembles nothing more than the historical norm of tribal conflict.

So the internal forces are pushing the country backward, and so is the external force majeure being applied by the U.S. To an extent, Yemen still is self-determining, but in a movement that is fundamentally counter-revolutionary. At the end of this movement lies another strongman – at least one strong enough to alternately conciliate and cow the tribes, if not to make himself universally feared.

The revolution in Libya is not in much better condition, though the retrograde movement has not been so rapid. Things seem to have stabilized at a point short of more or less continuous armed conflict. There are reasons to think someone with strong political, nationalist instincts could still overcome a provincialism that cannot be in the interest of the Libyan people as a whole.

There Be Dragons and There Be Waverings

Even though it did not display the clarity and insight of Mr. Shadid’s writing, a brief Associated Press notice last month revealed the causes behind one sequence of waverings in the Egyptian courts.

There were waverings, I claimed in the below post about Mr. Friedman’s piece, on the arrest and then release of certain foreign nationals affiliated with or employed by non-governmental organizations. But now the causes pushing in different directions no longer have entirely to be speculated upon. The AP found out the Moslem Brotherhood was cross with the military caretaker government for allowing – or maybe arranging – the release.

The interests in question don’t have to be guessed at either. The Brotherhood does not like foreign nationals “agitating” for reforms they themselves may or may not be prepared to endorse – particularly when the NGOs are aligned with the Brotherhood’s political rivals on the issues in question. But they are correct to insist that the right of political agitation over the form and substance of the Egyptian constitution belongs to the Egyptian people alone.

The military have their own reasons for accommodation with the United States, which has since affirmed the then-pending promise of military and economic aid – in the full amount. Between the military as caretaker government and the Brotherhood, it now appears, there was already sufficient tension to create the dialectical movement I was trying to explain.

So, even though the “specific causes, effects, and explanations to be made for these [waverings]… are not directly material to speculative philosophy,” it was wrong for me to attribute them to the influence of the big bourgeoisie. Or again, in this particular case, the conclusions of speculative philosophy were falsified by the facts. But that doesn’t make Mr. Friedman right about the “dragons.” On the contrary, subsequent events tends to confirm that the revolution in Egypt, among others is the Arab Spring, are bourgeois, and not Islamic, in nature and effect.

Some are succeeding and others are failing – have failed. The dialectical tally for the day might come as a surprise.